I Introduction

1.1. NATO and a comprehensive approach

1.1.1 Comprehensive approach

NATO recognises that the military cannot resolve crisis or conflict by itself. Modern crises and conflicts are often not related to the military and therefore require assistance from outside the military. The operating environment involves complex and interlinked areas such as ethnic, religious, ideological and technological issues. Crisis management requirements have expanded in terms of duration, tasks carried out, actors involved, complexity and multitude of factors (social, economic, environmental...).

Achieving acceptable and sustainable solutions requires capabilities that the military alone cannot provide. A comprehensive political, civilian, and military approach is necessary to effectively manage today's complex crises. However, it requires a strong trust between all parties to make this approach possible. It is important for the military to recognize that sometimes non-military actors may not always support the military. A successful resolution to the conflict will depend on a mutual understanding of both the military's and the non-military actors' purpose, resolve, capabilities, and motivation.

At all levels, including the tactical one, NATO commanders must be empowered to conduct effective cooperation and coordination to execute operations. This should include working with international and indigenous local authorities and other non-military actors. Sometimes local actors can have more power than the formal leaders. There is the importance for shared understanding engendered through cooperative working, liaison, education and common language. The Alliance also stresses the value of collaborative working based upon mutual trust and a willingness to cooperate. In this sense institutional familiarity and information sharing are the key.

Comprehensive approach can be understood as a concept, philosophy or mind-set rather than a documented process or capability. Therefore it is also better to speak of “a” comprehensive approach instead of “the” comprehensive approach. Furthermore, this phrasing suggests flexibility in its characteristics instead of a standardized blueprint. Different operational circumstances will ultimately affect non-military actors’ procedures in working with the military. Moreover, NATO decided to not develop and publish any definition on what comprehensive approach exactly is, not to claim ownership. Rather, NATO encourages all responders to a crisis to participate within a comprehensive approach for improving the overall success of the international community's mission. Thus, comprehensive approach
is a mind-set aiming for synergies by coordinating or at least de-conflicting political, humanitarian, development and security efforts.

### 1.1.2 NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach

The focus of NATO is upon the collaborative role for better understanding, informing and working with partner nations and non-NATO-entities. In this context, there are three goals to NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach:

a. Improve the coherent application of the Alliance's own crisis management instruments, including its military and political planning procedures.

b. Improve the Alliance's practical cooperation at all levels with partners, the UN and other relevant international organizations, governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), contractors, commercial partners and local actors when planning and conducting operations.

c. Enhance the Alliance's ability to support stabilization and reconstruction efforts in all phases of a conflict in concert with other actors.

NATO contributes to a comprehensive approach through four key areas: planning and execution of military operations; training, education, exercises and lessons learned; interaction with non-military actors; and strategic communications. In the area of planning, the important requirement is to cooperate with other non-military actors to identify interdependencies of the respective objectives as this will be a factor for mission success. The role of the military force must be carefully considered since achieving military objectives alone will not necessarily lead to the end state.

Although implementing a comprehensive approach may vary between the levels of operation (strategic, operational and tactical), and from one crisis to another, a number of guiding principles apply:

- Proactive engagement between all actors, both before and during a crisis.
- The importance of shared understanding engendered through cooperative working, liaison, education and a common language.
- The value of collaboration, based upon mutual trust and a willingness to cooperate, promote institutional familiarity and information sharing.
- Thinking focused on outcomes, ensuring that all actors work towards a common goal (or outcome) and ideally, mutually agreed objectives underpinned, in the absence of unity of effort, by harmonization of effort.
- Acknowledging the decision-making autonomy of partner organizations.

### 1.2. Civil-military interaction

NATO's engagement in a comprehensive approach to resolve crises is facilitated through civil-military interaction (CMI), which applies to all military bodies and at all
levels. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) functions are the main facilitator. Facilitation is done through CIMIC activities including liaison and assessments, as well as planning, coordination with other capabilities/functions involved in CMI and enabling local legitimized authorities working to resolve the crisis. CMI is defined as:

“A group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, thereby mutually increases the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises.”

Thus, CMI enables processes that are necessary for building and maintaining relationships with non-military actors. It aims at expanding own knowledge networks and developing shared situational understanding of the civil environment with other relevant actors. Due to the fact that diversity of non-military actors is the reality in almost all operations, unity of effort will be hard to achieve; rather harmonization of efforts should be aimed upon to avoid negative impacts for the civil environment and for own operations.

1.2.1 Levels of interaction

Depending on the type of interaction, certain responsibilities will be expected by the counterpart. The levels of interaction range from coexistence to cooperation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>the state or condition of existing at the same time or in the same place. Generally no direct interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>seeking the opinion or advice of other actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-confliction</td>
<td>process of avoiding undesirable interference among actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>process of bringing together different elements of a complex activity into an efficient relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>process of acting together for mutual benefit</td>
</tr>
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Possible levels of interaction between responders to a crisis.

1.2.2 Civil-military interaction principles

The following CMI principles are (non-exhaustive) guidelines for an effective CMI:
1.3. CIMIC in operations

CIMIC is applied across the full spectrum of operations, domains and environments. However, as operating environments are different, the emphasis between the CIMIC core functions may change. Combat operations require a different quantum of CIMIC activities compared to stabilization or disaster relief operations. The principles of CIMIC remain the same, but the emphasis between the core functions may change.

CIMIC’s main effort – within the CIMIC core function “support to the force” - is the CIMIC contribution to operations planning (e.g. to targeting or de-conviction of mass movements). The CIMIC estimate and assessment has to support to mitigate effects of the civil environment on our military mission and vice versa.

Due to the tempo of operations early synchronization efforts with the host nation (HN) and non-military actors is necessary. High operational tempo and changing situations demand a continuously updated, comprehensive situational awareness at all times.

1.3.1 Combat

Combat operations may be required to directly defend NATO against an aggressor. The tempo of activities in combat is usually high with accelerated speed and scale of manoeuvre. The operating environment is characterized by the fact that the defence will first and foremost involve territory of the member states of the Alliance; those states are sovereign and generally fully-functioning. The relationship between the NATO force and the host nation (HN) is governed by long standing bilateral- and/or multi-lateral agreements, most notably the NATO status of forces agreements. Many NATO nations have their own structures and procedures in place.
to deal with most aspects of CIMIC in the event of armed conflict. Moreover, a joint task force deployed in a NATO nation can expect that some CIMIC functions will be undertaken by the host nation. Support to the civil environment will be a national responsibility and memoranda of understanding may cover many aspects of support to the force. Even where a NATO nation has been subjected to significant destruction, it is assumed that the national government will retain both the will and ability to organize and carry out civil reconstruction of the country, supported by international organizations other than NATO. CIMIC will focus on ‘Support the force’ as the HN and other responders will support the civil environment. CIMIC units liaise primarily with the HN at every level in order to benefit from HN capabilities to support the operations.

Specific characteristics of combat operations:

• The host nation is responsible for providing basic services to the population. During combat operations IOs/NGOs may fill in capability gaps as the second responder although they are likely to be fewer in areas of high intensity combat due to unsafe operating environments. During early stages of combat, accessibility into those areas could be limited or non-existent for them. The military commander, as the last resort, should be prepared to close civilian capability gaps (key civil life support, humanitarian issues, key civil infrastructure and civil administration) temporarily and to set the conditions for return of responsibility to non-military actors. Consequently, planning must be initiated in the early stages including clarifying responsibilities between the national government and the commander of a deployed force.

• Regardless of the nature of the operation; military forces will encounter civilians operating in and around the area of operations (AOO). A 100% evacuation is unrealistic. Refugees, internally displaced persons and evacuees might result in interference with Allied forces’ operations. The military has to be ready to support the control of civil mass movements to complement HN efforts. Military profile will be high, resulting in resource intensive activities and enhanced demand for CIMIC liaison to remainders of authorities and/or community leaders and existing international organizations (IOs) / non-governmental organization (NGOs). It is important that in the absence of (functioning) HN authorities the United Nations High Commissioner’s Office for Refugees (UNHCR) is the designated UN agency responsible for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. As such they will support the HN. The control of civilian movement, as well as the use of infrastructure (MSRs, APODs/ SPODs) would be vital areas of coordination with the HN. If a mass movement is expected to hamper operations, the military, through (CIMIC) liaison, may have to support HN authorities and IOs/NGOs, facilitating their involvement through appropriate actions.

• The adversary might target civilians by destroying vital infrastructure or use other means to destabilize the society, like minority tensions. Moreover, (major) CIMIC sites of significance, e.g. vital/critical energy infrastructure, have to be taken into
1.3.2 Crisis response

Crisis response operations include multifunctional operations, which contribute to conflict prevention and resolution, humanitarian purposes or crisis management in pursuit of declared Alliance objectives. Crisis response operations may be as demanding and intense as combat operations. They can be differentiated into:

- **CIMIC staff** should cooperate with the host nation to integrate the influx of humanitarian aid and development organizations. Basic civil infrastructure and life sustaining systems (such as water supply or power) may have been destroyed during the operation or exist in such poor condition that a rapid reaction will be needed.
- **CIMIC projects** will be of lesser significance in combat operations. If conducted, they should focus on crisis management and compensation of negative effects for the civil environment and enhancement of the countries’ resilience. 

Military contribution to peace support. Peace support may take place in the context of both inter-state and intra-state conflict, which imposes challenges to the military due to the multifaceted nature of security activity. Civil-military liaison is key to facilitate effective CMI.

- **Non-combatant evacuation operations**. Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are national diplomatic initiatives, with NATO forces participating in a supporting role. In preparation for and during the execution of a NEO, the commander should consider establishing a mission-tailored CIMIC liaison element to facilitate interaction with non-military actors in order to avoid friction, competition for resources or duplication of effort. To achieve this, CIMIC liaison must be established as soon as possible, initially as part of an operational liaison and reconnaissance team (OLRT).

Military contribution to humanitarian assistance. Military contribution to humanitarian assistance is intended to support the efforts of the host nation civil authorities, who have the primary responsibility to provide assistance in these cases. IOs and NGOs provide assistance. Generally, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) facilitates dialogue and interaction between civil and military organizations.

Counter irregular activities. Countering irregular activities requires NATO forces to have an understanding of the particular character and root causes of the conflict, its context and its participants. Counter-irregular activities fall into three categories (counter-insurgency, counterterrorism and counter-criminality) of which the categories with the most relevance for CIMIC is counter-insurgency (COIN). CIMIC is to facilitate activities in partnership with the contested authorities and other stakeholders, in order to contribute to a creation of an environment in which civil organizations can effectively operate.
II NATO organization and other military actors

2.1. NATO CIMIC

2.1.1 Fundamentals

**Definition.** Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is a joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of civil-military interaction with diverse non-military actors.

The aim of CIMIC is to support the mission objectives by establishing and maintaining cooperation with non-military actors within the area of operations. Ideally all actors will work to a common goal. Where this is not possible, interaction will ensure that activities are harmonized as far as possible to avoid negative impacts on own operations as well as on non-military operations and the civil environment. This will minimize interference or unintended conflicts between different actors.

**Application.** CIMIC is applicable to all types of NATO operations. Commanders are required to assess and analyze the civil environment and apply the cross-cutting topics perspectives in all scenarios when planning and conducting military operations. These considerations include the appreciation that large numbers of non-military actors will be present in the area of operations. The application and profile of CIMIC depends on the type of operation, the civil environment, and the relationship with non-military actors.

**Principles.** CIMIC principles are fundamentals that guide commanders, staff and forces in the planning and conduct of operations. These principles contribute to a successful implementation of a comprehensive approach with CIMIC as the facilitator of civil-military interaction (CMI).

a. **Understand the civil environment**

   Understanding the civil environment is crucial for mission success and conflict resolution. The commander requires a comprehensive picture of the civil
environment for mission planning and execution because, for example even an
unintended violation of the (local) traditions and customs can lead to a loss of
support of the population and the trust of non-military actors. In turn, this can
lead to the military forces losing their legitimacy, which would seriously
undermine the mission.

b. **Understand the aims and objectives of all non-military actors**
   Commanders and staff must fully understand the mandate, aims and objectives,
   role, structure, methods and principles of non-military actors. Establishing and
   maintaining strong relationships prior to and during operations ensures mutual
   understanding. Non-military actors can also use these relationships to develop
   an understanding of how liaison with the military can benefit their objectives.

c. **Respect civilian primacy**
   Governments, and in some cases non-military actors, are and should remain
   responsible for the provision of basic needs and services. The military’s first
   priority is to accomplish its mission. The military should only give additional
   support to non-military actors if it is required to accomplish the mission. Any
   support to non-military actors should be given as quickly and efficiently as
   possible in order to not detract from the military’s focus.

d. **Act with integrity**
   When interacting with non-military actors it is crucial to demonstrate openness,
   competence, capability and resolve to gain respect, trust and confidence
   between all actors and so engender successful relationships. A high degree of
   transparency, balanced by the needs of operational security, avoids
   misunderstanding and mitigates the risk of the military force losing legitimacy.
   The military should manage expectations and communicate in advance what
   realistically can be achieved.

e. **Integrate planning with non-military actors**
   By engaging non-military actors, commanders are able to encourage
   collaborative analysis, integrated planning and interaction in the joint operations
   area, thereby supporting unity of purpose and effort. CIMIC will enhance
   integrated civil-military planning and the development of a process and structure
   for effective coordination and cooperation with non-military actors.

f. **Establish effective relationships and communication with non-military actors**
   Commanders and their staffs should develop personal relationships with non-
   military actors, using civil-military liaison, and make mindful decisions on the
   degree of reliance on those actors for critical tasks. Establishing relationships
   must be planned, quickly built and continually reinforced. The relationship can be
   used to ensure that all communication is conducted in line with the
   communication strategy.

When sharing information (see Figure below) it is important not to compromise the
position or impartiality of specific non-military actors and to avoid the perception
that their organizations are part of an intelligence gathering mechanism.
Communication and information systems should be as interoperable as possible.
This requires an interface to enable the transfer of information between the military and civilian networks.

Effective information sharing with non-military actors

2.1.2 CIMIC core functions

CIMIC has the following core-functions:

- civil-military liaison;
- support to the force; and
- support to non-military actors and the civil environment.

Each require the Alliance and its members to have capabilities of sufficient quality and quantity to be able to conduct CIMIC.

Civil-military liaison

Under the concept of comprehensive approach, NATO has instituted broader coordination with non-military actors. NATO liaison therefore includes military-military as well as civil-military interactions, with CIMIC focusing on the latter. The aim of civil-military liaison is to establish and maintain liaison with non-military actors at appropriate levels. It is facilitating interaction, harmonization, information sharing and supporting concerted or integrated planning and conduct of operations. Early liaison will be a fundamental part of the planning and development process of both of the other core CIMIC functions.

Civil-military liaison includes but is not limited to:

- timely identification of relevant non-military actors;
- developing a liaison structure including a notification mechanism; and
Support to the force

Commanders will require non-military support from within their joint operations area as well as coordination of efforts to minimize disruption to military operations. The force may be partially dependent on civilian resources and information from civilian sources. For that reason, CIMIC plays a proactive role by contributing to planning and conduct of operations. This includes, in cooperation with other military functions actions to:

- gather, assess and report information regarding the civil environment;
- identify and assess key civil indicators and sensitive factors having a critical impact on the planning and conduct of operations;
- identify and assess the impact of the military operation on the civil environment;
- recommend how to mitigate the negative consequences or exploit the opportunities of military operations in respect to cross-cutting topics and legal obligations;
- identify and assess the impact of non-military activities influencing own operations;
- promote force acceptance and transparency;
- contribute to informing the civil society in the mission area in line with the communication effort led by strategic communications; and
- facilitate access to non-military resources, when needed.

Support to non-military actors and the civil environment

Within a comprehensive approach, military support to non-military actors and the civil environment will generally only be conducted if it is required to create conditions that support the accomplishment of the military mission. It may include a wide spectrum of resources such as information, personnel, material, communications facilities, specialist expertise or training. Facilitating this military support towards non-military actors is a task of CIMIC. The support itself can be provided by all elements of the military. A staggered approach should:

- support by means of capacity and information sharing;
- enable support by means of capacity building; and
- support by military means (only as a last resort).

2.2. CIMIC Organization

This sub chapter is mainly based on Allied Command Operations Manual AM 86-1-1, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Chapter 2 (TTP2).

2.2.1 CIMIC assets

General
CIMIC assets - as a pillar of the CIMIC capabilities - are organized to facilitate the contributions to CMI, in order to increase both effectiveness and efficiency, dialogue and, to the extent possible, practical cooperation at all levels with relevant non-military actors. CIMIC contribution to NATO operations, will be achieved through:

- CIMIC staff elements;
- CIMIC units;
- CIMIC functional specialists;
- CIMIC reach back;

1. CIMIC staff elements:
   Operate at all levels of command integrating CIMIC into the headquarters battle rhythm and coordinating with upper and subordinate CIMIC staff elements and CIMIC units. Their role is to continually assess the civil environment and advise the commander on any impact it may have on the mission and vice-versa. These CIMIC staff elements facilitate CMI for the entire headquarters and command. CIMIC staff elements can temporarily augment the headquarters CIMIC branch at every level of command.

2. CIMIC units:
   CIMIC units are assigned to the different levels of command, as determined within the operations plan. A CIMIC unit executes tasks assigned by the commander, to achieve CIMIC objectives in close coordination with the CIMIC staff elements of the level of command the CIMIC unit is assigned to. CIMIC units at higher tactical level have the ability to execute command and control over subordinate CIMIC units within the appropriate span of control. CIMIC unit size and organisation may vary in accordance with operational needs depending on the mission and environment. Command and control relationships, hierarchical structures and integration of enablers must be considered when developing the plan for the employment of CIMIC assets. The size, organization, composition, and function of CIMIC units will differ, depending on the contributing nation policy, doctrine and structure. Regardless of national organization, all CIMIC units offered to NATO for planning will be required to meet the principal and enabling requirements of the approved NATO Capability Codes.

3. CIMIC functional specialists:
   Military or civilian experts in well-determined civil areas of expertise who can perform tasks within their speciality.

4. CIMIC reach back:
   Currently a national capability to provide background information, subject matter expertise and supporting assessments from a remote location.
National CIMIC assets

A CIMIC unit is identified as a generic CIMIC asset which supports a specific military formation. It could be at platoon, company or battalion level, depending on the nation's capabilities.

CIMIC Battalion / CIMIC Group

A CIMIC battalion is usually deployed at corps level and component command level with following principal and enabling capabilities:

- to exercise command and control of the assigned CIMIC companies;
- to integrate all products generated by the CIMIC companies, providing a continuous analysis of the civil environment at corps level or above, highlighting vulnerabilities which might affect the success of the mission and recommending mitigating measures;
- to deploy and execute CIMIC tasks regardless physical and environmental conditions (weather, time, terrain, location);
- be organized and trained with regard to force protection in all its aspects.

CIMIC Company

A CIMIC company is usually deployed at divisional level with following principal and enabling capabilities:

- to exercise command and control of the support platoon and assigned CIMIC platoons;
- to integrate all products generated by the CIMIC platoons and will provide a continuous analysis of the civil environment at divisional level, highlighting vulnerabilities which might affect the success of the mission and recommending mitigating measures;
- to deploy and execute CIMIC tasks regardless physical and environmental conditions (weather, time, terrain, location);
- be organized and trained with regard to force protection in all its aspects.

CIMIC Platoon / CIMIC Detachment

A CIMIC platoon is usually employed in support of a manoeuvre brigade/battle group, to cover the core functions:

- Civil-military liaison,
- Support to the force, and
- Support to non-military actors and the civil environment.

CIMIC Functional Specialists
CIMIC functional specialists are military or civilian experts in civil administration, humanitarian assistance, civil infrastructure, economy, commerce and cultural affairs. This list is not exhaustive. CIMIC functional specialists can be assigned to a CIMIC staff element, a CIMIC unit or supporting with their expertise from outside the area of operation.

Functional specialists should be:
- capable of performing tasks in their areas of expertise;
- capable of assisting in the planning process or conducting CIMIC projects and activities;
- capable of deploying and executing their tasks regardless physical and environmental conditions (weather, time, terrain, location);
- organized and trained with regard to force protection in all its aspects.

**Multinational CIMIC Group**

The Multinational CIMIC Group is the NATO CIMIC specialized unit, projected for the civil-military cooperation at tactical and operational level, to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and serve as an essential forum for CIMIC consultations and as a centre of expertise for CIMIC related matters.

In accordance with its Operational Concept, the Multinational CIMIC Group can meet NATO CIMIC requirements by:
- augmenting the CIMIC staff element at different levels;
- form one or more CIMIC units at the tactical level;
- form the defined CIMIC elements at operational level;
- augment, if required, the CIMIC units on the tactical and operational level with functional specialists or supporting them from the Multinational CIMIC Group peace time location headquarters.

The entire Multinational CIMIC Group headquarters can be deployed to support the operational level for one single rotation of no more than six months. To sustain long lasting operations, a flexible and tailored structure has been foreseen in the Multinational CIMIC Group concept. This structure, which can be considered a CIMIC group minus (CIMIC GRP (-)), can support parent headquarters as a CIMIC element at theatre level but also as a CIMIC unit. The Multinational CIMIC Group (-), formed by a tailored Multinational CIMIC Group headquarters (-) and Multinational CIMIC Group participating nations CIMIC units, is designed to support up to one major joint operation and it is sustainable by Multinational CIMIC Group and its participating nations for more rotations of six months. The Multinational CIMIC Group headquarters (-) is smaller in size but can perform the same tasks as the entire Multinational CIMIC Group headquarters, having the same capabilities to respond to the CIMIC core functions and relying on logistic and communication and information service support from the assigned parent headquarters.
2.2.2 Generic staff functions

CIMIC relations to other staff functions must be established and, at all levels, the integration must be supported by a constant dialogue between J/X 9 branch and other branches. It is also extremely important that the CIMIC staff is involved in the operations planning process. Even if other branches are having relations with the civil environment, it must be clear that the J/X 9 branch remains the focal point in dealing with the civil environment. One of the main tools to support the planning is the CIMIC assessment. Formats can vary from mission to mission, adapted to the situation. For that reason CIMIC staff must be included on ground reconnaissance missions and should maintain close contact with relevant civil organizations and government officials in the run-up to an operation.

The Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (ACO COPD) is the basic reference document for planning staffs within the NATO Command Structure. It shapes the operations planning process. It addresses all aspects of an operations plan and provides guidance on the conduct and methods of planning as well as the factors to be taken into consideration during the development of a plan. It also specifies the standard structure and content of operation plans. As such, it can be a reference for the planning at tactical levels, especially for headquarters operating at the high end of the tactical level.

Functional planning guides provide planning guidance in specific functional areas. In general, the functional planning guides mirror the areas covered in the list of typical annexes to the main body of a Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive or operations plan. In the specific field of CIMIC the reference tool is the CIMIC Functional Planning Guide.

2.2.3 CIMIC within naval forces

Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) is to provide command and control for the full spectrum of Alliance joint maritime operations and tasks and is the principal maritime advisor to the Alliance. MARCOM has overall responsibility to SACEUR for all Alliance Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) tasking and activities, which includes planning, preparation, execution, evaluation and organizational matters.

Maritime security operations are operations conducted in cooperation with national authorities and international organizations (IOs) to counter the threats, and mitigate the risks, of illegal activities. They aim to safeguard the Alliance's strategic interests, security and stability by contributing to mitigate gaps in current national law enforcement capacity. Maritime forces may conduct operations to counter maritime crime, if this is regarded as a de-stabilizing factor for the nation/region or funding terrorist organizations. This necessitates close coordination among governments, law enforcement, the private sector, IOs and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Conducting maritime security operations requires authority to exchange information and the ability to communicate, plan and coordinate with a variety of relevant non-military actors. Cooperation with the countries’ navies/coast guard forces, maritime authorities; flag state, port state, national shipping authorities, jurisdiction and other departments responsible for the coastal areas and adjacent sea areas is fundamental for the commander. In the maritime environment, some of the most significant factors are merchant navies, which are likely to be present in the area of operations and wish to continue their passage with minimal interference. Merchant shipping aims, methods and perspectives may have to be reconciled with those of NATO so that the operational commander's mission can be fulfilled. The joint task force will interface effectively with merchant shipping through NCAGS (NCAGS) and the Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System (AWNIS). NCAGS and AWNIS have certain unique characteristics and are global concepts being implemented by NATO nations, partner nations, non-NATO nations and other regional shipping organizations. NCAGS is the provision of NATO military cooperation, guidance, advice, assistance and supervision to merchant shipping in support of the commander's mission to enhance the safety of participating merchant ships and to support military operations. The aim of AWNIS is to contribute to freedom of navigation by the provision of safety and security of navigation information for military and merchant ships in support of maritime operations.

NCAGS and AWNIS are contributing to a comprehensive approach in close cooperation with CIMIC on all levels of command. NCAGS and AWNIS inherent relationships with the merchant shipping industry facilitate the de-confliction of military and commercial shipping operations. Within the CMI context, NCAGS and AWNIS coordinate with military and non-military actors; including military maritime security agencies, government departments / agencies, law enforcement agencies, international and non-governmental organizations in support of the commander's mission.

Maritime CIMIC assets

The NATO Shipping Centre (NSC) is an integral and permanent element of MARCOM and provides the single point of contact between the NATO and merchant shipping industries for the voluntary exchange of pertinent information, provision of the merchant shipping element of the recognized maritime picture to the military and the provision of appropriate risk information to the merchant industry.

There will be one safety of navigation information coordinator at the MCC level or above for the entire area, even if there is more than one NATO or non-NATO operation going on.

Deployable NCAGS elements are capable of sustained worldwide deployment, conducting NCAGS operations independently or as an integrated part of a naval task force/group.
For the template "port assessment" see annex.

### 2.3. Integration/ relations

CIMIC staff is fully integrated into the respective HQ's operations; this includes representation in key multi-disciplinary/ cross-functional groups as part of the overall battle rhythm and through normal inter-relationships for managing/dealing with operational working. Figure "CIMIC staff relations and interactions" shows as an example the broad interaction in a higher tactical (joint) staff between the J/X9 staff division and internal branches/organizations on operations.

Staff layouts may differ in different echelons, but the principles of integration remain the same. CIMIC is integrated in all phases (pre-operational, operational, transition). Tasks/activities are different though (see Chapter 5 and 6).

CIMIC staff relations and interactions

Besides the different staffs and functions, CIMIC is related to other capabilities as follows:

#### 2.3.1 Strategic communications

Strategic communications (StratCom) effects must be integrated in CIMIC planning and execution of activities at all levels because they influence the perceptions and decision-making of key audiences and leaders, thereby assisting mission accomplishment. To ensure coherence of messaging, CIMIC staff should
participate in the communication planning cycle including the StratCom working group and the information activities coordination board, alongside more routine public affairs and StratCom coordination meetings.

2.3.2 Information operations

CIMIC activities assist the commander in shaping the information environment and perceptions. In addition to civil-military liaison, CIMIC staff will establish relationships with a variety of non-military actors and thereby establish a valuable source of information to support Info Ops planning. To secure the desired influence, planned and regular key leader engagement will be essential. The CIMIC staff will lead and facilitate civil-military liaison.

2.3.3 Psychological operations

Psychological operations and CIMIC can be mutually supporting. CIMIC interaction with civil agencies and populations will aid wider knowledge development and assist with understanding the information environment and the audiences within it. Psychological operations may affect the attitudes of population groups and therefore make an area more permissive for CIMIC.

2.3.4 Special operations

Special operations (SOF) and CIMIC can mutually support each other in their efforts. SOF can provide a military enhancement to the civilian mission, making improvements in the local community.

2.3.5 Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence

Local civilian authorities have prime responsibility for dealing with CBRN incidents within their jurisdiction but, if their resources are inadequate, they may request military assistance. CIMIC should facilitate the coordination between own forces and the stakeholders involved.

2.3.6 Electronic warfare

The broad and increasing usage of the electromagnetic environment (EME) by different types of actors, affects critical infrastructure. It is therefore critical to coordinate own activities with various actors, friendly or neutral, to avoid or minimize undesired effects. CIMIC has a facilitating function.

2.3.7 Counter improvised explosive devices (C-IED)
Counter-IED measures are primarily done by military and law enforcement. It involves a comprehensive approach of countering the threat networks that employ improvised explosive devices (IEDs), defeating the devices themselves, and training others. Counter-IED, or C-IED, is usually part of a broader counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, or law enforcement effort. Because IEDs are a subset of a number of forms of asymmetric warfare used by insurgents and terrorists, C-IED activities are principally directed against adversaries and not only against IEDs. CIMIC facilitates the civil-military interaction with relevant civil agencies and the populace.

2.3.8 Force protection

CIMIC activities have the potential for promoting acceptance of NATO operations, thereby helping to reduce incidents against the NATO-led force and contributing to the overall force protection effort. This can be achieved through trust and confidence that can be developed by unbiased liaison with all relevant actors and equally balanced support to different recipients. Further, CIMIC may receive information through its liaison that can be useful for improving force protection, such as information on the overall acceptance of the force amongst the population or warnings on current threats.

2.3.9 Targeting

NATO uses the joint targeting process and the information operations processes to identify targets and decide on applicable effects. CIMIC assessments as well as CIMIC liaison activities are an essential contribution to the targeting process. CIMIC assists in identifying critical infrastructure (sites of significance/sites of major significance) and principal actors within the joint operations area, supports the development of the no-strike list and provides an overall assessment of the impact of any military activity on the civil environment (and non-military actors). It is essential to harmonize and synchronize all actions at all levels to prevent unintended detrimental effects.

2.3.10 CIMIC input to staff functions

The list below reflects other possible staff functions in a joint structure and is not exhaustive. For more staff functions, see figure “CIMIC staff relations and interactions”.

J/X 1: Terms and conditions of service for locally employed civilians. Identification and provision of specialist manpower (e.g. linguists). Responsible to organize functional specialists.

J/X 2: Input to development of joint collection plans: J2 may use information derived from the CIMIC process. Cooperation between J2 and J9 is the most
important relation to enhance Situational Awareness and to achieve Situational Understanding.

J/X 3/5: Active involvement in the conduct of current operations. Accounting for the effect of current operations on the civil environment, particularly the population. Awareness of the effect of the civil environment on own operations. Inclusion of civil factors in short term planning.

J/X 4: Usage of lines of communication and de-confliction with civil usage. Host nation support/civil-military resource management.

J/X 5: Integration of CIMIC into long-term plans, both prior to an operation and in the execution phase (e.g. branch/sequel plans, transition planning).

J/X MILENG: CIMIC staff should facilitate the interaction between military engineering (MILENG) and relevant non-military actors. The commander must balance the requirements for MILENG efforts in support of operations and assistance to non-military actors.

2.3.11 Staff Advisory Group

The staff advisory group (SAG) contributes to a comprehensive approach, conducting civil-military interaction routinely and have direct or indirect links, relationships and need for coordination with CIMIC staff. Close relations are key to get a deep Situational Understanding. Members of a SAG can include but are not limited to:

- political advisor;
- legal advisor;
- gender advisor;
- medical advisor;
- provost marshal;
- special operations forces advisor;
- StratCom advisor; and
- public affairs advisor.

2.4. Civil Affairs

This sub chapter is mainly based on the US Army Field Manual 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, dated 16 MAY 2018.

2.4.1 US Civil Affairs (CA) Breakdown “The What, the Who, and the Where”

US Civil Affairs (CA) Definition:
Designated active component and reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations.

Role

The role of CA is to understand, engage, and influence unified action partners and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), conduct military government operations\(^\text{15}\) (MGO), enable civil-military operations\(^\text{16}\) (CMO), and provide civil considerations expertise through the planning and execution of civil affairs operations\(^\text{17}\) (CAO). This role, founded in policy, directive, and joint doctrine, clearly depicts the reason why the CA branch was established and the unique contributions it provides to the US army and US Department of Defense (DOD). CA forces are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to plan and execute CAO across the range of military operations, engaging the civil component (IPI, unified action partners, other civil entities, and interagency) to support the joint force commander's (JFC's) CMO concept. Senior-level CA planning and policy representation across army and DOD agencies is required to ensure proper integration and early determination of requirements.

The intent of CAO is to enhance stability, set conditions for the mitigation or defeat of threats to civil society, and to assist in establishing local government capability or enhancing its capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats.
CORE COMPETENCIES AND FUNCTIONS

CA forces execute CA core competencies and functions. The CA branch provides three core competencies nested within CAO. The core competencies nest within the commander's overall responsibility for planning and executing CMO. CA functions are structured under each competency, organizing tasks and systems (people,
organizations, information, and processes) into executable capabilities to achieve the desired effects.

The functions nested under the core competencies are capabilities executed to accomplish the designated role of the branch. The CA branch has the overall responsibility to perform these functions; however, not every organization within the branch has the capability or requirement to fully execute every function.

CAO consist of the following core competencies and their nested functions:

**Civil Affairs activities (CAA)**
- Civil reconnaissance (CR)
- Civil engagement (CE)
- Civil information management (CIM)
- Civil-military operations center (CMOC)
- CAO staff support

**Military government operations (MGO)**
- Transitional military authority
- Support to civil administration (SCA)

**Civil Affairs supported activities (CASA)**
- Foreign assistance
- Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA)
- Populace and resources control (PRC)
- Civil-military engagement (CME)

**BRANCH CHARACTERISTICS**
Branch characteristics are nested with the core competencies and functions of CA and apply to the branch as a whole. The CA branch is:

**Civil component oriented.** CA is the commander’s primary tool for civil considerations during military operations. They focus on personal interaction and the management of civil information to develop the commander’s situational understanding of the civil component.

**Culturally attuned.** CA is aware of cultural nuances, divergent world views, biases, prejudices, and stereotypes that affect both the civil component and military operations.

**Engagement focused.** CA engages IPI and unified action partners to establish and maintain relationships and communication channels in order to enhance and influence the relationship between military forces and the civil component.

**Civil information management focused.** CA formations collect, collate, process, analyze, and evaluate civil data in order to produce valuable and timely information for dissemination.

**Military government focused.** CA supports or executes the functions of civil administration during transitional military authority or SCA missions.

**Skilled integrators and coordinators.** CA integrates and coordinates with IPI and unified action partners to facilitate information flow, synchronize efforts, and promote mission legitimacy. CA understands that relationships and coordination between affected parties enhance or enable successful mission accomplishment.

**Diplomatically astute.** CA understands the sensitive political aspects of military operations. They establish relationships with formal and informal leaders of influence and carefully manage those relationships to achieve positive outcomes during diplomatically sensitive interactions.

**Skilled as negotiators and mediators.** CA negotiates and mediates with and between IPI and unified action partners to further US objectives and resolve conflict.

**Stability oriented.** The CA core competencies provide required and reinforcing effects to the decisive action tasks of offense and defense, but they are most directly aligned in support of stability tasks.

**Language capable.** CA employs language skills and interpreters in order to enhance the execution of the core competencies of the branch.

**Critical and adaptive thinkers.** CA forces are self-directed, self-disciplined, self-monitored, and self-correcting in their ability to apply the elements of thought to the topics, situations, problems, and opportunities they encounter. When confronted by
unanticipated circumstances during the execution of a planned military operation or event, they are able to make adjustments within the context of the plan to either exploit the advantage or minimize the impact, thereby assuring a more successful outcome.

**BRANCH PRINCIPLES**

CA principles provide comprehensive and fundamental rules or assumptions of central importance that guide how CA approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations and captures the broad and enduring guidelines for the employment of CA forces. The principles include the following:

a) **CA only executes missions that support the commander's objectives.** All actions planned, programmed, or undertaken by CA must be tied to the commander's objectives and directly support unified land operations. Operating outside this context reduces the effectiveness of U.S. operations and misuses finite resources.

b) **Stability is the framework for CAO.** CAO play an important role in supporting all army operations—offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities. Although the CA core competencies provide capabilities across the range of military operations, they are most directly aligned in support of the six primary stability tasks:

   - Establish civil security.
   - Establish civil control.
   - Restore essential services.
   - Support to governance.
   - Support the economic and infrastructure development.
   - Conduct security cooperation.

c) **The civil component is a critical factor in all military operations.** Military operations always have a degree of involvement (assistance, interference, or influence) with the civil component. CA plays a vital role in preparing, planning, and integrating courses of action that involve the civil component, reducing the friction between U.S. forces and the local populations and mitigating their impact on military operations.

d) **CA is civil component oriented.** The CA core competencies revolve around the identification of civil strengths and vulnerabilities with the goal of mitigating causes of instability. These CA competencies enable U.S. forces to engage unified action
partners, the IPI, the threats, and the causes and conditions that give rise to the threats.

e) CA must not be tasked as active collectors of threat information. CA missions are dependent upon engaging and developing relationships with the civil component of the operational environment. Through the course of these interactions, information is gathered that supports the development of civil considerations. A clear distinction must be made between civil and threat information. However, as every soldier is a sensor, CA forces will report information that they perceive as a threat or potential threat through normal channels. It is inappropriate and detrimental to the CA mission to task CA forces to actively collect threat information. If the civil component perceives that CA is acting on behalf of intelligence organizations (rather than a resolver of civil component issues), CA forces lose the credibility and access required to establish and maintain these critical relationships. This could have major negative impacts on the commander’s mission, creating additional protection risks for the CA branch overall.

f) Military analysts, in conjunction with CA personnel, conduct civil considerations analysis and evaluation for CA formations. The evaluation of civil information that leads to the identification of civil strength and vulnerabilities is a multifaceted problem that requires inter-branch coordination and cooperation. CA personnel collect, collate, and process civil information as part of the civil information management process. Trained military intelligence analysts within CA formations, in conjunction with CA personnel, then conduct in-depth analysis of this civil information to deduce, distinguish, and categorize relationships and networks from this information. That analysis is then evaluated and interpreted by CA personnel in order to assess, predict, validate, and determine the impact of ongoing CAO and CMO and to the commander’s overall mission. Leaders then use this evaluation to create adaptive plans and innovative solutions to the commander’s mission challenges.

g) CAO are an information-related capability. CAO involve direct interaction with IPI and institutions and unified action partners for the collection, collation, and dissemination of civil information. They are a tool employed in the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions.

h) A comprehensive, interrelated knowledgebase is an invaluable asset. CA gathers civil data for analysis, evaluation, and transformation into actionable civil information within the operational area. This information is collated and maintained within a central repository. This base of knowledge is available for dissemination and sharing, and it is critical for understanding civil component trends and predicting civil impacts on military missions or military impacts on the IPI.

i) Regional and cultural competencies are essential to successful CAO. CA rely on engagements, relationships, and an understanding of the civil component to
effectively plan and execute CAO in support of the commander’s mission. Regional and cultural competencies are not only the skills needed to interact with people of different cultures but also the knowledge and understanding of how local cultures interact with one another and how the overall region functions.

j) **CAO are population centric.** CAO require direct interaction with indigenous populations in order to open up communications and foster trust, legitimacy, and cooperation.

k) **CA must analyze programs and projects for sustainability.** CA forces must ensure program and project sustainability. Equipment, facilities, and services should be to the standard of, transitioned to, and sustainable by the IPI. Unsustainable programs and projects can create false expectations and lead to unintended effects, such as loss of credibility and popular support.

l) **CAO mitigate civilian interference with military operations and the impact of military operations on the civil populace.** CA identifies and addresses friction points between military operations and the civil population. A hostile civilian population threatens the operations of friendly forces and can undermine mission legitimacy. A supportive civilian population can provide freedom of maneuver, resources, and information that facilitate friendly operations.

m) **CAO are nested with the joint construct of CMO.** CAO enhance the JFC’s planning, execution, and assessment of CMO through assessments, identification of civil considerations and population centric operational variables, integration of CAO and CMO plans into campaigns and operations.

**US ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCE STRUCTURE**

The US Army CA branch provides capabilities in support of joint and army requirements. These capabilities exist in both conventional force and special operations formations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Most of the army CA force is in the United States Army Reserve which consists of four regionally aligned Civil Affairs Commands (CACOMS) that support the geographic combatant commands. The Active Army CA force consists of a special operations brigade with regionally focused battalions and a conventional force battalion with regionally aligned companies as well as a global response force company.

The total US CA capability consists of approximately 7000 officers and enlisted personnel spread across 4 CACOMS, 10 brigades, 39 battalions, 168 companies, 840 CA teams, and various headquarters staff positions.

**2.4.2 US CA core competencies and functions (CCFs – Broken Down) “The How”**
The three CA core competencies nested within CAO describe the overarching capabilities that the CA branch provides. CA functions are aligned under the core competencies, organizing tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) into executable capabilities. These functions may be executed prior to, simultaneously with, or in the absence of other military operations, across the range of military operations and all levels of war. The following figure shows the nesting of the CA core competencies and functions.

**Civil Affairs core competencies and functions**

CA forces, from the civil affairs team to the civil affairs command, possess capabilities within their formations that support or execute CAO. Each CA organization has the ability to reach-back to a regionally aligned higher CA headquarters, as well as other entities that possess more robust capabilities and resources that can be applied to assist in the execution of missions.

**CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES**

Civil affairs activities is a core competency under the umbrella term of CAO, and are those activities specifically planned, executed, and assessed by CA forces, which provide unique capabilities to the commander. They are enduring capabilities that increase the commander’s understanding of, deliberate interaction with, and planning for the civil component, to include the means to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate unified action partners during unified land operations. This includes civil reconnaissance (CR), civil engagement (CE), civil information management (CIM), civil-military operations center (CMOC), and civil affairs operations (CAO) staff support. These functions are critical to the successful integration of IPI,
unified action partners, and the interagency into unified land operations and the understanding of civil considerations in support of the commander’s mission.

**Civil reconnaissance**

CR is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment. The civil information collection plan drives CR for the purpose of understanding the impacts of the civil component on military operations, the impacts of military operations on the civil component, and the development of assessments and running estimates, enhancing situational understanding and facilitating decision making. The purpose of CR as a function is to:

- Verify or refute information.
- Assess the operational environment.
- Locate, identify, survey, and observe areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE).
- Detect and monitor changes in the civil component.

CA forces conduct CR to gather civil information and assess or monitor effects of military operations on the civil component. CR is focused by the civil information collection plan, which synchronizes CA collection efforts with the commander’s critical information requirements and specific requests for information through the operations process. The outcomes from CR flow into the information gathering process of CIM, which adds to the understanding of civil considerations and ultimately become inputs to the commander’s common operational picture (COP).

**Civil engagement**

CE is the planned and targeted activities in which CA forces deliberately focus on the interaction with the IPI, unified action partners, and other civil entities. CA conducts CE to promote the relationship between military forces and the civil component. This enhances the commander’s understanding of the civil component and legitimizes the U.S. mission. CE may be conducted in person or by other means of communication. The purpose of CE, as a function, is to:

- Gather information.
- Validate assumptions.
- Facilitate operations.
- Coordinate efforts.
Collaborate with the civil component.

Deconflict operations between the civil populace and military.

Identify local influencers and other centers of gravity.

Resolve conflict.

Mitigate the impact of military operations on IPI.

Influence actions by civil entities.

Evaluate civil considerations.

Identify key influencers.

CA forces are trained in language, negotiations, and mediation techniques, as well as the ability to identify cultural nuances, divergent world views, motivations, biases, prejudices and stereotypes. The outcomes from CE flow into the information gathering process of CIM, which adds to the understanding of civil considerations and ultimately become inputs to the commander’s COP.

Civil information management

CA forces provide the commander with expertise on the civil component of the OE. CIM is the process whereby civil information is collected, analyzed and evaluated, and disseminated to the supported element, higher headquarters, and other US government and department of defense agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This process ensures the timely availability of raw and analyzed civil information to military forces throughout the area of operations in order to enhance the COP and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace process.
CIM is conducted in six steps that generate situational understanding through collection, collation, processing, and analysis and evaluation of information, leading to the production and dissemination of civil information products that are fused with supported units and can be shared with unified action partners. The following figure depicts the six step process.

Civil information management process

The data collected provides current civil component information for dissemination through the CIM process. Civil considerations are developed from data with relation to ASCOPE within the civil component of the commander's OE. The management of civil information is the fusion of analyzed data into the COP to enhance the supported commander, department of defense, interagency, international organizations, NGOs, and IPI situational dominance.

CIM is not solely a task of a CA unit's CIM cell. Every CA element has a role within CIM. CA forces should also actively incorporate the supported unit's information requirements into the civil information collection plan to enhance the COP and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace process. Every CA soldier has the ability to conduct basic analysis and evaluation of civil information, while CMOCs, CIM sections, and higher CA headquarters analysts conduct in depth analysis and evaluation of that civil information as part of the process that enhances the situational understanding of the supported commander and unified action partners.

Note: Army Techniques Publication 3-57.50, Civil Information Management, provides additional information on CIM.
Civil-military operations center

The CMOC function requires over-the-horizon and nontraditional communications capabilities to most effectively conduct interagency collaborative planning and coordination, integrate nonmilitary stakeholders to synchronize operations, and coordinate plans and operations with the civil component of the OE.

The CMOC serves as one of the primary coordination interfaces for U.S. forces with IPI, unified action partners, and the interagency. A CMOC is tailored to the specific tasks associated with the mission and augmented by assets (for example: engineer, medical, transportation) available to the supported commander and unified action partners. The CMOC facilitates continuous coordination among the key participants with regard to CAO and in support of the commander’s CMO plan in order to manage civil information, analyze civil considerations, and develop civil inputs to the COP. This occurs from tactical levels to strategic levels within a given area of operations depending on the level of the CMOC.

Note: Army Techniques Publication 3-57.70, Civil Military Operations Center, provides additional information on CMOC.

Civil liaison teams (CLTs) exist at the CACOM, CA brigade, and CA battalion (with the exception of the battalions in the 95th CA Brigade) levels. The CLTs are organic components of the CMOCs they support. The CLT extends the outreach of its parent CMOC into multiple areas. A civil liaison team provides limited civil-military interface capability as a spoke for the exchange of information between indigenous populations and institutions, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other governmental agencies, and has limited capability to link resources to prioritized requirements. The CLT is a stand-alone team for the CMOC that acts in the same role as a civil affairs team does for a supported battalion. The CLT provides the supported CMOC with a CR and CE capability for CAO and CMO coordination without interfering with the regular staff functions.

Civil affairs operations staff support

CAO staff support provides a dedicated planning, integration, and assessment capability to army and joint staffs from brigade to combatant command and special forces battalion to theater special operation command. CAO staff support during the military decision-making process (MDMP) and the joint planning process synchronizes, integrates, and coordinates the civil component with the commander’s CMO responsibilities and operational plans. CAO staff, in coordination with the CMOC, integrate and synchronize CR efforts to inform mission analysis, develop and update the COP, and update the civil information collection plan.
CAO staff support is provided in the following ways:

**J-9 Civil-military operations directorate.** The J-9 coordinates with military and civilian organizations that influence operations or campaigns. The J-9 normally leads the civil-military staff element and is an important asset in planning and coordinating CMO within the joint planning process. JFCs can establish a J-9 to plan, coordinate, conduct, and assess CMO within the joint planning process.

*Note:* Joint Publication 3-57, *Civil Military Operations*, provides additional information on the J-9 CMO directorate organization, staff functions, and responsibilities.

**Assistance chief of staff, G-9 (S-9), civil affairs operations.** The G-9/S-9 is the principle staff officer responsible for the planning, integrating, evaluating, and assessment of civil considerations into the MDMP and army design methodologies. The G-9/S-9 is designated to provide the commander with actionable civil information that will increase the commander’s awareness and understanding of the civil component, ensure efficient use of finite resources, and synchronize the efforts of unified action partners, IPI, and the interagency within the operational environment.


**Theater civil affairs planning team.** The T-CAPTs are permanent, five-person, regionally aligned planning teams that performs CAO and CMO planning, coordination, and integration at the theater level to enhance the geographic combatant commander’s strategic plans, campaigns, or operations and theater security cooperation plans and programs.

**Civil affairs planning team.** The CAPT is a planning augmentation element that can be requested to supplement J-9/G-9 staffs to facilitate and manage CAO in support of the commander’s CMO plan.

**In lieu of support.** CA companies are templated by rules of allocation against a brigade combat team that, by the modified table of organization and equipment, has a dedicated S-9. In a brigade combat team (or special forces group) without an assigned S-9 or at battalion level where there is not a dedicated S-9 position, the CA company commander (at brigade combat team level) or a team leader (at battalion level) might be required to perform the duties of the CAO staff officer. It is critical that CA officers and noncommissioned officers understand the army MDMP and
design methodologies and can incorporate civil data and information into all army planning processes.

**Security force assistance brigade civil affairs operations staff section.** The SFA brigade CAO staff section is responsible for training or advising foreign security force counterpart staff elements to enable them to engage and build rapport with civilian unified action partners, IPI, and independent foreign agencies within the operational environment. This section promotes foreign security forces’ capabilities to assess interests, functions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of civilian unified action partners, IPI, and independent foreign agencies in the operational area; reduces interference of noncombatant civilians with combat operations; and plans, coordinates, and conducts foreign humanitarian assistance projects that reduce civilian vulnerabilities to security and environmental threats.

**MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS**

Military government is the supreme authority the military exercises by force or agreement over the lands, property, and indigenous populations and institutions of domestic, allied, neutral, or enemy territory therefore substituting sovereign authority under rule of law for the previously established government (JP 3-57). It requires a long-term commitment and the application of resources that would support the newly established government long after combat forces were withdrawn from the region. CA forces’ unique civilian-acquired skills and deep understanding of the civil component within the operational environment combine to provide the army with a capability to establish military government now and into the future.

CAO includes activities that:

- Establish civil security, provide support to governance, provide essential services, support economic development and infrastructure, and establish civil control for civilian populations in occupied or liberated areas until such control can be returned to civilian or non-US military authority.

- Provide expertise in civilian sector functions that normally are the responsibility of civilian authorities. That expertise is applied to implement department of defense policies to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civilian sector functions.

- Establish and conduct military government until civilian authority or government can be restored.

Military government operations (MGO) are executed when, through the course of military operations, replacement or sustainment of civil authority is required to maintain stability and governance. MGO support the US diplomatic, informational, and military and economic instruments of national power abroad through executing governance tasks mandated by US policy and international law.
MGO are a core competency of CA forces within CAO. CA Soldiers are trained, educated, and organized to support or execute the functions of a civil administration during transitional military authority or support to civil administration. These operations are supported by CA generalists through assessments and initial identification of civil vulnerabilities and executed by military government experts through the provision of expertise in civilian sector functions that normally are the responsibility of civilian authorities. MGO are designed to enhance, rehabilitate, restore, or establish civilian sector functions and are executed by providing support to civil administration to an established civil authority or asserting transitional military authority until a civilian authority or government can be established.

When force is necessary and a territory is occupied by an army, military authority is imposed in accordance with the law of land warfare and international requirements. Military authority is asserted through the imposition of military government. The objective of military government is to establish civil control and stability in support of the US government stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The end state of which is a reconstructed indigenous government that emulates governing policies that are consistent with U.S. interests. Once an interim civilian government is established, military authority is exerted to support civil administration, whether that civil administration is imposed by the occupying power or is inherently indigenous.

**Transitional Military Authority**

Transitional military authority is defined as a temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority (FM 3-07). A variety of CA forces can support transitional military authority through the execution of civil affairs activity and civil affairs supported activities, while others are specifically trained and educated to conduct transitional military authority by applying civilian sector expertise to conduct government operations that are normally the responsibility of civilian authorities. Support to governance is one of six primary army stability tasks. CA provides transitional military authority assistance throughout the range of military operations and sometimes outside of the range of military operations, in order to meet life-sustaining needs of the population.

Within its capabilities, the occupying force must maintain an orderly government in the occupied territory and must have, as its ultimate goal, the creation of a legitimate and effective civilian government. During transitional military authority, the following terms apply:

**Military governor.** A military governor is the military commander or other designated person who, in an occupied territory, exercises supreme authority over the civil population subject to the laws and usages of war and to any directive received from the commander’s government or superior.
**Military government ordinance.** A military government ordinance is an enactment on the authority of a military governor promulgating laws or rules regulating the occupied territory under such control.

Support to governance is a stability task required for obtaining a stable population-centric operational environment. Transitional military authority enables commanders to achieve civil control and stability and enable civil security. The department of state has the lead on foreign policy and controls the majority of the resources which can be used under Title 22, United States Code, and the Foreign Assistance Act. These resources are typically tied to achieving U.S. interests. Once an interim civilian government is established, military resources are exerted to support civil administration.

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**Note:** U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, *Stability*, provides additional information on transitional military authority.

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**Support to civil administration**

Support of civil administration (SCA) is assistance given to a governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or interim civilian authority or supporting a reconstructed government. SCA occurs when military forces support department of state in the implementation of interim civil authority or US foreign policy in support of host nation (HN) internal defense and development. SCA supports the US diplomatic, informational, military and economic instruments of national power abroad through executing tasks affiliated with cooperative security, theater security cooperation, and foreign internal defense as a function of stability operations and irregular warfare.

The CA responsibilities during SCA missions are designed to support the commander's operational and support functions with respect to the continuity of government in a foreign nation or HN. Generally, these include the following:

- Identifying, validating, or evaluating foreign nation or HN essential service infrastructure.
- Assessing the needs of the IPI in terms of the CA functional areas.
- Monitoring and anticipating future requirements of the IPI in terms of the CA functional areas.
- Performing liaison functions between military and civilian agencies.
- Coordinating and synchronizing collaborative interagency or multinational SCA operations.
Participating in the execution of selected SCA operations as needed or directed.

Performing quality control assessments of SCA operations and costs.

Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of SCA operations.

Coordinating and synchronizing transition of SCA operations from military to indigenous government or international transitional government control.

Initiating or refining CIM process with geospatial projects that depict affected populations and civil vulnerabilities.

**Civil affairs military government capability**

There are 18 military government specialist capabilities and 8 other Army capabilities nested within 16 functional specialties that are aligned within the 5 functional specialty area framework. This provides the foundation of the Army's required military government. The following figure shows the hierarchal structure of the functional areas down to the functional specialists.
The CA military government capability is organized around five functional specialty areas based off the US government stability sectors. These functional specialty areas are:

**Security.** The CA security functional specialty area is concerned with civil security and public order that generates the foundational conditions for stability within the operational environment. This relates to the development and administration of policies, planning mechanisms, and training of partner nation public officials to respond to threats and hazards (man-made, natural, internal and external) across all levels of government. When required, the capabilities within this functional specialty area...
area can assist in the establishment and maintenance of a transitional military authority.

**Justice and reconciliation.** The CA justice and reconciliation functional specialty area is concerned with the administration of legal systems and institutions for the application of civil and criminal laws within the civil component of the operational environment. When required, the capabilities within this functional specialty area can assist in the establishment and maintenance of a transitional military authority.

**Humanitarian assistance and social well-being.** The humanitarian assistance and social well-being functional specialty area is concerned with activities designed for the provision of basic needs and services (water, food, shelter, sanitation, and health services), as well as those that facilitate the restoration of a social fabric and community life, the systems and institutions for the provision of primary and secondary education, and the return or voluntary resettlement of those displaced. When required, the capabilities within this functional specialty area can assist in the establishment and maintenance of a transitional military authority.

**Governance and participation.** The governance and participation functional specialty area is concerned with public administration, cultural relations, public information, and environmental management. Collectively, these programs, policies, systems and institutions enable a state's ability to serve the citizenry, articulate interests, manage resources, and exercise bestowed power in a society. These same programs, policies, systems, and institutions confer participation and the individual and collective citizenry's ability to share, access, or compete for power through nonviolent political processes, and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the nation. When required, the capabilities within this functional specialty area can assist in the establishment and maintenance of a transitional military authority.

**Economic stabilization and infrastructure.** The economic stabilization and infrastructure functional area is concerned with foundational commerce, monetary, fiscal labor issues, agriculture, utilities and public works, communications systems, and transportation fields. Collectively, these programs, policies, systems, and institutions constitute an economic system. The economic system is the intersection of government institutions and activities, corporate and private enterprises, populations, and the mobilization of resources for the production and distribution of goods and services, which are integral to the stability of a region or society. When required, the capabilities within this functional specialty area can assist in the establishment and maintenance of a transitional military authority.

**Functional specialties**
Each functional specialty area has one or more functional specialties nested within it. The following figure shows the nesting of functional specialties under each of the five functional specialty areas.

**Functional specialty areas and functional specialties**

**CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORTED ACTIVITIES**

Civil affairs supported activities (CASA) are those functions in which CA plays a key role in the planning, coordinating, or synchronizing but for which they are not the proponent. These supported activities include foreign assistance, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), populace and resources control (PRC), and civil military engagement (CME). These missions are executed through a combination of capabilities provided by multiple branches across the army, other services within the department of defense, or other governmental departments and agencies.

CA supports these operations through the planning, integration, execution, and transitioning of civil affairs activities and military government operations. CA knowledge and expertise of the civil component provides commanders the necessary tools to execute military operations with minimal impact by or on the civilian populace. Army, other services, and the joint force conduct these missions that are population centric and require CA capabilities.

CA integrate resources to support the commander’s mission. Unified action partners, IPI, and interagency provide unique expertise on humanitarian authorities to support the commander’s mission. Legal authorizations used to fund foreign assistance, FHA, and PRC are generally constrained by U.S. Congress for specific purposes. CA forces understand these authorities and should provide expert advice to the commander and staff. CAO in support of foreign assistance, FHA, PRC, and CME are discussed in the following paragraphs.

**Foreign assistance**
Foreign assistance is civil or military assistance rendered to a foreign nation through development assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, and security assistance. The United States provides foreign assistance through security cooperation in conjunction with a geographic combatant commander's theater security cooperation plan. Security cooperation is all department of defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. Foreign assistance can also be provided when the United States is sponsoring a foreign internal defense program or foreign humanitarian assistance in conjunction with other security cooperation efforts. Foreign assistance operations support a HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. The following figure provides a visual representation of the components of foreign assistance.

Components of foreign assistance

CA forces can plan, program, execute, and assess civil affairs operations in support of the commander’s plan. Regional and cultural competencies possessed by CA Soldiers are essential to mission success. Civil affairs operations focuses on the civil component during foreign assistance to provide the commander with viable courses of action to assist in the stabilization of the focus area. CA forces are skilled integrators and coordinators of the populace and the resources within an operational area. These skills assist the commander in synchronizing efforts and capabilities in the most efficient manner possible. Ultimately, CA will reduce the redundancy of resources, maximize the usage of the current infrastructure, and assist in the coordination of unified action partners, IPI, and interagency groups supporting foreign assistance operations.

CA forces possess the capabilities to evaluate the civil component through the planning and execution of civil affairs activities in support of foreign assistance. The focus of foreign assistance programs is to legitimize and enhance the stability of a HN’s political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems. CA forces can provide a sociocultural understanding of the operational environment that enhances the ability of the United States to achieve the desired end state. Support to foreign assistance can include technical expertise, advice, and assistance that can exponentially influence the success of other ongoing programs and initiatives. This assistance forms a better foundation on which a nation can build programs to meet the needs of the populace and promote its own sustainable development or growth. CA forces can assist in the development of these programs and provide assessments to the commander on their effectiveness.

Note: Army Techniques Publication 3-57.30, Nation Assistance, provides additional information regarding security assistance, FID, and Title 10, United States Code,
authorities that oversee these missions.

**Development assistance programs**

A principal objective of the foreign policy of the United States is the encouragement and sustained support to people of developing countries for improving the quality of their lives. Development assistance programs are programs executed by the department of state directly or indirectly, through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which finances numerous development assistance programs to address the following needs (which CA forces can support with the full range of civil affairs activities and support civil administration):

- Agriculture and nutrition.
- Population control.
- Health.
- Education.
- Energy.
- Environment improvement.

**Humanitarian and civic assistance programs**

This assistance can only be provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises, and it must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. In contrast to emergency relief conducted under foreign humanitarian assistance operations, humanitarian and civic assistance programs generally encompass planned activities in the following categories:

- Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural or underserved areas of a country.
- Construction and repair of basic surface transportation systems.
- Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
- Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

CA units and personnel supporting humanitarian and civic assistance provide unique capabilities of CR, CE, and CIM, combined with planning, coordinating, and synchronizing of the civil component, with an understanding of the cultures within the host nation.
Security assistance programs

Security assistance is a group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. The principal components of these programs include foreign military sales, foreign military financing, international military education and training, peace operations, and excess defense articles.

CA personnel in support of these security assistance programs are able to—

Identify host nation requirements.

Develop or review the nomination list of programs or projects to support the mission objectives.

Provide input to the feasibility of each program.

Provide input to the prioritization of each program to meet the desired end states and goals.

Foreign humanitarian assistance

Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) are Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation (JP 3-29). Most US government agencies, as well as United States Code and DOD directives utilize the terms humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief (FDR). FHA operations are different from foreign assistance primarily because they have a direct humanitarian need. The department of defense uses appropriated funds specifically for FHA in the form of overseas humanitarian disaster and civic aid. Foreign assistance is not funded by overseas humanitarian disaster and civic aid, and it is intended as deliberate assistance to promote long-term stability. FHA activities conducted by US Armed Forces fall into two broad categories:

Steady-state FHA. Steady-state FHA are activities normally planned and conducted as part of the geographic combatant commander's theater campaign plan. The intent of steady-state FHA activities is to assess and increase the affected nation's capacity and capability to respond to disaster.

Foreign disaster relief. FDR is a limited duration contingency operation. The goal of FDR is to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims, including victims of natural disasters and conflicts, internally displaced persons, refugees, stateless persons, and vulnerable migrants.
The CA role in FHA is to assist the commander in planning, advising on the activities, and coordinating with unified action partners, IPI, and interagency to synchronize efforts. CA forces will also play a key role in conducting assessments. FHA operations are inherently complex and require a significant amount of interagency coordination. FHA is normally directed from the strategic level, coordinated and managed at the operational level, and conducted at the tactical level. On all levels in support of FHA activities, CA forces:

Participate in interagency assessment, planning and synchronizing of FHA activities.

Identify, validate, or evaluate host nation and international resources available for FHA activities.

Advice, assist, and plan displaced civilian movement and control.

Participate in the execution of selected FHA activities as directed.

Provide liaison with IPI.

Assist in the coordination of local labor.

Liaise with judge advocates to assist the commander to meet legal and moral obligations.

Monitor and evaluate FHA.

Assess requirements and support for the operation of a civil-military operations center.

Conduct and maintain an assessment of humanitarian issues in designated nations or regions.

Identify shortfalls in host nation humanitarian assistance programs and resources.

Although FHA operations may be executed simultaneously with other types of operations, each type has unique characteristics. For example, FHA operations may be simultaneously conducted with peace operations, but each has its own strategic end state. Military commanders must be cautious not to commit their forces to projects and tasks that go beyond the FHA mission. Military commanders conducting FHA simultaneously with other operations must develop end state, transition, and termination objectives, as well as measures of effectiveness and measures of performance complementary to simultaneous military operations.

There are many operations that are related to FHA. These operations are diverse and CA forces will support these related operations as necessary. The related
operations consist of:

Stability operations.

Foreign assistance, to include:

Humanitarian and civic assistance.

Security assistance.

Development assistance.

Peace operations.

Noncombatant evacuation operations.

Civil military operations.

Mass atrocity response operations.

International chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response.

Note: Army Techniques Publication 3-57.20, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, provides additional information on FHA.

Populace and resources control

Military operations are not conducted in a vacuum that is free of civilian presence or influence. No matter the operational environment, military operations can be disrupted by actions of the indigenous populace. Whether it is uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians within the operational environment, illegal activities, or any civil functions between these extremes, commanders must consider populace and resources control (PRC) measures in the planning and execution of operations. While PRC falls under the proponency of the military police branch, CA forces are integral to the planning, execution, and assessment of military operations concerning PRC measures. CA forces are highly attuned to the impacts that military operations can have on the civil population, as well as those the civil component will have on military operations. They assist in the development of courses of action that will support the commander's goals, with minimum impact on civil-military relations and current and future operations.

PRC consists of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control. Both components are normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments. During times of civil or military emergency, proper authorities
define, enact, and enforce PRC measures. For practical and security reasons, military forces employ PRC measures of some type and to varying degrees across the range of military operations. PRC operations are executed with, and as an integral part of, military operations. CA forces provide multiple capabilities to the commander that can assist in the development and execution of these measures.

**Populace control**

Populace control measures are a key element in the execution of primary stability tasks in the areas of civil security and civil control. Populace control involves establishing public order and safety, securing borders, population centers, and individuals. International law requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe, secure environment and address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace. Control measures require a capability to secure borders, protect the population, hold individuals accountable for criminal activities, control the activities of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablish essential civil services, and set conditions in the operational environment that support stability through unity of effort.

The authority and extent of populace control measures that a commander may impose varies greatly with the type of mission and the operational environment. The operational environment includes a wide variety of intangible factors, such as the culture, perceptions, beliefs, and values of adversary, enemy, neutral, or friendly political and social systems. These factors must be analyzed and continuously assessed throughout the operations process to develop a situational understanding of the environment. The characterization of the operational environment as permissive, uncertain, or hostile further impacts the planning for and the execution of populace control measures.

**Dislocated civilian operations**

Dislocated civilian (DC) operations are actions required to move or keep civilians out of harm's way or to safeguard them in the aftermath of a disaster. The disaster may be natural (such as a flood or an earthquake), man-made (such as combat operations, social, or political strife), or a technological hazard (such as radiological disaster, network outage, intrusion, cyberspace attack, or a complete loss of electricity). The requirement to conduct DC operations may occur during any phase across the range of military operations. If the DC is within their nation's borders, USAID may be involved in providing assistance, whereas a refugee falls under the assistance of the department of state's population refugees and migration.

The CA supporting tasks in DC operations support the commander's freedom of movement while safeguarding the civilian population. CA Soldier tasks include—

Identifying or evaluating existing host nation and international community DC plans and operations.
Advising on DC control measures that would effectively support the military operation.

Advising on how to implement DC control measures.

Publicizing control measures among the IPI.

Assessing measures of effectiveness.

Participating in the execution of selected DC operations as needed or directed and in coordination with the internationally mandated organizations (for example, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)).

Assisting in arbitration of problems arising from implementation of DC control measures.

Identifying DC locations and composition.

In DC operations, controlling agencies (for example, UNHCR, UN OCHA, ICRC, or HN) normally care for the basic needs of DCs, such as food, water, shelter, sanitation, and security. Controlling agencies must also be prepared to prevent or arrest the outbreak of communicable disease among DCs. This last point is important for the health of the populace and military forces.


During military operations, US forces must consider two distinct categories of civilians—those remaining at their homes or places of habitual residence and those dislocating. U.S. policy dictates the placement of people in one of these categories. The US category may conflict with how international organizations, NGOs, and the HN refer to the people. Therefore, CA Soldiers and civil affairs operation planners must be careful in how they describe categories of civilians. The first category includes civilians who are indigenous and other local populace, including civilians from other countries. Civilians within this category may or may not need help. If they can care for themselves, they should remain in place.

DCs are civilians who have left their homes. Their movement and presence can hinder military operations. They will likely require some degree of aid, such as medicine, food, shelter, clothing, and similar items. DCs may not be indigenous to
the area or to the country in which they reside. The term *dislocated civilian* is unique to the Department of Defense and not used by the Department of State or NGOs. These organizations use the term *internally displaced persons* for civilians displaced within their country and the term *refugees* for people who flee their country of origin and cross an international border. The following distinctions exist among the various categories of DCs:

Displaced persons is a broad term used to refer to internally and externally displaced persons collectively (JP 3-29). In addition:

Returnees are displaced persons who have returned voluntarily to their former place of residence.

Resettled persons are a subset of displaced persons - civilians who have been able to resettle in a third country, usually with the assistance of UNHCR and the government of their new country of residence, rather than returning to their previous home or land within the country or area of original displacement. Resettled persons are usually a very small subset of the original displaced population as opportunities for third- country resettlement are rare.

Evacuees are civilians who are removed from their places of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation.

Internally displaced persons (IDP) are any persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or place of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.

Migrants are persons who belong to a normally migratory culture who may cross national boundaries or have fled their native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution. Migrants travel to escape economic stagnation and poverty. This is in contrast to refugees, who travel to escape persecution, conflict, and perhaps death.

Refugees are any persons who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, are outside the country of their nationality and are unable or, owing to such fear, are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country.

Stateless persons are civilians who either have been denationalized, whose country of origin cannot be determined, or who cannot establish their right to the nationality claimed.

**Resources control**
Resources control provides security for the natural and man-made material resources of a nation-state, mobilizes economic resources, denies enemy access to resources, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents and criminal entities. Resources control measures include, but are not limited to, licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints, and border security, to include customs inspections, ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.

Resources control directly impacts the economic system of a host nation or territory occupied and governed by US forces. Resources control measures regulate public and private property and the production, movement, or consumption of material resources. Controlling a nation's resources is the responsibility of indigenous civil governments. During a civil or military emergency, proper authorities define, enact, and enforce resources control measures to maintain public order and enable the execution of primary stability tasks in the areas of civil security, civil control, restoration of essential services, and support to economic and infrastructure development tasks.

Enactment of resources control measures must conform to legal and regulatory policy and be enforced justly and firmly by the governing authority. US forces will not execute these measures unless the requirements are clearly beyond the capabilities of the host nation's security forces, the host nation has requested assistance, and appropriate US authorities (to include the US Ambassador) have granted approval for such assistance. Resources control includes property control which is the control of movable and immovable private and public property. CA generalists support the host nation's lead by facilitating coordination and security while CA military government and functional specialists support by providing advice, assistance, and training for host nation forces executing these missions. Resource control measures may include:

- Establishing procedures to resolve property rights for land and subterranean resources.
- Implementing mechanisms to prevent unauthorized seizures of land or property.
- Securing existing harvest storage facilities to prevent spoilage and looting of harvested crops.
- Implementing rationing and distribution programs for key commodities (food and fuel).
- Establishing border security, including customs procedures to prevent arms smuggling and stop contraband, such as drugs and natural resources.
- Regulating and securing access to valuable natural resources.
Stopping illicit trade in natural resources and developing governance mechanisms and incentives to bring trade into the market.

Initiating processes for addressing and resolving resource ownership and access issues.

Freezing financial accounts of enemy combatants.

Locking international access of overseas financial accounts to prevent money laundering.

Protecting and securing strategically important institutions, such as government buildings and archives, museums, religious sites, courthouses, and communications facilities.

Implementing effective resources control requires the host nation government or transitional military authority to inform the populace of the measures to be imposed and the justification for the action. The message to the population must clearly convey that the control measures are necessary due to security and the populace. Enforcement of the restrictions must be consistent and impartial so the government establishes and maintains legitimacy among the populace. A well-crafted populace resources and control plan limits control measures to the least restrictive measures necessary to achieve the desired effect. Continuous assessment of the operational environment measures the effectiveness of the restrictions, the attitude of the population toward the government, and the impact the restrictions have on the operational environment. As the security situation improves, restrictions should be modified or rescinded.

**Note:** Army Techniques Publication 3-57.10, *Populace and Resources Control*, provides additional information on resources control measures.

### US CA AND NATO CIMIC CROSSWALK

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Civil-military operations center (CMOC)

CAO staff support

Military government operations (MGO)
- Comprehensive Approach
- CIMIC functional specialists

Transitional military authority

Support to civil administration (SCA)

Civil Affairs supported activities (CASA)
- Civil Military Interaction (CMI)

Foreign assistance

Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA)

Populace and resources control (PRC)

Civil-military engagement (CME)

CIVIL AFFAIRS PRODUCTS

CA personnel prepare area studies, conduct assessments, and create and maintain running estimates to assist in the planning and updating of mission plans across the range of military operations. CA produced area studies, assessments, and running estimates include geo-references. These geo-references allow for future geospatial application of these products into operations and mission planning sequences. These products develop and update the understanding of the civil component for the commander’s common operational picture. The information and material contained within these products are critical for the commander’s and staff’s situational understanding and the formation of the commander’s vision for the operational environment, including:

Impacts of the populace on military operations.

Impacts of military operations on the populace.

Development of courses of action.

Development of branches and sequels.

Completion of objectives, goals, and milestones.

Facilitation of the transition of army operations.

Identification and reinforcement efforts to consolidate gains.
Information requirements that drive and focus the civil information collection plan.

**Area studies**

CA personnel obtain, analyze, and record information in advance of the need. The basic evaluation of an area is the CA area study that establishes baseline information relating to the civil components of the area in question. The CA area study is a pre-mission study prepared regionally by country or to a specific subnational area within a country as the baseline research document for CA forces. The CA area study presents a description and analysis of the geography, historical setting, and the social, political, military, economic, health, legal, education, governance, infrastructure, and national security systems and institutions of a country using a combination of open- and restricted-source materials. CA personnel update the information detailed in the CA area study periodically, as required, prior to the receipt of a mission. CA requires the ability to retrieve accurate and current data on demand. This requirement necessitates a system to capture, store, collate, and produce this data in the form of a report, which is comprised from all available collected data at any given time. This report provides the baseline for the area study.

This baseline information is used as the basis for the creation of the civil affairs operation running estimate during the planning process. If an area study does not already exist, then the CA force must, time permitting, create one during mission preparation and planning, or it must conduct similar research and analysis required to directly produce the running estimate.

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**Note:** Army Techniques Publication 3-57.60, *CA Planning*, Appendix A, provides additional information on area studies.

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**Civil affairs assessments**

CA assessments provide a precise means to gather meaningful and significant information. CA soldiers perform three basic types of assessments - the initial assessment, the deliberate assessment, and the survey. Gathering information should not be a haphazard process. Each type of assessment is based upon the information and analysis of the previous type. In addition, each type of assessment in the progression becomes more focused, specific, and detailed with an ultimate goal of identifying civil vulnerabilities that pose a threat to the successful and timely completion of the mission. As with all military missions, this task must have a well-formed, practical plan.

**Initial assessments**
While the area study is completed ahead of the need and reviewed and updated prior to deployment, the initial assessment is conducted upon entry into the designated AO. The objective and focus of the initial assessment should be broad enough to allow CA forces to quickly obtain an updated baseline of the general conditions within the entire AO to validate or refute the information and assumptions used in planning, as well as to update the CAO priorities and civil information collection plan. During continuous operations, the initial assessment requirement may not be necessary for follow-on CA forces because of the transfer of current and detailed operational data during transition. CA teams conducting initial assessments must be aware of the security situation at all times.

Deliberate assessments

Deliberate assessments are conducted in a methodical manner in accordance with civil affairs operations priorities and the civil information collection plan on specific geographic areas or social, economic, governmental, or infrastructure systems of interest. They are a determination of current conditions, capabilities, or attitudes within these defined areas. Deliberate assessments are characterized by firsthand observations, interviews, and other tools to gather information used to make knowledgeable decisions and to determine locations and priorities for follow-on, in-depth analysis. CA teams may use a wide variety of detailed checklists or formats during a deliberate assessment to ensure it has scrutinized all aspects of the assessment area.

Surveys

The survey is a detailed assessment in which the object of the assessment is examined carefully, as during an inspection or investigation. Surveys are conducted in a methodical manner in accordance with civil affairs operations priorities and the civil information collection plan on specific subjects identified as requiring in-depth investigation during deliberate assessments. This investigation may include people, groups, locations, facilities, or capabilities within a location or part of a critical geopolitical, cultural, or ethnic system. During the survey, the CA team may use a variety of detailed checklists or formats within the civil information management construct to ensure it has scrutinized all aspects of the specified entity, location, or facility targeted for survey. Survey development should leverage operations or research analysis capabilities if available. The findings of a survey may lead to refined mission statements or reallocation of forces and resources.

Note: Army Techniques Publication 3-57.60, CA Planning, provides more information on CA assessments.

Civil information collection plan
An information requirement is any information element the commander and staff require to successfully conduct operations (ADRP 6-0). Commanders cannot successfully accomplish activities involved in the operations process without the necessary information to make informed decisions. Civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, and data mining (the collection of information from a combination of open- and restricted-source materials for routine and continuous study and research) should be synchronized into the civil information collection plan. For the purposes of the mission command warfighting function, validated civil information collection plan requirements are requirements that, when answered, will fill a gap in knowledge and understanding of the civil component through analysis of civil considerations within an area of operations and the area of interest. Civil reconnaissance and civil engagement fill identified gaps or requirements in the civil information collection plan and may be conducted concurrently with other operations. The commander's intent, priority intelligence requirements (PIR), and the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) focus civil affairs operations and the civil information collection plan. In return, CA forces provide the operations process with a continual flow of essential civil information through the running estimate during offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. This relationship tailors civil affairs operations to effectively identify and assess civil vulnerabilities, enabling U.S. military forces to achieve decisive results.

**Note:** U.S. Army Field Manual 3-55, *Information Collection*, provides the fundamentals of information collection, and Army Techniques Publication 3-57.50, *Civil Information Management*, provides additional information on the civil information collection plan.

**Running estimate**

Army Doctrine Publication ADP 5-0 describes how running estimates provide information, conclusions, and recommendations from the perspective of each staff section. Running estimates help to refine the common operational picture and supplement it with information not readily displayed. Staffs evaluate and synthesize information and provide it to commanders in the form of running estimates to help commanders build and maintain their situational understanding. Upon receipt or in anticipation of a mission, each staff section begins updating its estimate based on information requirements related to the mission. CA forces record relevant information in running estimates. They maintain a continuous assessment of the civil component as related to current operations as a basis to determine if they are proceeding according to the mission, commander's intent, and common operational picture.

The running estimate feeds directly into the military decision making process, whether conducted unilaterally as part of CA-only operations or integrated into the supported unit’s planning process and development of the common operational
picture. To focus the estimate process, planners first develop a restated mission statement that delineates those civil affairs operations tasks necessary to successfully support the commander’s mission. The mission statement is a short sentence or paragraph describing the unit’s civil affairs operations essential task (or tasks) and purpose that clearly indicate the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. It contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, as well as the reasons thereof, but seldom specifies how. Figure 3-1, page 3-14, shows the crosswalk of the military decision making process steps with the information in the running estimate.

During course of action analysis, CA staff officers ensure each course of action effectively integrates civil considerations and present a summary of their running estimate to describe how their findings impact or are impacted by other staff functions. The CA staff officer must be able to articulate how operations affect civilians and estimate the requirements for essential stability tasks that commanders might have to undertake based on the capability of the force and that of the interagency, international organizations, and NGO partners. Ultimately, the CA staff officer recommends the best course of action from the civil affairs operations perspective even though it may not be the course of action the staff recommends to the commander.

CA planners and staff use the running estimate throughout the operations process to assess the current situation, determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent, determine if future operations are supportable, and develop branches and sequels to current operations.

**Note:** Army Techniques Publication 3-57.60, *CA Planning*, provides additional information on the CAO running estimate.

**Annexes**

FM 6-0 describes how staffs support the commander in understanding, visualizing, and describing the operational environment; making and articulating decisions; and directing, leading, and assessing military operations. Staffs make recommendations and prepare plans and orders for the commander. Staffs use annexes as attachments to plans and orders to provide more detail and organize information. The civil affairs operations (CAO) staff supports the commander in communicating the commander's decisions and intent through these products. Key information recorded in the running estimate informs the orders process, particularly in the functional annexes. The CAO staff (G-9/S-9) refines the CAO aspects of the plan and order by publishing Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations), further amplifying the commander's intent in terms of CAO. In addition to Annex K, the CAO staff is involved in the development of Annex V (Interagency Coordination), in conjunction with the assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) or the battalion or brigade.
2.4.3 Doctrinal Matchup / Comparison “The Why”

U.S. Army Doctrine hierarchy for Civil Affairs.

2.5. CIMIC and non NATO military organizations

2.5.1 European Union (EU) forces

EU battlegroups (EU BG) are multinational, military units, designed to be a “political instrument” for the EU to promptly (initial forces in theatre within 10 days) demonstrate determination and presence, thereby accepting capability gaps and limited operational effectiveness.

An EU BG package comprises the EU BG, the force headquarters ((F)HQ) and assigned operational and strategic enablers. The EU BG has a strength of 1,500 to 3,500 troops. Its core is composed of an infantry battalion (3 to 5 infantry companies) and the combat service support and combat support elements, which includes a CIMIC unit, and a medical task force directly supporting the infantry forces (see figure below). The (F)HQ can be composed as shown in the picture, an
example for the staff element J/X9/civil-military interaction is depicted in the picture below.

The structure and composition is depending on the framework nation, numbers of troop contributing nations and the composition of the core BG. Even if the operations headquarters (OHQ) is not part of the BG package the CJ9 division of an OHQ for an EU BG operation is depicted below.

The deployment period of the EU BG can be extended to up to 120 days by increasing logistic sustainability.

The complexity of contemporary conflicts and crises requires a comprehensive approach which addresses the multiple levels and dimensions on which they evolve. The EU has a unique mix of instruments to tackle such complex challenges more effectively.

There is a genuine European way to resolving external conflicts and crises. It is made of civilian and military means, hard and soft power, strategic autonomy and cooperation with our partners, and includes promoting human rights and good governance, entails investing in strong societies, in education and development, and ensuring security and stability.

Just as today’s security challenges cannot be faced with military means alone, there are situations which cannot be resolved by only relying on humanitarian and development aid or diplomacy. There are situations in which a quick and decisive military reaction is necessary to save lives and prevent protracted conflicts and violence. This is where the EU Battlegroups come in.

Battlegroups are employable across the full range of tasks.

These include:

- conflict prevention
- initial stabilization
- humanitarian interventions and rescue tasks
- crisis management
- peacekeeping

Deployment of EU BGs always requires a unanimous decision of the Council and would generally require an authorizing UN Security Council Resolution.
CIMIC units are an integral part of the EU BG. Their tasks are to establish and maintain a CIMIC liaison organization, to gain the necessary information for the current civil situation picture, to establish CIMIC centers and to assist in synchronizing EU BG with UN- and EU-operations / activities.

Besides the principles for an EU BG operation it is generally envisaged that a major EU-led military operation will be multinational in nature (combined) and with command structures able to command and control operations in which elements of more than one service participate (joint). Therefore, EU OHQ and EU FHQ for an EU-led military operation should be both combined and joint.

The EU HQ Manning Guide provides the general principles and procedures for the designation, structure, composition and augmentation of EU HQs, which apply generically at the Military Strategic level and the Operational level and also for CMI/CIMIC staff elements. It is a tool box for the operational commander (OpCdr) or the force commander (FCdr) to design the HQ taking in account all relevant conditions for the future mission (air-, land-, sea-based, FHQ off shore or land-based etc.).

### 2.5.2 UN forces

United Nations military personnel are the "Blue Helmets" on the ground. They consist of military personnel contributed by national armies from across the globe.

UN Forces work alongside **UN Police** and civilian colleagues to promote stability, security, and peace processes; they protect personnel and property; work with local communities, and security forces promote lasting peace.
In many missions, protection of civilians is now usually a specified priority within a mandate. Blue Helmets are protecting populations against threats and contributing to a secure environment.

**Global contribution for global peace**

All military personnel working under the Blue Helmet are first and foremost members of their own national armies and are then seconded to work under the command and control of the UN.

They have more than 100,000 UN uniformed personnel coming from over 120 countries. They come from nations large and small, rich and poor. They bring different cultures and experience to the job, but they are united in their determination to foster peace. Currently the majority of troops come from African and Asian countries while the contribution of western countries is increasing.

**What UN military personnel do**

UN military personnel can be called upon to:

- Protect civilians and UN personnel;
- Monitor a disputed border;
- Monitor and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas
- Provide security across a conflict zone;
- Provide security during elections;
- Assist in-country military personnel with training and support
- Assist ex-combatants in implementing the peace agreements; they may have signed.

One of the biggest changes UN Peacekeeping has seen over the 70 years of its existence has been the increasingly multi-dimensional nature of UN peacekeeping operations. UN military peacekeepers are often deployed in inhospitable, remote and dangerous environments where they face an unprecedented scale of challenges especially when protecting civilians, under asymmetric threats.

**Deploying UN Forces**

The UN can only deploy military personnel when there is a UN Security Council resolution authorizing them to do so. The Security Council will say how many military personnel are required, and UN Headquarters will liaise with the Member States to identify personnel and deploy them. This can take time – often more than
six months from the date of the resolution to get boots and equipment on the ground.

With these limitations in mind, since 2015 the UN has been working with Member States to develop a new arrangement called the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS). Through the PCRS, Member States can pledge to have specific units available for UN Peacekeeping. Far in advance of a possible deployment, the UN Secretariat will perform an assessment of the readiness of the personnel, training, and equipment of those units. Select units can also be pledged to the Rapid Deployment Level of the PCRS and will be made available within 60 days of a request from the UN Secretary-General. When fully operational at the start of 2018, this system should help reduce the deployment timelines of military forces for future mission start-ups.

The deployment of female peacekeepers to peace operations significantly contributes to achieving sustainable peace and the improved wellbeing of women and girls in conflict-affected regions.

Security Council Resolution 1325 urges equal participation of women at all sectors of peacekeeping operations, including the military. This is also reinforced in the policy on gender equality by the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support and the guidelines for integrating gender perspective into the works of the UN Military (2010).

Role of female soldiers within UN Forces

Female soldiers perform in many functions and capacities, from command to frontline roles, while bringing an added value to military operations. Female soldiers provide an invaluable perspective in planning operations and in making key decisions, especially those affecting civilians, particularly women and girls. This is an operational imperative for a mission as it provides a holistic approach to meet its mandate in today's complex and evolving peacekeeping environment.

Female soldiers' visibility can empower women and girls and increase women's participation in the security sector.

Some unique tactical skills female military personnel bring to this field include screening of female civilians and conducting of house searches in areas where it is not culturally appropriate for men to enter private spaces. Local populations in host countries often feel more comfortable liaising and sharing information with military troops that include women alongside men. By obtaining better information, we can better protect these communities.

Blue Helmets Performance Standards
To implement their mandated tasks, the troops need to prepare adequately, starting sometimes far before deployment. This preparation covers every aspect of UN Peacekeeping such as ensuring the availability of the necessary and proper equipment. It is also critical that peacekeepers are properly trained, to name a few, in Protection of Civilians, the use of force, and the Rules of Engagement. Also, a thorough understanding of conduct and discipline is a key training requirement.

- Policies on readiness, performance, command and control.

- Protection of Civilians (POC) Implementing Guidelines for military component in peacekeeping missions (February 2015) provide clear objective for military component when it comes to POC.

- Rules of Engagement: This document provides authority for the use of force and explains policy, principles, procedures and responsibilities relating to the use of force. For each mission, specific rules of engagement are drafted.

- UN troops in the field are required to implement their mandate with utmost professionalism, dedication and dignity, often at significant personal sacrifice. Unfortunately, Blue Helmets have been accused of acts of misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse. These reprehensible acts are an affront to the values of protection that UN Peacekeeping upholds. All acts of misconduct are unacceptable and forbidden. See also UN Code of Conduct.

Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System

The UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) aims to establish a more predictable and dynamic process of interaction between the UN Headquarters and Member States for strengthening readiness and timely deployment of peacekeeping capabilities with the right qualities.

There are four levels of readiness in PCRS:

- **Level 1**: A Troop Contributing Country makes a formal pledge for a unit and provides the list of major and self-sustainment equipment and certification of completion of basic training and human rights screening. Member States are encouraged to include the time frame of availability and duration of deployment for each pledged capability.

- **Level 2**: Based on the UN operational requirements, pledges at Level 1 can be elevated to Level 2 after an assessment and advisory visit has been conducted by a UN Headquarters team.

- **Level 3**: Following a satisfactory assessment, units which have achieved a reasonable degree of preparedness are elevated to Level 3.
**Rapid Deployment Level (RDL):** Having reached Level 3, the Troop Contributing Country may pledge to deploy within 60 days following a request made by the UN Headquarters.

### III Non – military actors

| **Within a comprehensive approach, military support to non-military actors and their environment will generally only be conducted if it is required to create conditions supportive for the accomplishment of the military mission within the context of the mandate. They may include a wide spectrum of resources such as information, personnel, material, equipment, communications facilities, specialist expertise or training. Enabling this is a role of CIMIC and it may be executed by all elements of the military.** |

Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is the link between the military mission and the civil dimension in the area of operations. It is important to understand which actors are engaged within the operation area and beyond. In this chapter this potential interaction will be described. Regardless of the type of operation, a complex civil environment will be partially detrimental and partially beneficial to the mission.

NATO is required to establish contacts with non-military actors prior to operations to be prepared for missions and operations. The goal is to establish a reliable and sustainable network including a mutual understanding between organizations to foster cooperation during a mission or operation. Ideally, military and non-military actors should develop mutual understanding and good working relationships already in peacetime through training, education and other initiatives. While CIMIC is a well-established tool for military actors, most non-military actors have not implemented a civil counterpart system, including focal point and necessary means for communication and coordination. This has to be understood by all parties when engagement starts and underpins the necessity of common training in advance.

Experience has shown that the context of a mission can vary significantly. A feature common to most missions, however, is the complex assortment of non-military actors that will be engaged within the area of operations and beyond. The commander will be required to work alongside these actors to reach the end state effectively and efficiently, and must therefore retain a high level of flexibility.

Therefore, the military commander requests a clear picture of the civil environment. In order to support the military commander and to create this picture the CIMIC Staff will work closely with other branches (especially J/G 2) in concert with non-military actors in a comprehensive manner.
The list of non-military actors includes international organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, governments and governmental organizations (GOs), law enforcement agencies, civil defence organisations, local actors and other authorities, like tribe leaders, religious leaders, leaders of ethnic minorities as well as majorities and stakeholders from the private sector. Not all types of the listed actors above will necessarily be present in the area of operations.

Therefore, the civil environment is not a homogeneous one. Each non-military actor will have their own motivation, legal status, mandate, mission, procedures and policies to govern their work and conduct them. Due to their diversity, techniques that promote effective interaction with one type of actor will often be different from those that work with another. Some non-military actors may be reluctant to work closely with military actors. Some non-military actors may even avoid any interaction. Change will be constant and therefore this requires primarily CIMIC capabilities to constantly adapt to their environment and to embrace a broad spectrum of interaction.

The commitments that non-military actors devote themselves to are not only found in the area of humanitarian assistance or disaster relief. They are spread over a vast spectrum from immediate aid to save lives, via medium-term engagement in the broader field of time-limited assistance, up to long-term economic development projects, including infrastructural stabilization, educational aspects, conflict resolutions or society-developing issues in general but not limited. This variety of approaches results in different agendas, structures and procedures. All of these actors and their actions have an impact on the overall situation and therefore must be part of the military considerations.

A detailed analysis of the key non-military actors in the area of operations should be conducted as part of a pre-deployment assessment to determine how the force should interact with these actors in pursuit of a comprehensive approach. Factors for consideration could include organizational roles, mandates, missions, aims, goals, resources, interests and capacity. Understanding these factors enables the commander to minimize friction when interacting with them.

**Terminology:**

The field of language, and terminology in particular, requires the attention of both military and non-military organizations. The different use of terms can cause misunderstanding and create loss of efficiency. Awareness and communications training provides CIMIC personnel with the tools needed to avoid many difficulties in this area and enables them to function as a force multiplier to provide best support in the fields of humanitarian aid and humanitarian assistance.

**Humanitarian Assistance** is aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population.
Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles. In case of emergency and disaster relief most civil actors use the term "humanitarian aid" instead of "humanitarian assistance".

**Core Humanitarian Principles** provide the foundations for humanitarian action. There are four humanitarian principles:

• **Humanity.** Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to alleviate human suffering, to protect life and health, and ensure respect for human beings.

• **Impartiality.** Humanitarian assistance and action must be carried out impartially, on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious beliefs, class or political opinions.

• **Neutrality.** In order to continue to have the confidence of all parties involved, humanitarian actors must act neutrally and must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

• **Independence.** To ensure humanitarian actors’ ability to act in accordance with neutrality, the principle of independence was formulated, to highlight that humanitarian assistance must be delivered autonomously from military, political or economic objectives.

These principles are central to establishing and maintaining access to affected people, whether in a natural disaster or a complex emergency, such as armed conflict. Promoting and ensuring compliance with the principles are essential elements of effective humanitarian coordination. The humanitarian principles are derived from the core principles, which have long guided the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the national Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies. The principles’ centrality to the work of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and other humanitarian organizations is formally enshrined in two General Assembly resolutions. The first three principles (humanity, impartiality and neutrality) are endorsed in General Assembly resolution 46/182, which was adopted in 1991. General Assembly resolution 58/114 (2004) added independence as a fourth key principle underlying humanitarian action. The General Assembly has repeatedly reaffirmed the importance of promoting and respecting these principles within the framework of humanitarian assistance.

Commitment to the principles has also been expressed at an institutional level by many humanitarian organizations. Of particular note is the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and NGOs in disaster relief. The code provides a set of common standards for organizations involved in humanitarian activities, including a commitment to adhere to the humanitarian principles. More than 492 organizations have signed the Code of Conduct. Also of
note is the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response elaborated by the Sphere Project and contributing to the demographic change worldwide, HelpAge International and Handicap International published the “Humanitarian inclusion standards for older people and people with disabilities” in 2018 as the latest contribution to the International “Human Standards Partnership”.

Above mentioned 4 core humanitarian principles are only a nucleus. The Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) sets out nine commitments that organisations and individuals involved in humanitarian response can use to improve the quality and effectiveness of the assistance they provide. These three standard documents use the language of human rights to remind that all people have the right to life with dignity which has a broader bearing than humanity and reflects the “Sustainable Development Goals 2030” set in force in 2016 by the United Nations.

A large group of non-military actors consists of humanitarian and development actors, which are not mutually exclusive.

a. **Humanitarian actors.** Humanitarian actors are civilians, whether national or international, engaged in humanitarian action with a clear commitment to humanitarian principles. This commitment is usually laid down in their legal mandates, mission statements and statutes. Military forces that deliver humanitarian assistance are not considered humanitarian actors.

Activities of humanitarian actors are governed by humanitarian principles. Humanitarian actors must engage in dialogue with all parties to conflict for strictly humanitarian purposes. This includes ongoing liaison and negotiation with non-state armed groups. Humanitarian actors’ compliance with humanitarian principles affects their credibility, and therefore their ability to enter into negotiations with relevant actors and establish safe access to affected people. There are multiple pressures on humanitarian actors to compromise humanitarian principles, such as providing humanitarian aid as part of efforts to achieve political ends. Maintaining principled humanitarian action in the face of these pressures is an essential task, but not an easy one.

Adhering to humanitarian principles, in particular neutrality and impartiality, and being perceived as doing so, is critical for humanitarian actors to ensure access to affected people, in particular in times of armed conflict. It can also make a significant difference to the security of humanitarian personnel and the people they assist. Humanitarian actors will have to try constantly to negotiate their legitimacy based on the perception of the local population. Humanitarian principles are crucial for humanitarian actors to avoid being misused by some and rejected by others. Most humanitarian actors will only interact with the military if humanitarian principles are not compromised.

Humanitarian action comprises assistance, protection and advocacy activities undertaken on an impartial basis in response to humanitarian needs resulting from
armed conflicts, complex emergencies and/or natural disasters. The primary objective of humanitarian action is to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity. It focuses on short-term emergency relief and is needs-based.

The humanitarian community is not a constituted system with a defined membership. It comprises a large number of humanitarian organisations that differ considerably depending on their individual role and reason of existence.

The humanitarian community does not consider all acts of charity or emergency relief as humanitarian assistance and not all providers of relief as humanitarian actors. ‘Humanitarian’ for the humanitarian community refers to organizations and actions guided by humanitarian principles. These principles define how humanitarian assistance is delivered. The cornerstone lies with the upholding of the humanitarian imperative, and must be separate from any political considerations. Access for humanitarian actors to communities in need must therefore be granted.

b. Development actors. Development actors seek to respond to ongoing structural issues that may hinder economic, institutional and social development and therefore help to create the necessary capacity needed to provide sustainable solutions.

In the context of human development it usually encompasses foreign aid, governance, healthcare, education, poverty reduction, gender equality, disaster preparedness, infrastructure, economics, human rights, environment and issues associated with these but there is no common understanding, or rigid formula, of what a development organization is. They vary in size, scale and function.

Development aid is financial based aid given by governments and other agencies or private stakeholders like foundations to support economic, environmental, social, and political development of developing countries.

The horizon of support is laid down for a middle or long-term period up to multi annual engagement by the partners.

For further Annex "Non-military Actors".

3.1. International Organizations

The term international/intergovernmental organizations refers to inter-governmental organizations or organizations whose membership is open to sovereign states. IOs are established by treaties, which provide their legal status. They are subject to international law and are capable of entering into agreements between member states and themselves.

The most prominent IOs are the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). Other examples include the African Union, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the World Trade Organization. Their missions are highly political by nature.

International Organizations have different mandates and each one of these organizations is complex in terms of organizational structure. UN is an international governmental organization with over 130 agencies. It also comprises humanitarian agencies and agencies that receives their mandate with political agreements. For example, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) administers and coordinates most development technical assistance provided through the UN system. OCHA is more likely to be involved in coordinating the activities of relief agencies including United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program (WFP). The International Organization for Migration (IOM), is another influential organization that may be encountered.

3.1.1 United Nations

The United Nations (UN) are involved in humanitarian peacekeeping and political missions and may therefore operate in similar theatres to NATO. The UN system comprises six principal organs, programmes and funds, specialized independent agencies, departments and offices.

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. OCHA assists governments in mobilizing international assistance when the scale of the disaster exceeds the national capacity. It takes the lead in coordinating humanitarian action, although in response to specific disasters specialized agencies may take on this role depending on the cluster structure and nature of the disaster or conflict.

The United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

Interaction with the humanitarian actors should be made through OCHA, especially in instances where military action may cause humanitarian impact or is required to support humanitarian operations. Activity should be coordinated through established fora or clusters. Where OCHA has established a dedicated UN-CMCoord Officer or focal point function, this is the first point of contact.

United Nations funds, programs and agencies

UN funds, programs and specialized agencies (UN agencies) have their membership, leadership and budget processes separate to those of the UN
Secretariat, but are committed to work with and through the established UN coordination mechanisms and report to the UN Member States through their respective governing boards. The UN agencies, most of which also have pre-existing development-focused relationships with Member States, provide sector-specific support and expertise before, during and after a disaster. The main UN agencies with humanitarian mandates include Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), IOM, OCHA, UNDP, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), UNHCR, United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UN Women, World Food Program (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO), which support disaster response across needs, from shelter, protection, food security, health, nutrition, education and livelihoods to common services like coordination, logistics and telecommunications.

**International Coordination Mechanisms**

Effective disaster response requires careful coordination at global, regional and national levels. The UN has established a number of interdependent coordination mechanisms designed to guide relations among humanitarian actors and between humanitarian actors, governments and disaster-affected people to ensure the delivery of coherent and principled assistance.

a. **At global level; Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC)** is the most senior UN official dealing with humanitarian affairs, mandated by the UN General Assembly to coordinate international humanitarian assistance during emergency response, whether carried out by governmental, intergovernmental organizations or NGOs. The ERC reports directly to the UN Secretary General, with specific responsibility for processing Members States’ requests and coordinating humanitarian assistance; ensuring information management and sharing to support early warning and response; facilitating access to emergency areas; organizing needs assessments, preparing joint appeals, and mobilizing resources to support humanitarian response; and supporting a smooth transition from relief to recovery operations.

b. **At country Level; UN Resident Coordinator (UN RC)** is the designated representative of the UN Secretary General in a particular country and leader of the UN Country Team (UNCT). The UN RC function is usually performed by the UNDP Resident Representative who is accredited by letter from the UN Secretary General to the Head of State or government.

c. **Humanitarian Coordinator (HC)** is appointed by the ERC when large-scale and/or sustained international humanitarian assistance is required in a country. The decision to assign an HC to a country is often made at the start of a crisis and in consultation with the affected government. In some cases, the ERC may choose to designate the UN RC as the HC, in others another Head of Agency (UN and/or international non-governmental organisation (INGO) participating in the coordinated response system) may be appointed and/or a stand-alone HC may be deployed from the pre-selected pool of HC candidates. The HC assumes the leadership of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) in a crisis. In the absence of
an HC, the UN RC is responsible for the strategic and operational coordination of response efforts of UNCT member agencies and other relevant humanitarian actors.

d. **Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)** is an in-country decision making forum focused on providing common strategic and policy guidance on issues related to humanitarian action.

**Bridging mechanisms: cluster coordination**

Coordination is vital in emergencies. Good coordination means fewer gaps and overlaps in humanitarian organizations’ work and also for other agencies and organizations present in the area of operations, for example the military. It strives for a needs-based, rather than capacity-driven, response. It aims to ensure a coherent and complementary approach, identifying ways to work together for better collective results.

To improve capacity, predictability, accountability, leadership and partnership, the Humanitarian Reform of 2005 introduced new elements to the basis of the international humanitarian coordination system which was set by General Assembly resolution 46/182 in December 1991. The most visible aspect of the reform is the creation of the cluster approach. Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations (UN and non-UN) working in the main sectors of humanitarian action. They are created when clear humanitarian needs exist within a sector, when there are numerous actors within sectors and when national authorities need coordination support.

Clusters provide a clear point of contact are accountable for adequate and appropriate humanitarian assistance. Clusters create partnerships between international humanitarian actors, national and local authorities, civil society and military (CIMIC).

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) helps to ensure coordination between clusters at all phases of the response, including needs assessments, joint planning, and monitoring and evaluation.

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**The Global Clusters are:**

Please note: Pending the scope of required aid or assistance not every cluster will be established in each operation (UN slogan: tailored to the needs). However each cluster remains under the patronage of a UN-body, although a NGO can take the cluster lead in country due to their expertise.

**UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord)**

United Nations humanitarian civil-military coordination supports OCHA’s overall efforts in humanitarian operations with a military presence, where OCHA leads the establishment and management of interaction with military actors. This relationship will change depending on the type of emergency and the roles and responsibilities of the military. OCHA supports humanitarian and military actors through training and advocacy on the guidelines that govern the use of foreign military and civil defence assets and humanitarian civil-military interaction. OCHA also seeks to establish a predictable approach to the use of these assets by considering their use during preparedness and contingency-planning activities.

UN-Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic
strategies range from cooperation to coexistence. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

In every humanitarian response, dialogue and interaction with all armed actors is a crucial aspect of humanitarian activities. However, the objectives, strategies and mechanisms will differ. In complex emergencies, humanitarians emphasize the distinction from the military, dialogue and negotiations with non-state armed groups for humanitarian access or protection, as well as security of humanitarian actors. In disasters during peacetime, the focus is likely to be on coordination and appropriate use of foreign military assets (FMA) in support to humanitarian operations.

At all times, the UN-CMCoord Officer has a crucial role to liaise and explain the humanitarian mandate and principles to the military and commanders of other armed actors, and, likewise, in explaining the mandate, rule of engagement and objectives of military and other armed actors to the humanitarian community. This facilitates mutual understanding, working in the same operational environment, and appropriate coordination arrangements.

Four key guidelines have been developed under the auspices of the multi-stakeholder UN-CMCoord Consultative Group and Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), respectively. They set down the principles and concepts for UN-CMCoord; when and how FMA can be considered in support of essential basic needs; how they should be employed; and how UN Agencies and the broader humanitarian community should interact and coordinate with foreign and domestic military forces. They are:

a. ‘Oslo Guidelines’ - Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) in Disaster Relief - (1994 / Updated Nov. 2006 / Rev. 1.1 Nov. 2007). The Oslo Guidelines were developed to fill the “humanitarian gap” between the disaster needs that the international community is asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet these needs. They address the use of FMA following natural, technological and environmental emergencies in times of peace. They assume a stable government, which remains overall responsible for all relief actions. They also assume that the state receiving FMA provides the necessary security for international organizations.

b. ‘MCDA Guidelines’ - Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (March 2003 / Rev. I Jan. 2006). The MCDA Guidelines were developed to cover complex emergencies. They provide guidance on when military and civil defence assets can be used, how they should be employed, and how UN agencies should interface, organize, and coordinate with international military forces. The Guidelines underline that support by military forces is a last resort and must not compromise humanitarian action that FMA should be requested on the basis of humanitarian needs alone, and that FMA support must be unconditional.
Guidelines are non-binding. They are widely accepted reference documents that provide a model legal framework for the development of context-specific or thematic guidance. Topic and context-specific guidance respond to the particular context of humanitarian action.

The type of interaction between humanitarian and military and other armed actors is dictated by the operational environment. The scope and kind of information to be shared, as well as the level of dialogue and coordination, are context-dependent. Generally, in complex emergencies and high security risk environments, the preferred strategy is co-existence. This will ensure distinction between humanitarians and military and other armed actors, and to preserve principled humanitarian action. In disasters in peacetime, closer “cooperation” may be appropriate. CMCoord aims to maximize positive effects of civil-military interaction, while reducing and minimizing negative effects, using the most appropriate strategy and approaches.

Points to take into account

- Militaries can contribute to humanitarian action through their ability to rapidly mobilize and deploy unique assets and expertise in response to specifically identified requirements.
- While military action supports political purposes, humanitarian assistance is based on need and is provided neutrally without taking sides in disputes or political positions on the underlying issues.

c. IASC Reference Paper on Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies (June 2004). It assists humanitarian practitioners in formulating country specific operational guidance on civil-military relations for particularly difficult complex emergencies. Part 1 of the paper reviews, in a generic manner, the nature and character of civil-military relations in complex emergencies; part 2 lists the fundamental humanitarian principles and concepts that must be upheld when coordinating with the military; and part 3 proposes practical considerations for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination. The Reference Paper is one of the most important guides for the UN-CMCoord Officer to determine appropriate liaison and coordination mechanisms in complex emergencies, and, when relevant, for the development of context-specific guidance.

d. IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (February 2013 / replaced the IASC discussion paper of September 2001). The Armed Escorts Guidelines underline that as a general rule humanitarian actors will not use armed escorts. There may be exceptional circumstances in which the use of armed escorts is necessary as a last resort to enable humanitarian action. Before deciding on such exceptions, the consequences and possible alternatives to the use of armed escorts must be considered. As a general rule, it is the responsibility of the HCT to collectively assess and agree to their use. Each context has its own specificities, therefore alternatives must derive from a thorough analysis.
Effective and consistent humanitarian civil-military coordination is a shared responsibility, crucial to safeguarding humanitarian principles and humanitarian operating space.

3.1.2 European Union

The European (EU) has set up a number of Diplomatic Delegations across the world to promote political and economic reforms. It is also undertaking many operations in specific areas as part of its Common Security and Defence Policy but operates in military conflict in general only, if mandated by United Nations. For example the European Union was mandated by UN in 2014 for a peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic. The goal of the mission was to stabilize the area after more than a year of internal conflict. The mission ended its mandate after nearly a year in 2015.

3.2. International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is the largest humanitarian network. Its mission is to alleviate human suffering, protect life, health, and human dignity. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is not a single organization. It is composed of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and of the 191 individual National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

Each has its own legal identity and role, but they are all united by seven fundamental principles and specific channels of communication and coordination. These principles are humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality. Each component of the Movement is committed to respect and uphold them. In June 2006, the Red Crystal symbol was adopted as a non-religious symbol. It is given the same recognition as the Red Cross and Red Crescent. The Red Crystal is now an accepted symbol for medical personnel, facilities and supplies.

The Red Lion with Sun is a recognised symbol, but only used in Iran and Shi’i dominated countries. Official the Red Lion with Sun was adopted in 1980 by the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, but after the revolution Iran re-established its former symbol for its national society. The Red Shield of David is another
recognized symbol but doesn't belong to the ICRC community. However, installations flagged with these symbols shall not be attacked and have to be taken in consideration for careful planning of military operations.

**International Committee of the Red Cross.** The ICRC defines its mission as: “the ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles”. The ICRC therefore deals directly with governments and armed forces, as well as armed opposition groups, to promote compliance with and respect for the law of armed conflict.

During conflicts, the ICRC directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the Movement. ICRC is also the custodian of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) also known as the Law of Armed Conflict (LoAC). The ICRC is committed to responding rapidly and efficiently to the humanitarian needs of people affected by armed conflict or by a natural disaster occurring in a conflict area. The main activities of the ICRC are:

- Visiting detainees;
- Protecting civilians;
- Health;
- Building respect for the law.

The ICRC is neither an international organization nor a non-governmental organization. It is a private association under Swiss Law which was given an international mandate by the states party to the Geneva Conventions to help victims of armed conflict. ICRC is not mandated by governments, its functions and activities are mandated by the international community of states. It is worth mentioning four key characteristics of the ICRC:

- The ICRC seek and maintain a dialogue with all the parties to a conflict.
- The ICRC favours a confidential approach. The ICRC’s practice of confidentiality is reinforced by the organization's immunity from the obligation to testify in a court of law.
- The ICRC is able to play the role of neutral intermediary and to offer its mediation and offices whenever required.
- The ICRC action cannot be part of any integrated or comprehensive mechanism. The ICRC is limited by its fundamental principles which exclude close cooperation with military forces. The ICRC must maintain its independence of decision making and action while consulting closely with military actors.

**International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).** The IFRC carries out relief operations to assist victims of natural and technological disasters, epidemic outbreak, etc. and combines these with development work to strengthen the capacities of its member National Societies. It also directs and
coordinates its members’ actions to assist the refugees and those affected by health emergencies. The IFRC’s work focuses on four core areas: promoting humanitarian values, disaster response, disaster preparedness, and health and community care.

**National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.** The 191 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies constitute a vital field presence of the Movement in nearly all countries. National Societies act as auxiliaries to their national authorities in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services including disaster relief, and health and social programmes. In times of armed conflict, they may assist the civilian population and support the medical services of the armed forces. Their local knowledge and expertise, access to communities and existing infrastructure allow them to act fast and efficiently. This makes them important first responders in many countries and invaluable partners for international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). National Society programs and services address both immediate and long-term needs and include:

- Emergency response;
- Disaster preparedness;
- Community based healthcare;
- First aid training and activities;
- Restoring family contact for disaster victims;
- Youth and volunteer activities.

### 3.3. Non-governmental organizations

NGOs, which can play a role in international affairs by virtue of their activities, are predominantly private (not established by intergovernmental agreement), self-governing, non-profit organizations dedicated to specific aspects of humanitarian, philanthropic and development activity. They are not supposed to be part of (or affiliated with) any government.

NGOs exist at the local, national and international levels and pursue different missions and motivations. Some NGOs work in both humanitarian assistance and long-term development. They play a crucial role in the transition from short-term relief to long-term development. The work of international NGOs often strengthens the skills of local experts and trainers, reducing dependency on external assistance.

Many, but not all NGOs coordinate with the international humanitarian community through the clusters and other coordination mechanisms. Several of the large NGOs and the NGO consortia have their own guidelines and policies on whether and how to engage with the military. However, a proportion of the NGO community will most likely avoid direct interaction with any military force, regardless of nationality, to pursue their own objectives and to preserve their impartiality and neutrality.
Humanitarian NGOs, similar to the ICRC, will avoid the perception of being associated with any party to a conflict, but will have dialogue with all parties (including non-state armed actors) in order to gain security or access to all people in need. The military forces must understand and accept this premise.

In recent decades there has been a vast increase in the number and scale of NGOs. At one extreme, an NGO may resemble a multinational corporation, with significant budgets, international presence and considerable diplomatic leverage. At the other end of the scale, NGOs may pursue a narrow agenda with a low budget and limited means. NGOs are often highly motivated, displaying a vocational drive and belief in the causes championed by their donors. NGOs in general, and humanitarian ones in particular, are cautious about interacting with the military in case it compromises their impartiality and neutrality. Please note that carrying weapons and other military equipment in vehicles of humanitarian NGO is not allowed, also weapons have to be left outside of buildings run by the organizations prior entering.

NGOs are accountable to their trustees, donors and beneficiaries ensuring that the effects of their actions benefit those that they have taken upon responsibility to help and remain true to their organization's values. Most NGOs will operate within a territory using a recognizable and flat command and control structure.

Establishing mechanisms and processes for cooperation during a crisis is essential, and regular peacetime liaison will help the military to understand the various types of NGOs and their sensitivities.

### 3.4. Governmental organizations

Governmental organizations (GOs) are, depending on their specific area of expertise, dependent on their sponsoring nations to support their efforts in the mission area. They can have an expertise in good governance, health care services and support, economic development, infrastructural reconstruction, development, education and political capacity building. Their main focus varies from granting humanitarian assistance to long-term development projects. Examples of GOs are United States Agency for International Development (USAID), UK Department for International Development (DFID) or German Agency for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)).

### 3.5. Law enforcement agencies

Law enforcement agencies are other kinds of important non-military actors. Examples include: police (police forces might have civil or military status, for example gendarmeries, which have a military status and are policing the population), border police, customs, correction facilities and national law enforcement. Such law enforcement agencies are also important counterparts and specialists who contribute to security and governance. Police liaison is normally
conducted by the provost marshal. CIMIC personnel must maintain a close relationship with the office of the provost marshal and should consider law enforcement agencies in assessments and planning.

3.6. Civil defense organizations

Civil defence is the name of a number of organizations dedicated to protecting civilians from military attacks, as well as to providing rescue services after natural and human-made disasters alike. In most countries civil defence is a government managed, volunteer-staffed organization, separate from the fire brigade and the ambulance service.

3.7. Local actors and authorities

This broad category of non-military actors includes the governing authorities of the nation(s) directly impacted by NATO operations. Local actors are the group of all people and organizations that reside in the mission area and are originally from that country/area. They may include authorities at the national, regional and local level, and will usually include civil society organizations, local media, informal leaders (local powerbrokers), civil society groups, semi-official authorities and religious leaders respected by the local population.

Local actors, like the international community, are very diverse and cannot be regarded as a single entity. One should also be aware of the fact that local actors are not merely passive objects of transformation and recipients of international assistance. They have ownership and their own motivation to resolve the conflict. The effort of the international community is, or should be, aimed at helping to enhance their resilience.

3.8. Private sector

The private sector is what sits outside of direct state control. It describes any privately owned group or person involved in profitable activities. In many countries the private sector owns large parts of the national critical infrastructure. The private sector might only coordinate if it supports their business model or due to legal obligations.

Private sector companies are increasingly involved in disaster response, often as part of their commitment to a corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategy. This involvement can take many forms, including being donors to the UN, Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and NGOs, or being direct service providers of aid. Companies like DHL and Ericsson have been working to support humanitarian logistics and telecommunications for years and are joined by a growing number of private sector actors involved in disaster response. The vast majority of private companies’ involvement in disaster relief occurs independently. Liaison may be
required with these various organizations, both for their advice and to ensure coordination of activity.

There is a strong rationale for the private sector to collaborate with the civil preparedness, disaster response and the humanitarian communities. The private sector is indeed a fundamental component of affected communities. Private sector interests are often equally vulnerable to a natural disaster or the impact of conflict. Local business operations are among the first to be hit by emergencies. Their infrastructure, supply chains, workforce, and markets can all be severely affected. There is a business interest for engagement; by preparing for and responding to emergencies, businesses can ensure that their operations will not be severely affected by emergencies. In addition, engagement in humanitarian action ensures an increase in staff engagement and satisfaction, strengthening of community resilience, prosperity and sustainable development as well as enhanced relationships with communities.

IV Knowledge development

4.1. Aim

Processes and information that support decision-making already exist within NATO. The problem is that this “information” or isolated knowledge often resides in the heads and offices of subject matter experts across (and external to) the organization; it is not fused, de-conflicted, or shared, at least not in a formal, well-established manner nor is it often available in an electronically retrievable format. Therefore, there is a need to “connect” or fuse existing information, and the processes that are used to develop it, so that the decision-maker is presented with a clear holistic understanding, as early as possible in the decision making process.

Knowledge development (KD) is a continuous iterative process carried out at strategic, operational and tactical levels to provide the decision maker with a comprehensive understanding of complex environments, including behavior, relationships and interactions between systems and (non-military) actors.

A knowledge development process covers the collection, analysis, access and transfer of basic data to more usable information, information to awareness and awareness to understanding. This contributes to preparation for and execution of missions by providing higher level of awareness and understanding for decision making in response to indications and warning of an emerging security problem as well as during the planning, execution and assessment of operations.
The challenge of KD is to make the relevant information available on time in a form that can be analysed and distributed in near real time and to develop a level of shared understanding that supports timely and effective decision making.

Knowledge development including all source intelligence is essential to an effective understanding of the civil environment. CIMIC personnel should use KD to create, refine and execute the best CIMIC activities synchronized within the operational (physical, information and cognitive) environment.

4.1.1 Understanding the civil environment

The civil environment is described as the political, economic, social ethnographic, cultural, infrastructure and information elements of the people with whom a military force of government operates. For CIMIC a deep understanding of the civil environment is crucial for conducting CIMIC activities, liaison and engagement. The commander requires a comprehensive picture of the civil environment for mission
planning and execution because, for example even an unintended violation of the (local) traditions and customs can lead to a loss of support of the population and the trust of non-military actors. In turn this can lead to the military forces losing their legitimacy, which would seriously undermine the mission.

4.1.2 The knowledge development process overview

Iterative in nature, knowledge development is defined as a process that includes collecting and analyzing, and integrating isolated data into useable bodies of knowledge, and making that knowledge available so that it can be shared. A simple overview of the KD process is shown in the picture.

The KD concept identifies three key steps in the KD process:

Collection. This involves the acquisition of information by various staffs, sensors and units. KD is driven by information and knowledge requirements relating to potential areas of strategic interest prior to a crisis or by commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) in established areas of operation.

Analysis. The purpose of analysis is to put information into context and then draw conclusions, deductions or implications. Analysis is required to provide products for assessment, planning and execution. Analysis in support of a requirement can be accomplished by a variety of techniques or approaches.

Access. Once knowledge has been developed it must be stored and “transferred” to decision makers and users in a timely manner. This will require tools and procedures to either ‘push’ knowledge to the user, or allow the user to ‘pull’
knowledge depending on the situation and operational requirement to ensure appropriate knowledge transfer.

**System analysis**

Introduced and developed as part of KD, systems analysis is an integral part of the KD process. To summarize, systems analysis is an analytical process that can be employed to holistically examine adversaries, potential adversaries, nonaligned, and friendly nations or entities. Systems analysis integrates the analyses of study areas, such as the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) domains. Systems analysis is a continuous, iterative and collaborative process that should be conducted in close co-operation with internal/external subject matter experts (SMEs), GOs, and NGOs, as required. It is successfully utilized in both the civilian and military communities and has proven to be particularly useful in analyzing and understanding problems in complex operational environments.

Elements of KD and systems analysis thinking are already supporting existing operations and missions, with positive feedback to indicate these decision-support capabilities should be implemented in a more formal and coherent manner. While considered the key enabler for the operations planning process and with the importance of KD to the execution and assessment of NATO operations, the implementation of KD, including systems analysis capabilities, could also be considered a critical stand-alone capability.

**Information knowledge management**

The KD process is supported by the information / knowledge management (IKM) process which supports the information, intelligence and KD requirements of the entire organization. KD not only uses IKM for the development of knowledge, it also is critical to the third KD step of making knowledge accessible. It is important to note, however, that KD and IKM are not the same. KD is the process that develops knowledge to support decision making whereas IKM manages the provision of that knowledge across an organization.

**Knowledge requirements**

KD is driven by information and knowledge requirements relating to potential areas of interest prior to a crisis or by CCIRs in established areas of operation. The primary purpose of KD is to support subsequent decision making in response to indications and warning of an emerging security problem as well as during the planning, execution and assessment of operations.
4.2. Information

4.2.1 How to collect

The first stage of the KD process involves the acquisition, collection and collation of information for later processing into actionable knowledge.

The initial phase of the KD Process depends heavily on the quality of the external information collection sources and relationships. The sources of information for different types of operations may differ greatly and will likely include traditional intelligence sources, data repositories of designed information proponents and a broad spectrum of open Internet sources. Each source will require different mechanisms for establishing reliability and the credibility of the information collected.

The quality of the initial knowledge retrieval has tremendous impact on the efficiency and focus of further collection efforts and therefore should be supported by effective navigation and retrieval functionalities.

Experience shows that well designed search engines, including open-source intelligence accessible to operational planners and other end users, reduce the number of unnecessary requests for existing information or analysis products.

Holistic analysis of the engagement space requires an array of information, including not only that provided by intelligence sources and traditional Intelligence collection means, but also information from other non-intelligence/military sources, like CIMIC. Open sources available through the world wide web reflect an endless supply of information, although the sources are mostly unevaluated and of undetermined reliability. Civil governmental authorities from the international to local level, IOs and NGOs might be able to provide reliable information.

However, each of the aforementioned groups may have competing agendas and may provide information with the aim of influencing NATO operations to benefit their group. Those sources of information are out of NATO control and categorized as “uncontrolled” or “casual” sources. Therefore, mechanisms must be established to identify, evaluate and access potential resources of PMESII information. PMESII collection is to be conducted in a fully disclosed manner, with no attempt to disguise or hide NATO affiliations.
If such disclosure is ill-advised or problematic, consider utilizing other avenues, to include traditional intelligence disciplines, to obtain the necessary information.

The challenge is to obtain access to the right information, provided at the right time, by a reliable resource that is willing to share. The following principles provide guidance and describe the factors that should be considered before the authorized NATO element contacts a source:

To identify a valuable resource for PMESII information, the following factors and questions need to be considered and raised before the intended information exchange:

**Information content factors:**

Does the resource have a proper knowledge about the subject, country or culture?

Were past publications/studies issued on the subject by the potential resource? Were references provided on that subject?

Is the resource in close contact with the subject of interest (in place or liaison element)?

**Operational factors:**

Is the resource NATO friendly, neutral, impartial or adversarial?

Has the resource cooperated with NATO/Allies before? If yes, what is the resource’s reputation?

Are the resource’s interests and aims in line with, independent of or contradictory to NATO’s interests and goals? To what degree?

Is the information seen as reliable and is this assessment confirmed by other resources?

Is the resource willing to share information?

Is the resource willing to provide “one way” information, without getting information back from NATO?

Can a non-information exchange be arranged through which NATO barters goods or services for information (i.e., food, fuel, water, medicine or other support activities)?

Can/will the resource provide information in a timely and reliable manner?

What assessed risk does the potential resource assume by virtue of the proposed cooperation?
Are there any arrangements or memoranda of agreement already in place or possible to formalize information exchange expectations?

**Security factors:**

Can the resource be evaluated/validated by counter-intelligence and security (CI&Sy)?

Ensure that the resource has no ties (social, financial, economical and political) to opponent forces in the area of interest (AOI) (as assessed and validated by CI&Sy).

Assess the potential resource’s motivations for cooperation.

It is critical to handle and evaluate the PMESII resource information the same way that information from traditional intelligence sources is evaluated to ensure decision makers and planners receive reliable and accurate information. Source evaluation/validation is an assessment of how reliable the source is and how likely the information that comes from it is to be true and free of biases. Collected information cannot be taken at face value.

There are many reasons why information may not be reliable or entirely accurate, not the least of which is hostile deception. A description how a resource and its information can be categorized is available from NATO human intelligence governing directives. The advantage of this categorization method will be:

It provides a universally understood and standardized shorthand assessment of information; and,

Over time, it gives an indication of the capabilities of various resources and agencies and aids the selection of those best suited for particular tasks.

Before relying on a resource’s information, a proper background check/screening by the appropriate CI&Sy elements must be conducted. After the evaluation/validation process, information provided by a resource must be classified through approved NATO procedures.

It should be clearly understood that through the knowledge development process all information, independent of its reliability, will be processed and considered. It is vital that information and intelligence used in (external) planning, operations or assessments and to inform decision makers is evaluated and reliable. However information evaluated as deliberately deception should also be considered valuable for information operations.

Information is useless if it cannot be processed in a timely manner. Therefore, unnecessary duplication, collection and processing needs to be avoided. At the first stage, the requirements for information must be clearly identified. This will be done
by comparing already existing and available information (in databases/files) and operational information requirements by the appropriate analyst. Research and analysis tools need to be used to find the already evaluated information for operational use. In this process, the value of the information must be assessed against operational requirements with respect to:

• Age of information.

• Reliability/accuracy.

• Scope on subject.

• Detail/depth of information.

A request for information should be submitted and processed by knowledge brokers only after ensuring existing information will not satisfy the information requested. Information requested or acquisitioned should be limited and focused to AOI-supporting information, based on functional area RFIs, CCIRs or priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). By using this approach, information can be developed into actionable intelligence or knowledge. This new knowledge will itself be stored in a knowledge database to make it available for later analysis or to support other requirements.

The integration of newly received information or derived produced knowledge into an existing knowledge repository or knowledge base – which is both an information acquisition and knowledge development function – requires:

Establishing structural relations between distinguishable components of new information/knowledge and the knowledge base data structure (collation).

A clear understanding of process flow from each element or individual that enters data into the knowledge repository.

Usage of a “master-data-format" to ensure external data can be easily provided and integrated into existing knowledge base data structures.

Deducting implied consequences/changes to existing context on all affected levels of aggregation, which might be supported by an automated reasoning mechanism.

Capturing contextually significant change history of new content to ensure traceability and validation of changes.

Indicating tolerated contradictions with existing context from an analytic perspective, if deviating perspectives are to be reflected.

Sanitizing content, if necessary, and determining level of classification/disclosure.
These functions are closely related to the analysis process and may involve corresponding data tagging in the knowledge base. Depending on volume and required skill level, they may be distributed to specialized functions, e.g. a dedicated disclosure process and knowledge broking process, but still need to be closely coordinated with analysis. Due to this distribution of work, the KD process requires continuous coordination of products and updated knowledge base content. Therefore, a well-structured knowledge base is considered an indispensable means of collective situational awareness and work coordination throughout the whole KD process.

### 4.2.2 How to analyze

Analysis is defined as the study of a whole by examining its parts and their interactions. The purpose of analysis is to put information into context and then draw conclusions, deductions or implications.

Conducting analysis of the civil environment is not limited to CIMIC analysts, but also performed next or in absence of dedicated analyst personnel within the framework of a deployment, operation or exercise. CIMIC field and staff personnel are required to gather (specific) information, determine the relevance and derive accurate conclusions in order to contribute to planning, assessing and executing CIMIC activities. However due to the complexity of the civil environment, there is a preference for personnel conducting CIMIC analysis to be well-educated and trained in analysis methodology, such as:

- Event analysis, based on single event or report.
- Topic analysis, on special subjects of concern.
- Gap analysis, based on requirements and existing knowledge
- Capability and force/ratio analysis.
- Generic pattern analysis.
- Course of action analysis.
- Effects analysis.
- Systems analysis

Whilst many well-established analysis techniques can be used to support knowledge development, it is the systems perspective of an engagement space that is critical in achieving KD’s overall aim of providing a holistic understanding.
It is therefore the emerging systems analysis methodology that is core to the overall KD process and which is explained in detail in annex 8.1.7. "System analysis".

During initial analysis the preliminary focus of KD is usually only broadly specified, e.g. a geographical region or AOI. The initial information acquisition and analysis process relies on a balanced effort across the entire operational environment and is not influenced by operational objectives. Such analysis permits the formulation of a preliminary understanding of how the major actors, systems and components interact within the operational environment. Once the mission has been established, this understanding will then form the basis of more detailed analysis and will help identify gaps in existing knowledge and areas requiring further study.

As the depth of analysis is further developed, the identification of specific focus areas and operational objectives may either be derived from the analysis or given by external guidance. The focus areas are driven by the CCIRs with the initial information requirements being formulated by his planning staff. In the later stages of KD, focus areas may evolve further due to changes in the situation, results of the ongoing analysis process, or due to emerging current or future planning requirements. In most cases, the true complexity of the operating environment, and the options for influencing the achievement of operational objectives with desired effects only emerges as a result of the in depth iterative analysis process.

Continuous review and adjustment of the analysis is required and can only be achieved through coordination of the KD process and the planning, execution and assessment processes.

Actionable knowledge is only of value if it is understandable and usable by the target audience or decision maker. Knowledge can be provided by subject matter experts or by other specialists and needs to be evaluated within the context of a specific mission environment or AOI. Knowledge can be either provided as a reactive response to specific knowledge requests or by proactively distributing knowledge to try to meet all user requirements. Good KD practice maximizes knowledge distribution without overloading staff with unnecessary and superfluous information. To make today's complex interrelationships between entities understandable to non-experts, new ways and methodologies need to be found to make knowledge accessible to the target audience.

All actors, whether civil or military always use their own information scheme and follow their own focus of interest, which not necessarily matches the interest of the other party. In order to get a common understanding on the risks in the operation theatre it is recommended to agree between all parties on a common risk analysis structure. Pending the specific challenges during an operation the tool has to be dealt as a living document.

4.2.3 How to access
The knowledge transfer step should be facilitated by robust communication mechanisms, user-friendly navigation systems and search engines that permit easy access to the knowledge base. Due to the nature of some analysis products, continuous personal contact with the end user/consumer in order to explain and, if necessary, re-model and refine analysis products, can be beneficial.

### 4.2.4 Knowledge Transfer

Information sharing is an enabler for effective CIMIC. Making information widely available to multiple responding civilian and military elements not only reduces duplication of effort, but also enhances communication, coordination and collaboration and provides a common knowledge base so that critical information can be pooled, analysed and validated. Civil-military collaboration networks need to be designed to facilitate sharing of information among non-military and military organizations. A collaborative information environment facilitates information sharing, while operations security measures will be considered at each step of the process.

Like all steps in the KD process knowledge transfer must be considered as part of a “spiral process” and not an independent final step. Continuous end-user interaction is not possible or even desirable throughout all phases of the KD process, however, consultation and feedback should be sought periodically to ensure suitability and acceptance of the final product. This promotes a better situation understanding of the problem by the end user and can lead to a refinement or change to the original information request. Validation of analysis products is essential in achieving user acceptance during this phase and can be achieved by the inclusion of referenced source data.

It is essential to transfer analysis results into a format and the required depth of detail that satisfies the end user’s specific knowledge requirements (e.g. operational planning process, commander’s decision brief). This step has to ensure that relevant complexity of the operational environment is not over-simplified in favor of simplicity/swiftness of product development and acceptance. Tool support must be tailored to enhance visualization and understanding of complex analysis products.

### V Planning and assessment

#### 5.1. Introduction

“All the world's a stage, and all the men and the women merely players.”

*William Shakespeare*
Just as a good play needs a good story that captivates the viewer, a military interaction requires planning and adaptation. As on stage, the solution of multidimensional challenges is accomplished in several acts. The focus of the considerations has been chosen independently of the distinction between operational and tactical levels. Although most of the reference documents tend to focus on operational and strategic planning levels, the planning portion of this chapter is aimed more at staff members who are interested in the influence of their contributions to these levels.

Assessments and situation analysis are the basis of good planning and further operations. An actor has to put himself in all facets of his portrayed character. A CIMIC staff member makes the deduction and conclusion by identifying and analysing all key elements of the PMESII (TE) domains. Once the information has been evaluated and products developed; these products will contribute to the decision making process.

Only the interaction of all actors results in a well-sounding symphony.

## 5.2. Planning

Military planning describes specific activities associated with the deployment, employment, sustainment and redeployment of a joint task force and provides a unifying purpose on individually applied actions (ways) and resources (means) based on operational objectives (ends). Military planning is based on understanding the problem and framing conditions.

The overall planning for complex operations requires good communication and detailed planning and coordination with other actors. The majority of such civil-military interaction (CMI) are to be conducted by all NATO military disciplines and functions. However, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) personnel as enablers and facilitators of the CMI are trained for this task.

Through the sequence of planning activities, CIMIC staff need to effectively translate the commander’s planning guidance related to the civil environment into CIMIC related effects, and feasible contributions to a course of action, concept of operations and operation plan (OPLAN). This will be facilitated by the CIMIC estimate \(^{22}\) that includes but is not limited to the following actions:

- identify non-military actors that could influence the crisis and the mission;
- provide input to the comprehensive preparation of the operational environment including actions to identify and analyse the root causes of the crisis;
- support all sub teams as part of a joint operations planning group;
- advice on implications of military operations, including CIMIC activities, on the civil environment and vice versa;
- consider relevant cross-cutting topics;
The Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) is the basic reference document for planning staffs within NATO. It addresses all aspects of an OPLAN, provides guidance on the conduct and methods of planning, as well as identifying the factors to be taken into consideration during the development of a plan.

Functional planning guides provide planning guidance in specific functional areas. The intent of these guides is to supplement the planning information available in the NATO Crisis Response System Manual, Military Committee documents, approved NATO joint doctrine and the COPD. Specific tactics, techniques and procedures, and headquarters standing operating procedures and standing operating instructions explain how to implement CIMIC and naval cooperation and guidance for shipping related procedures into planning.

The aim of the comprehensive operations planning (COP) is to provide the best military advice to strategic and political military decision makers by ensuring a holistic understanding of engagement space. Unlike the conventional operational planning methodologies, comprehensive operations planning is not solely adversary and terrain centric but can be regarded as rather population centric. The planning phases are depicted below:

- consider the objectives and plans of relevant non-military actors;
- contribute to the assessments of the host nation;
- facilitate coordinated planning with non-military actors;
- share information of planning related information with non-military actors, within the limits of operations security; and
- develop the CIMIC effects and their corresponding measures of effectiveness, as well as the CIMIC activities to produce these effects and their corresponding measures of performance.
During planning for operations, the CIMIC planners will lead the X9 contribution to the OPP. This will include input in the development of the comprehensive preparation of the operational environment (CPOE – X2 led) and the contribution of CIMIC planners to each operations planning group (X5 or X35 led). CIMIC contribution to OPP will be briefly explained below. CIMIC functional planning guide (CFPG) can be referred to for detailed information.

5.2.1 Initial situational awareness (Phase 1)

From a CIMIC perspective this phase is dedicated to forming a common understanding of the linkages in the civil environment. Due to sensitivities, planning efforts are classified. Direct liaison authority (DIRLAUTH) is unlikely at this stage so there will be little external engagement. The CIMIC estimate may start by J/X9 in this phase. CIMIC would identify non-military actors and determine their role and their relations, especially IO/GO/NGOs and the host nation (HN) civil emergency structures. The CIMIC planner can start to work on the actors diagram and has to determine what CIMIC-related aspects will impact on possible engagement and initial deductions. Coordination between X2/X9 is necessary at all levels. Analysis should also include (where possible and where applicable) a study of HN resiliency status.
CIMIC contribution in Phase 1.
- Open source information gathering.
- Start of the **SWOT analysis** (Identify civil strength, weaknesses, opportunities and threats).
- **Actors diagram** (Identify non-military actors and determine their role and their relations) in the AOI.
- Start of the request for information (RFI) process.
- Start comprehensive preparation of the operational environment (CPOE) if initiated.
- Start of the CIMIC estimate (use TOPFAS\textsuperscript{23}, if possible, as a situational awareness tool).

5.2.2 Appreciation of the environment (Phase 2)

Phases 1 and 2 of the OPP are focused on the same central idea – to create shared understanding about the operating environment at both tactical and operational level. In fact, the only significant difference between the two phases is the level of detailed analysis. Phase 1 is focused on scanning the horizon for potential crises; and once directed by the commander, initiating the CPOE. Phase 2 is a more detailed analysis of the crisis, resulting in advice to the higher level and providing them with the developed CPOE. Regionally-focused and already deployed HQs (MNC-NE, MND-SE, NFIUs etc.) possess unique regional situational awareness which can be used during the OPP. Therefore, RFI process continues. The CPOE phase starts with the receipt of the warning order from the higher HQ (strategic warning order for the operational level; operational warning order for the tactical level), which will be followed by the activation of the operations planning group (OPG) at every level. Once an OPG is activated, it is usually composed of three teams. CIMIC plans has to support all three teams: blue (friendly forces), red (adversary forces) and green (others). CIMIC work at this phase is captured below:

- Liaise with organizations and agencies as far as authorized (DIRLAUTH).
- Contribute to the operational liaison and reconnaissance team (OLRT) if deployed.
- NFIU - RFIs / OLRT- RFIs.
- Contribute to CPOE / support the analysis of the PMESII & TE domains.
- Update the CIMIC estimate, SWOT analysis, actors diagram.
- Contribute to the liaison and engagement matrix (led by SHAPE J9).
- Participate in blue, red and green planning teams.
- CIMIC contribution to the CPOE briefing to the OPG.
- Analyse (tactical level) and contribute (operational level) to SACEUR's strategic assessment.
- Disseminate (operational level) and contribute (tactical level) to SACEUR military response options (MROs)
• Start compilation of data for CIMIC sites of significance, key non-military actors and crisis emergency planning (CEP) structures and procedures.
• Contribute to CIMIC relevant commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).

It should be noted that CPOE is cross-functional, drawing engagement from the most appropriate subject-matter experts (SME) across the whole HQ and external augmentation as required IOT provide a holistic view of all possible PMESII & TE elements in combination with the ASCOPE analysis matrix. At this phase, X9 staff members, in addition to X2, should actively engage with other members across the whole HQ and contribute to their processes in activities such as intelligence preparation of the battle space (IPB), targeting, non-lethal effects and other relevant activities.

### 5.2.3 Operational/ tactical estimate (Phase 3)

The focus of Phase 3 is to understand the challenges, the operating environment, and the mission through detailed staff analysis. It is essential that the CIMIC planner understands CIMIC as a joint function, which can influence the whole planning process and should be considered as integral part of collaborative planning.

Phase 3 is divided into two different steps:

a. **Phase 3a - Mission analysis** (looking for the ‘what’).
b. **Phase 3b – Course of action (COA) development** (looking for the ‘how’).

**Phase 3a - Mission analysis** determines the operational / tactical problem that must be solved, the specific operational / tactical conditions to be created and the key operational factors. Mission analysis for the CIMIC planner consists of an in-depth analysis of the civil environment to determine the problem to be solved (the “what”) and the conditions that must be established.

The CIMIC contribution to the CPOE is completed before starting this phase, and a factor analysis (Factor/Deduction/Conclusion) summary sheet has to be developed as integral part of the CIMIC estimate (Link to CFPG Annex B and F for a sample factor analysis).

The main CIMIC products of Phase 3a are the contribution to the mission analysis and the development of a draft CIMIC concept. A CIMIC concept depicts how CIMIC is going to be employed in the theatre and support the mission. CIMIC work at this sub-phase is captured below:

• Factor analysis (key in the mission analysis).
• Contribute to the development of the liaison matrix.
This sub phase ends with the mission analysis briefing (MAB). The key product from the MAB are the operational planning guidance (OPG) at joint level and component planning guidance (CPG) at component level to guide the main subordinate units. The CIMIC planners have to contribute to the OPG and CPG at each level in order to guide the further development/ update of the CIMIC estimate in support of the following stages of the planning process.

**Phase 3b – COA development** is aimed at selecting how to best carry out operations in accordance with the Commander’s intent. It includes a review of the commander’s planning guidance, the development of the courses of action (COAs) and contributes to the combined joint statement of requirements (CJSOR). The own (blue) COAs will be tested against the adversary (red) COAs during war gaming in order to refine them. X9 participates in the war gaming in green team portraying the actions of non-military actors and their impact on the operation as well as the implications of military (own and adversary) operation on civilian activities and population.

- Provide input into operations design and centre of gravity (COG) analysis.
- Complete CIMIC sites of significance.
- Determine NATO and HN CIMIC forces available and CIMIC C2 structure.
- CICOM (if relevant) at all levels.
- Identify gaps in civil capacities/capabilities with impact in own operations.
- Update the CIMIC estimate (to be continued until Phase 4b).
- Start drafting the CIMIC concept.
- Prepare the CIMIC contributions to the mission analysis briefing (MAB).
- Receive/ disseminate (operational level) strategic planning directive (SPD), coordinate and contribute to operational planning directive (OPD) and component planning guidance (CPG).
- Update the CIMIC estimate, and the liaison and engagement matrix.
- Provide input to both blue and red COAs.
- CICOM at all levels to coordinate the CIMIC Concept for each COA.
- Analyze effects of non-military actors.
- Participate in the war gaming on the green team.
- CIMIC contribution to MoE-MoPs.
- Contribute with CIMIC relevant input to CJSOR.
- Contribute to operational/ component planning directive.
- Start drafting the Appendixes 2 (CIMIC Structure) and 5 (Reports and Returns) to the Annex W of the OPLAN.

At the end of this phase, the whole CIMIC staff must have a clear understanding of the CIMIC capabilities required to support the selected COA, staff augmentation requirements, the CIMIC concept and the supporting C2 arrangement. For the COA decision brief, CIMIC planner has to create a CIMIC concept for each blue COA (a
single CIMIC concept can support all the blue COAs, but can also differ pending on the presented blue COAs).

### 5.2.4 OPLAN Development (Phase 4)

The purpose of this phase is to transfer the ideas, expressed in the chosen and refined COA into a written OPLAN. OPLAN development is split into two distinct parts:

a. Phase 4a - Concept of operations (CONOPS) development.

b. Phase 4b - Operation plan (OPLAN)/ operation order (OPORD) development.

**Phase 4a - CONOPS development** begins following the revision of the commander’s selected COA (during COA decision brief), the operational/ tactical design, the provisional component mission, and the corresponding objectives. The CIMIC involvement during this sub-phase will be:

- Update the CIMIC estimate.
- Ensure relevant cross cutting topics are considered.
- CICOM at all levels.
- Ensure CIMIC relevant information is integrated in the main body of the CONOPS*.
- Contribute to the key annexes to the CONOPS*.
- Continue the development of the appendices to annex W to the OPLAN (to include, but not limited to, appendices 3 'Key civil organizations’ and 4 ‘CIMIC sites of significance').

**Phase 4b –** The purpose of OPLAN development phase is to implement the CONOPS and to determine the conduct of operations. In the OPLAN development CIMIC involvement will be:

- CIMIC contribution to the OPLAN main body and annexes.
- Finalized ANNEX W and its appendixes.
- CICOM at all levels.

This phase ends with the signed OPLAN as the responsibility for the further planning is now transferred from X5 to X3.

### 5.2.5 Execution (Phase 5)

This Phase starts after the promulgation of NAC execution directive (NED) and the receipt of the activation order (ACTORD). The purpose of this phase is the execution of the approved OPLAN. It requires interaction with other military and non-military actors to conduct integrated, coordinated and synchronized activities.
CIMIC will contribute to this phase by providing the commander with periodic and specific CIMIC assessments.

Phase 5 could have many sub-phases. The NATO planning cycle of PLAN (X5), refine (X35), execute (X3) and assess (operational analysis branch) firmly kicks in. The CIMIC plan will be refined and then given to the X3 shop. The CIMIC planners will likely remain with the OPG and look at subsequent operations and ultimately the transition.

5.2.6 Transition (Phase 6)

The purpose of this phase is to review, develop and coordinate a tailored OPLAN or SUPPLAN for transition, including the handover of responsibility to the HN, or international organizations, or a follow-on force. The planning for disengagement of NATO forces must be initiated well in advance and may involve a large number of non-NATO actors. Continuous liaison and coordination between Alliance HQs on all levels, the HN, and civil organizations and agencies is essential.

The CIMIC involvement during this phase will be:
- To participate in the planning process and procedures for the handover of responsibilities.
- To facilitate the interaction with other international or national actors in developing a transition OPLAN or SUPPLAN.

5.2.7 Integrated planning with non-military actors

When civilians and military forces interact, there has to be coordination within the limits of what is suitable, feasible and acceptable for each. Whether the relationship will be one of cooperation or coexistence, coordination must take place.

The core lesson from CMI in events, ranging from humanitarian assistance (HA)/disaster relief (DR) to open hostilities, is that each has its own unique requirements in an often complex environment.

During hostilities, the interaction between civilian and military participants will normally be much more restricted and circumspect than during a natural disaster and emergency response.

At one end of the spectrum is ‘cooperation’, whereby during HA/DR operations the civil-military goals closely align and share information relatively freely, and association is not limited. On the other end of the spectrum, ‘coexistence’ represents a more complex environment where the military is engaged in hostilities that limit civil-military information sharing and association. Military planners should note that the willingness of aid agencies to engage with the military along the
coordination spectrum will depend not only on the conflictual nature of the operating environment but also on the culture of each agency.

Identification of civilian-military information sharing and planning (CMIS) information allows the planners to identify likely sources amongst the civilian entities to approach requesting access to the information, but also initiates the process of identifying unclassified sources, or information likely to require declassification, when requested by the civilian entities.

5.3. Assessment

Conduct of CIMIC assessments will be performed as part of the overall HQ assessment process. To shape and execute this process CIMIC and other experts from all required staff functions cooperate under the lead of the HQs assessment element to provide an integrated assessment function.

CIMIC personnel at higher tactical level (corps level) and above are required to make regular assessments regarding their AOO as well as AOI. CIMIC staff at lower tactical level should be involved in this planning process by contributing to the situation awareness of higher HQ. And they also prepare for possible future tasks. CIMIC personnel are responsible for the evaluation of the civilian environment in the form of PMESII (TE). The responsibility of processing the PMESII (TE) factors can be distributed at the HQs differently among the staff elements.

The CIMIC staff is responsible for a variety of different analysis/planning products or contributes to them. A number of planning products are related to Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive and CIMIC functional planning guide and the entire planning process. In some cases analytical work will be similar to civilian think tanks – scanning environment for important topics to run the process. After completion to prepare the executive summary for the commander and subsequently disseminate to other HQ’s. NATO provides the CIMIC reporting and tracking system (CRTS); although size, format and functional area of analysis projects may vary depending on main focus of the HQ.

The CIMIC staff branch must search for new sources of information, not just military sources, but civil sources in particular. Many military institutions have agreements with civilian institutions to increase knowledge building and analysis capacity. Many think tank products are available free of charge on the Internet. These products can have a major impact on situational awareness and provide a better understanding of the operational picture.

An assessment should be clear to all readers. The characteristics as mentioned in CIMIC TTP1 are:

• **Accurate.** Bear in mind - inaccurate information may be more dangerous than no information at all.
The most common way of providing input is by using format of fact – deduction – conclusion. Subsequently assessing the impact on operation and preparing recommendation for commander. Next step would be continuous monitoring the effects of action taken.

An example of a CIMIC analysis can be found in the annex.

**5.3.1 PMESII & Technology, Environment (TE) – ASCOPE**

Situational awareness and understanding is a vital element for any mission success. It may heavily rely on CIMIC contribution in the form of frequent, detailed and accurate assessments of the civil environment in the area. These assessments will provide a picture of the civil situation to enable all command levels in NATO to understand the situation and better make the future decisions and coherent planning.

Monitoring progress is aided through the adoption of commonly understood procedures and techniques. The main tool used for proper analysis of the cross functional topics is the PMESII(TE)-ASCOPE chart (political, military, economic, social, infrastructural, information, technology, environment domains interwoven with area, structure, capabilities, organization, people, events).

No matter how fancy your tools are – conclusions are still made by yourself.

It might be useful to use other tools to better facilitate and process obtained information. CIMIC personnel is encouraged to look for new possible tools to support the analytical process in their HQ.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area</strong></td>
<td>Existence (or not) governmental, local structures: district, municipality, province. Role and responsibilities of those structure.</td>
<td>Area of Operations (AOR, AOI), terrain cover, avenues of approach, GO (NO-GO, SLOW-GO) terrain, weather impact.</td>
<td>Industrial-areas, business centres, regular (Black, underground) market, residential zones, special economic zones, mines, agriculture analysis, trade routes: import - export (internal, external), smuggling routes, natural resources zones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td>Locations, internal structures and responsibilities. Balance of powers, vertical – horizontal structures, (local level, governmental level, other important offices and services).</td>
<td>Presence and role of: Headquarters, units, training facilities, support facilities, military jails, checkpoints, and other military infrastructure.</td>
<td>Banking system, cash flow system, para-banks, state pension and state law and order systems. Stock exchange, GDP/national debt/financial ratings. Citizen’s expenses analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>Presence of public administration, parliament, court, essential services (quality and numbers) fire department, medical service and other government departments (law and order).</td>
<td>Projection of force in all domains (land, air, see, cyber, space), logistic support capability (sustainment).</td>
<td>Area/country financial stability system assessment, ability to provide financial/economic services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations</td>
<td>Political parties, associations, legal/nongovernmental political entities, social movements.</td>
<td>Military, para-military organizations, other uniformed services, voluntary fire brigades.</td>
<td>Business centres, labour unions, criminal groups, cooperative banks, banks, para-banks, underground economy entities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>High ranking officials on governmental and local level, political influential personalities, lobbyists.</td>
<td>Manning, morale, level of training, commander’s experience.</td>
<td>Business leaders, criminal personalities, analysis of labour work force, number of pensioners, trends on economic development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events</td>
<td>Campaigns, elections, political assemblies, marches, protests, riots, military coup.</td>
<td>Fighting, explosions, terrorist attacks, offensive – defensive operations.</td>
<td>Economical scandals, trade fairs, harvest, market days, theft, robbery, bribing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Measuring resilience aspects of nations

Approved by NATO Warsaw Summit, the seven identified baseline requirements (“7 BLR”) of resilience have increasingly entered military domain and military focus.

Guiding questions in assessing nations’ resilience are:
• How resilient are NATO countries?
• How will the civilian domain impact on the military operations?
• What will be the consequences of military operations in accordance with Art. 5 (high intensity warfare) for the military and civilian domains?
• What must be done as a part of the preparatory process?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Continuity of government</th>
<th>Energy supplies</th>
<th>Uncontrolled movement</th>
<th>Food and water</th>
<th>Mass casualties</th>
<th>Communication</th>
<th>Transport</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X-land</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y-land</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z-land</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>■</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Example of measuring Resilience aspects of Nations with trends and subsequently reflect them to Operational Picture.

5.3.2 CIMIC estimate/operations assessment

On different levels within military operations, assessments are used to establish a common operating picture and ensure situational awareness and understanding. The operations assessment includes the generation of the CPOE. Knowledge development (including the intelligence branch, supported by all other branches including CIMIC) provides knowledge on key actors and components that have influence on the operational environment so that a thorough understanding of the relevant systems is achieved. The basis for the CIMIC contribution to the CPOE is the CIMIC estimate. Created by the CIMIC staff in the initial phase of the planning. This is a living document which has to be updated regularly.
With a CIMIC assessment included in the CPOE, an image can be created of all factors within the human terrain of the environment. The following factors are addressed by CIMIC: Introduction, Mandate, Mission, History, Physical Terrain, PMESII&TE factors, CIMIC Operational Overview, and Non-Military Actors.

1. Introduction
   A short explanation of the use and the contents of the assessment.

2. Mandate
   Documents like NATO, UN resolutions, host nation (HN) documents etc. and a short description what they mean to CIMIC.

3. Mission
   Analyse the given directive from the commander. What does it mean for CIMIC? What are the CIMIC objectives?

4. History
   What are the historical factors within the HN that influenced the current situation? A brief description of countries/areas history.

5. Physical terrain.
   **Geography**
   This should contain information about the geographical aspects of the area of operations (AOO) relating to (future) operations. Maps should be used as much as possible. Different layers may be used reflecting most stressing important factors. It may also be necessary to cover adjacent countries / territories even though they are outside the AOO.

   **Climate**
   This will generally be a short paragraph and must be broken down to the seasonal changes and potential specific climatic information that may affect the operation. CIMIC primary focus at the implications of the climate on the civilian factors. Most of operational issues will be covered by reconnaissance section in HQ (J/X 2 shop).

6. PMESII&TE factors
   **Politics**
   Any grouping of primarily civil actors, organizations and institutions, both formal and informal, that exercises authority or rule within a specific geographic boundary or organization through the application of various forms of political power and influence. It includes the political system, parties and main actors. It must be representative of the cultural, historical, demographic and sometimes religious factors that form the identity of a society.
Military
The armed forces, and supporting infrastructure, acquired, trained, developed and sustained to accomplish and protect national or organizational security objectives. This also covers the internal security aspects of a country.

Economics
Comprehensive analysis on the economy of a country, or AOO, must be prepared. Economy most important branches. Flow of the money. Banking system. Budget in numbers. It includes not only economic development of a country, but also the distribution of wealth.

Social
The interdependent network of social institutions that support, enable and acculturate individuals and provide participatory opportunities to achieve personal expectations and life-goals within hereditary and nonhereditary groups, in either stable or unstable environments. It covers the social aspects such as religion, a society’s structure, the legal and judicial system, policing and supporting infrastructure, humanitarian, etc.

Information
The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. Encompasses the information and communication media. Also covers the status of data flow in country (AOO).

Infrastructure
The basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community, organization, or society. Includes logistics, communications and transport infrastructures, schools, hospitals, water and power distribution, sewage, irrigation, geography, etc.

Technology
Technology is human knowledge which involves tools, materials, and systems. The application of technology typically results in products. If technology is well applied, it benefits humans, but the opposite is true, if used for malicious reasons.

Environment
Environment is the complex of physical, chemical, and biological factors that act upon an organism or an ecological community and ultimately determine its form and survival. And the aggregate of social and cultural conditions that influence the life of an individual or community.
5.3.3 Indicator / factor deduction

**INDICATORS**

Definition:
An action, event, condition (other), specific or generalized, in form of gathered information, and expected to precede events that could be detrimental to NATO interests.

Why are we using indicators?
- Easy unclassified interface and working tool for external actors;
- Detection and management over discovered vulnerabilities;
- Early warning system for NATO;
- Increased base line resilience of NATO countries.

7. CIMIC operational overview
This includes four distinct reporting groups (A, B, C and D) on which CIMIC operators need to report on. These reporting groups can overlap the PMESII&TE factors but can also be used to create independent CIMIC assessments. The basis of a CIMIC report is formed by utilizing reporting groups during initial assessments.

- a. Key civil life support; power, water, sanitation, food and health.
- b. Humanitarian issues; shelter, HA-demining, HA freedom of movement, HA protection/security, minorities and vulnerable groups, internal displaced persons, (IDPs) refugees and evacuees movements and IDP’s and refugees and evacuees assistance centres.
- c. Key civil infrastructure; road network, rail network, civil aviation infrastructure, public transport assets, inland waterways/ports and CIMIC sites (relevant sites with impact on the civil situation like power plants, water plants, bridges etc.).
- d. Civil administration; law and order, police, detention facilities, borders and customs, local authorities civil administration capability, banking/economy, telecommunications and media and emergency services.

8. Non-military actors
CIMIC should assess which non-military actors will have an influence on the military mission. Thinking of HN government, local population, IOs, governmental organizations (GOs), non-government organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations.

Remember that the scheme presented above is only an example. It may be changed accordingly to commander and CIMIC needs. Make sure to come up with right format. Last but not least - remember to include necessary resilience aspects in CIMIC products or prepare a separate resilience briefing for the commander.
Indicators conditions:
• Measurable;
• Detectable;
• Contain resilience aspects;
• Convertible to unclassified Q&A format.

Indicators example:
Emerging of new movement (party) that is in any way supportive to x-land divide and rule policy (anti–united Europe, populist, nationalist)

**Justification:** Supporting (founding, running) efforts for parties/movements has proven to be effective tool in X-land arsenal in order to influence on current (future) country policy.

**Measurement:** information from open sources, intelligence community, reach-back institutions analysis.

**Involvement:** open sources, media (especially X-land driven), NATO units, reach-back institutions, other.

**Additional (where/how):** context of foundation of new body, finance issues.

Resilience aspect: possible threat to continuity of stable country policy (continuity of government), new actor influencing society (social resilience).

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**WARNING: WHITE INDICATORS - EXAMPLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CoG</th>
<th>Ability to ensure a stable and non-violent X-land society with full support to western institutions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warning problem Scenario;</td>
<td>Narrative: A internal X-land conflict will escalate from peaceful and turn out to be a armed conflict with involvement of NATO and Opponent Y-land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1</td>
<td>Significant changes to the current pro-Western politics (Pol.) incl. membership of NATO and EU etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2</td>
<td>Economic and political initiatives lead to dependency of opponent Y-land are launched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 3</td>
<td>Not -Supporting the EU sanctions against opponent Y-land (Pol.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 4</td>
<td>Increased opponent Yland compatriot policies and hybrid warfare attempts (vulnerability)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 5</td>
<td>Privatization and sale of critical infrastructure to pro-opponent Y-land companies (Resilience).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 6</td>
<td>Pro-Y-land party, the Yur party gained enough seats in parliament and change to de-facto ruling party in parliament (Pol.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 7</td>
<td>Government deny acknowledgement of the Y-land as a minority (culture, language etc.) in the society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 8</td>
<td>Accelerated disputed in the southern land border with opponent Y-land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 9</td>
<td>Increased Anti-western Harsh rhetoric in the Ria &amp; Lork – regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 10</td>
<td>Growing opponent Y-land investments in X-land - indeed infrastructure with more than 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 11</td>
<td>Increased numbers of opponent Y-land initiatives to interfere in internal X-land affairs via etc. Y-land minority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED-RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC
VI Execution

6.1. General

The best planning is only successful if the planned tasks will be executed in the right way, and vice versa. That means CIMIC has to do the right things, at the right time, at the right place, with the right means to support the mission. This chapter will mainly focus on the “how to…” dynamic.

6.1.1 CIMIC activities

CIMIC’s contribution to achieve mission objectives is to support the desired effects in terms of the civil environment. These effects will be defined during the planning process (see 5.2.3). CIMIC related effects can be for example, an established relationship to non-military actors or a minimized negative impact of military actions on the civil environment. For creating such effects following CIMIC activities will be used:

a. **Communication.** Effective cooperation is only possible if there is successful communication at all levels. This may prove difficult due to the absence of effective communications infrastructure. Based on the strategic level guidance the commander will be in contact with non-military actors. Keep in mind that sometimes local actors can have more power than the formal leaders. Equally, civil-military liaison officers are likely to be deployed to the non-military actors HQs. As described in section 6.2, it is important that CIMIC staff retain a
proactive relationship with their counterparts in these organizations. Stable relationships enable CIMIC staff to explain military objectives/operation to non-military actors and gain in-depth knowledge of the role and responsibilities of the non-military actors. Additionally, non-military actors are an essential source of information on various aspects of the civil environment (for example, historical perspective, political structures, host nation capabilities, and local culture).

Effective communication is an enabler for information sharing. Making information widely available to multiple responding civilian and military elements not only reduces duplication of effort, but also enhances coordination and collaboration and provides a common knowledge base so that critical information can be pooled, analyzed, and validated. Civil-military collaboration networks need to be designed to facilitate sharing of information among non-military and military organizations. A collaborative information environment facilitates information sharing, while operations security measures will be considered at each step of the process.

**Essential assets/tasks for communication are as follows:**
- Extended liaison matrix (ELM): The extended liaison matrix guides who communicates with whom on which level and when. (See annex)
- Cluster meetings: In AOOs where a humanitarian crisis is present, the UN OCHA cluster system may be activated. Participating in cluster meetings or liaising to cluster leads fosters mutual exchange of information. (See Chapter 3)
- Effective communication infrastructure, like: Internet connection, telephone, meetings, boards, interpreters.
- Sustainability: In order to be effective it is important to communicate with all relevant military and non-military actors within the AOO on a regular base.
- Mutual communication: communication means information exchange. CIMIC liaison will only be respected as a valid partner when information is not only gathered but also own relevant information is shared with non-military actors (See chapter 6.1.2).
- Communicate with respect: A mutual respectful treatment not only refers to one's own behavior but implies a respectful behavior of the counterpart.

b. **Planning.** It is critical that CIMIC staff are represented in the commander's planning groups. Factors relating to the civil environment are likely to impact upon all aspects of operations and related staff work. Therefore, the CIMIC staff should work in close cooperation with all military staff branches, and be part of all cross headquarters processes and bodies, to ensure that civil-related factors are fully integrated into all operation plans. To be effective, CIMIC staff must be included on ground reconnaissance missions and should maintain close contact with relevant civil organizations and government officials in the run-up to an operation. Whenever possible, CIMIC staff should participate in civilian planning and assessment groups. CIMIC support covers the political mandate, governance, non-military actors, and the civilian population and results in the
CIMIC contribution to the comprehensive preparation of the operational environment. At the same time CIMIC assets provide information, requests and assessments for the staff. Details of the CIMIC contribution to planning are laid down in the **CIMIC Functional Planning Guide**.

(See Chapter 5.2)

c. **Coordination.** Different mandates, cultures and perspectives require coordination of activities between the military and non-military actors to ensure that objectives are not compromised. Internal coordination is needed with all staff branches and functions to mutually increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions.

**Essential assets/ tasks for coordination are as follow:**
- Meeting: A meeting is the most effective tool to coordinate joint efforts.
- Coordination and harmonization: The military does not coordinate the tasks of non-military actors, but need to harmonize the joint efforts.
- UNOCHA: Takes the lead in coordinating humanitarian action, although in response to specific disasters specialized agencies may take on this role. Keep in mind that UNOCHA coordinates effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors. It coordinates also global humanitarian funding appeals and manages global and country-specific humanitarian response funds.

d. **Facilitating civil-military interaction.** CIMIC interacts with non-military actors and thereby enables and facilitates CMI for other headquarters staff. CIMIC personnel are trained in bringing together the appropriate military and non-military actors. Facilitating CMI will differ at each level of command due to the focus, responsibilities and scope of coordination.

**Essential assets/ tasks for facilitating CMI are as follows:**
- Non-military actors: It is important to have a complete overview about the aims, capabilities and characteristics of non-military actors within the AOO.
- CIMIC principles: For a successful facilitating of CMI it is vital to conform to the CIMIC principles

(See Chapter 2.1).

e. **Assessments.** CIMIC personnel will be involved in a variety of assessments. These assessments are to examine particular geographic areas, occasions, groups, actors or subjects of special interest, etc.. CIMIC assessments contribute to the situational awareness and understanding of the staff and inform the planning and decision making process. CIMIC also contributes to Operations Assessment in order to generate an understanding of the mission’s progress and success. (See Chapter 5.3)
6.1.2 Information sharing

Information sharing is the exchange of information between at least two actors. CIMIC exchanges information inside the military and with non-military actors, for the mutual use of information.

For the military it is vital to share information with non-military actors to reach common goals and objectives. Trust and mutual understanding are prerequisites to information exchange within the CIMIC community.

Making information widely available enhances coordination and collaboration and provides a common knowledge base so that critical information can be pooled, analysed and validated. Information sharing is a tool to prevent duplications, to increase the effectiveness and to save resources.

Information Sharing is a dynamic setting that ranges from interpersonal (face-to-face), to interorganizational, to high-tech systems (machine-to-machine) and is largely based on:

Willingness to share - revolves around a cultural openness to pursue relationships based on respect, trust and common goals.

Factors:

Culture: Cultivate a mindset for information sharing. All personnel involved in civilian-military cooperation, including the leadership, ought to recognize information sharing as a vital resource.

Trust: generate a steady flow of truth-telling between military and civilian organizations by letting know yourself, your intentions and limitations, being honest, open to feedback, and accept the civilian organizations as a separate entity by cultivating a culture of transparency.

Training and education: Ensure actors are aware of the advantages of information sharing.

Ability to share - is dependent on the established organizational policies, procedures and capabilities of those involved.

Factors:

Classification and releasability: The ability to share information is limited by the information's classification level, and the authority of potential viewing parties.

Training and education: Actors must know with whom they ought to share information, and how to do so.
**Infrastructure:** There are usually bureaucratic barriers in place, designed to protect information. However, information sharing infrastructure can also help lubricate the flow of information.

**Asymmetry of capabilities:** harmonize the efforts among the organizations towards a similar objective in order to achieve collaboration.

**Essential assets/ tasks for information sharing:**
- Identify participants: clearly identify the main actors and their role in a project, task, or event.
- Built institutional trust: it should be set through the institutionalization of Memoranda of Understanding or, as a last resource, by finding other solutions to Information-Sharing Barriers (conferences, workshops, briefings, etc). Additionally, special relationships should be established with key political, social, and military actors even if they are geographically divided.
- Cultivate interpersonal relationships: they are the pillars of trust, commitment, as well as, transparency when exchanging information.
- Support a common understanding: based on the use of standard protocols, common language and shared analysis.
- Classification as low as possible: when processing information the lowest classification possible should be used. This enhances the information accessibility by allowing relevant information to be provided to non-military actors. In case of classified information, there is the option to release information based on its age. Evaluate the information to determine if the classification can be downgraded.
- Use of humanitarian Information services and platforms: it allows a greater reach in information sharing as it should be the most practical solution with non-military actors. The humanitarian community offer several technological information sharing platforms and services. Military forces can join the following unclassified/open Web-based platforms to share information with the various organizations in the field, contributing for a quicker communication:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Platform / Service</th>
<th>Aim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HDX</td>
<td>Making data easy to find and use for analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://data.humdata.org/">https://data.humdata.org/</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Humanitarian Data Exchange</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://humanitarian.id/">https://humanitarian.id/</a></td>
<td>Self-managed contact management tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Download for IPhone and Android</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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https://reliefweb.int/

place where the disaster response community can share, find, and collaborate on information to inform strategic decisions.

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global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters.

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https://www.kobotoolbox.org/
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enable crisis responders to better understand how to address the world's disasters

https://www.acaps.org/

- Training and education: personnel involved in information sharing should have an understanding of the humanitarian principles and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Human Rights Law (HRL) to further simplify civil–military dialogue so that misunderstandings in roles, aims, tasks and perceptions can be better managed.
6.1.3 CIMIC and media

Strategic communications (StratCom) effort aims to enhance coherence of all information and communication activities and capabilities, both civilian and military. Therefore it is necessary for CIMIC to know, how to deal with media.

**Types of media.**

CIMIC also supports the force by communicating accurate information in a timely manner to non-military actors. Transparent communication improves public awareness and understanding of the military aspects of the Alliance’s role, aims, and activities, thereby enhancing organizational credibility and legitimacy.

If CIMIC teams face journalists (including cameras or microphones) they should be able to react, to decide, to state or to solve the situation by following the overall regulations with key messages and own experiences.

Therefore it is quite vital to understand the interviewer’s position, his way and motivation for getting a “good” or fitting statement. To handle such kind of situations by sending out your personal point of view in combination with the delivered mission defined key messages it is important to know the Do’s and Don’t´s regarding how to deal with media.

It might also be a solution to involve the public affairs office (PAO) by giving the contact data of PAO to the media, especially if the CIMIC team assumes possible challenges or if the journalist creates high pressure.

A positive report about the mission and/or the CIMIC work is important and supports directly the commander and the whole mission. In general media products (positive or negative) will give an immediate feedback and have an impact on the attitude of all actors toward the mission.
Media products will be seen and analyzed by J2 and the PAO and be reported to the commander. So it is important to increase positive feelings/sentiments for the mission which can strengthen existing relationships/partnerships and/or build up new relationships/partnerships with non-military actors.

Using the media for spreading our defined key-messages is a supporting factor for the whole mission. Overall NATO guidelines are:

- Tell and show the NATO story.
- Provide accurate information in a timely manner.
- Ensure that information provided is consistent, complementary, and coordinated.
- Practice appropriate operational security.
- Conduct work mindful of multinational sensitivities, and respectful of the local and regional cultural environment.
- Stick to unclassified facts, avoid:
  - Operational programs
  - Deployment details
  - Capability shortfalls
  - Casualty details
  - Morale
  - Mission-specific information

In addition the following characteristics need also to be taken into account when interacting with media:

- Authenticity: Being authentic and direct as in interpersonal communication. Always reply (positive and negative comments). Thank the journalist for contacting you.
- Transparency: Trust building.
- Decentralization: Nobody is the centre of universe (not alone to give answers; there are maybe other SMEs which can answer topic related questions.)
- Speed: Social Media are fast and can create fast products world-wide (real-time).
- Collaborate: This will increase visibility and strengthen partnerships for further actions.
- Structure: Always engage with a clear head. Think before talking /publishing; take your time. Treat everything published online as being available to everyone. Controlling the full message is impossible.

**Do's and Don'ts:**

- Avoid military terminology and technicalities (if possible).
- Limit the use of acronyms (or explain them).
- Never show arrogance or superiority.
- Recognize and correct your mistakes.
- If you don’t know an answer, provide a solution (other SME,...).
- Don’t respond to malicious behavior or threats – report it.
- Never lie.
• Be aware of what you say. It can be online immediately.
• Think like your opponent and focus on his interests.
• If asked by the media for a response: Provide rapid response (in accordance with your duty). Provide a timing if answer requires time to be produced.
• Use Key Messages and talking points (STRATCOM messages = official version) in order to send the same message every time when dealing with media.
• Always speak personally, unless officially authorized.
• Stay away from policy or speculation.

Checklists regarding dealing with media can be found in the annex.

6.1.4 Working with Interpreters

Most military operations are conducted in countries where CIMIC personnel lack the linguistic ability to communicate effectively with the local population. Working with interpreters is often the best or only option, but must be considered a less satisfactory substitute for direct communication. Be aware that a conversation conducted through an interpreter goes more slowly than a normal conversation. Plan your time accordingly.

For the use within military operations we can distinguish between 2 types of interpreters; the professional interpreter (often from your own country and culture which can also be military personnel trained in the language of the mission area) and the locally hired interpreter (LHI). When employing a LHI take in consideration where the LHI comes from or still lives. Employing a LHI who comes from a different region of the country limits his/her bias towards the persons he/she will meet. Also it increases the level of security for the LHI. For example in some cases families of LHI have been threatened because the LHI works for the military force.

In some mission areas it could be culturally sensitive for men to talk to women. Therefore it could be more effective to use female interpreters. This is something to take in consideration during the planning of a mission.

Your interpreter is an important member of your team and is essential for the success of your CIMIC tasks. Make sure you and your team acts accordingly.

Basic guidelines on the use of interpreters
• Speak with the interpreter beforehand about the subject of the conversation (depends on the level of OPSEC), how you would like the conversation to develop, and what the aims are.
• Inform the interpreter in advance that the translation has to be done consecutively, e.g. there will be a pause for the interpreter to provide the translation after every 2 or 3 sentences (depending on the complexity of the subject, the listener's comprehension level and the interpreter's skills).
Simultaneous interpretation – in which an interpreter translates a speaker's
When communicating through your interpreter.

- Check in advance whether any sensitivity (as a result of ethnic background, position of power, gender, etc.) may exist between the interpreter and the person you are speaking with. Make sure that the interpreter always behaves objectively and in a neutral manner towards the other person;

- If you are going to give a speech or a presentation, provide your interpreter beforehand with the full text, or at least the main points of what you are going to say. If the subject is of a specialized (military) nature, then give the interpreter topic-related advice for preparation. Provide the interpreter with a list of frequently used specialist terms and terminology, as well as with copies of charts, images and diagrams that are going to be used during the presentation;

- Agree in advance where the interpreter will sit. If you are standing to conduct the conversation, your interpreter should also stand. A good interpreter is an extension of the speaker – that is why you must always make sure the interpreter is clearly audible and visible to the listener(s);

- Inexperienced interpreters and people who have received no training as professional interpreters can feel ashamed if they have not heard or understood something properly, and they are afraid to ask you to repeat what you said. Emphasize to the interpreter to ask you to repeat if necessary, because this is always better than providing a quick but inaccurate (or even incorrect) translation;

- If more interpreters are present during the conversation agree on who will be translating which part of the meeting and for whom. If multiple interpreters will translate for different people attending the meeting this can create confusion;

**When communicating through your interpreter.**

- At the start of the conversation, do not forget to introduce the interpreter to the other people taking part, so that everyone knows who the interpreter is and why he/she is present. Then explain to the attendees how you will conduct the conversation through the interpreter. What is self-evident to some people may cause confusion to others who have possibly never communicated through an interpreter or heard a foreign language. Ask your counterparts to speak slowly with pauses after every 2 or 3 sentences to allow your interpreter to translate;

- Observe the non-verbal communication of your counterpart when your message is interpreted by the interpreter and keep eye contact;

- It is important to speak slowly so that the interpreter can consecutively interpret and make notes if needed;

- If necessary, modify your use of language by choosing widely used, understandable terms whenever possible, and by avoiding (military) jargon and abbreviations;

- Make sure the interpreter is always close to you when you are speaking, so that the listeners do not have to keep switching their attention between you and your
After the communication through an interpreter. The interpreter should preferably also be able to see you in order to observe your body language;

• An interpreter has to provide a literal and truthful translation of everything that is said by the participants in the conversation. In practice this is less straightforward than it seems. An interpreter is only permitted to merely provide a brief summary if you have explicitly requested him or her to do so;

• During long conversations, provide breaks more often than usual. Taking in information received through an interpreter is more difficult than during a normal conversation;

• If an interpreter behaves assertively, prevent him/her from taking the initiative away from you during the conversation;

After the communication through an interpreter.

• Evaluate the communication and performance of the interpreter and your own performance;

• Ask the interpreter about the impression of the counterpart and if applicable how you can develop your relationship with the counterpart;

• Evaluate the content of the communication. Go over your own notes and the notes of the interpreter. Make sure you capture all important information you have received.

6.2. Liaison

Liaison with non-military actors is a primary core function. Liaison is needed to establish and to maintain two-way communication between the military force and non-military actors at the appropriate levels in order to facilitate interaction, harmonization, information sharing, integrated planning and conduct of operations/activities. Accordingly, CIMIC staff and forces will:

• Identify relevant actors as soon as possible,

• Develop a liaison structure,

• Organize and manage CIMIC Information,

• Maintain liaison with non-military actors within the force's area of operations (AOO),

• Seek information to enhance SA and situational understanding (SU) in an open and transparent manner.

Key principles of CIMIC liaison are:

**Single point of entry for liaison.** Non-military actors tend to have a simply structured approach to areas of responsibility and grow quickly frustrated by repetitive approaches by different levels of the military for the same information. The creation of a liaison and co-ordination architecture minimizes duplication of effort by providing a clearly defined and accessible structure recognized by both the military and non-military actors alike.
Continuity. It takes time to cultivate and maximize liaison relationships between the military and non-military actors. Therefore a degree of continuity facilitates trust and understanding by both sides. The military need to know the organizational structure of the non-military actor, its planning and decision process and its motivation. The non-military actor needs to develop an understanding of how effective liaison with the military might benefit its civil aims/goals. The planning and tailoring of the liaison structure in line with changing circumstances demonstrates commitment and implies that the military attach importance to this principle.

Two-way flow of information. To be effective, military liaison to non-military actors must initiate and maintain a permanent exchange of information. It is important to be able to provide non-military actors an appropriate level of assessments of the military perspective to common areas of responsibility. This may comprise the form of an overview of the logistic pipeline issues, security situation, availability/usability of lines of communication (LOC), weather information or other mutual areas of responsibility. In each case, the information released must be current and relevant in order to be credible.

6.2.1 Liaison and coordination architecture

The CIMIC liaison and coordination architecture must be flexible and tailored to the mission and the situation. It must provide appropriate guidance to formations and units at all levels and have clear areas of responsibility. Key areas of CIMIC activity that specifically relate to liaison and co-ordination are highlighted below:

Direct liaison to key non-military actors. In any situation, certain non-military actors will be fundamental to achieve the mission because of their role or because of their capabilities. It is important to establish a good relationship to these key actors for a comprehensive approach to reach common goals. Usually each IO which is involved is a key actor. The most prominent IOs are:

- the United Nations (UN),
- the European Union (EU),
- the African Union (AU),
- the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and,
- the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Their missions are highly political by nature. See also chapter 3.

Keep in mind that the UN is involved in peacekeeping and political missions, thus quite often operate in similar theatres like NATO. The UN system comprises six principal organs, programs and funds, specialized independent agencies, departments and offices.
Pending on the situation it might be possible that even a small NGO has to be seen as a relevant non-military actor. Therefore, every non-military actor could be a key actor. This has to be taken into consideration while defining the key non-military actors.

**Direct liaison to host nation (HN).** The support of the HN to military operations, at all levels, is essential, regarding de-confliction of activities, assistance where applicable and the provision of resources and material. It is also important to be familiar with HNs civil emergency plan (CEP) that in case of an emergency the military knows potential shortfalls, have an overview of possible limited resources and where the CEP might hamper own operations.

**Credible liaison.** To establish an effective liaison and coordination architecture it is necessary for the liaison assets to perform credibly.

**Point of contact for civil community.** The liaison and coordination architecture with their liaison assets, like liaison officers or CIMIC centres are important point of contacts for the civil community to get in touch with the military. This needs to be communicated to ensure that it gets known by the civilian community.

**Competent advice to the right actor.** The CIMIC liaison and coordination architecture needs to ensure that any advices or information for the civilian community are competent and reliable, and addresses the right actor on the right level. The most important tool to ensure that is the liaison matrix.

**Liaison and co-ordination architecture matrix**

In order to visualize the appropriate liaison and co-ordination architecture that needs to be established, a matrix showing liaison activity versus level of military command is strongly recommended. This architecture normally is laid down in the extended liaison matrix (ELM) as annex to the OPLAN. An example of a possible liaison and co-ordination architecture can be found in the annex. Prior to/during an operation a matrix should be constructed and completed to allow all levels of command to see what their liaison responsibilities are, and with whom. During an operation, if necessary, it might be required to be updated.

A tactical level HQ receives an ELM as annex to the OPLAN of the higher HQ. The tactical level HQ will need to translate the ELM into a format that depicts tactical level liaison responsibilities in detail. This translation ideally is prepared by the CIMIC staff at the respective level, while consulting both higher and subordinate HQs. The result is a cross-functional ELM tailored to the tactical level that will again be an annex to the respective level OPLAN.

A liaison and coordination matrix can be as simple or as complex as necessary to meet the requirement. The matrix needs to determine the key liaison responsibilities between the military and non-military actors, but could also be
expanded to outline key CIMIC responsibilities to assist tactical teams, others than CIMIC, to visualize at what level, and by what means, they may meet the liaison responsibility.

6.2.2 CIMIC centre

CIMIC centres are a means to execute the CIMIC liaison and coordination architecture on the tactical level. CIMIC centres provide physical stationary location where the military force can interface with non-military actors. CIMIC centres enable the communication and cooperation between the civil community and the military. CIMIC centres must be assigned to an area of operations (AOO) permanently or only for a period of time connected to the operation in progress.

“Temporary” CIMIC centres could be fixed or mobile. The establishment of a mobile CIMIC centre has to be assessed, in particular in large AOOs.

Functions

The key functions of a CIMIC centre can be summarized as follows:

a. Facilitation and coordination. The CIMIC centre:
   - Provides a focal point for liaison with non-military actors in order to provide visibility and allow for harmonisation of military and civil activities within the AOO.
   - Provides guidance on military support to civil actors and projects.
   - Provides facilities for non-military actors such as meeting facilities, maps, and access to communications, security information etc.

b. Monitoring. The CIMIC centre plays a significant role in monitoring and tracking the civil situation. The use of a comprehensive reports and returns mechanism will enable this.

c. Information management. The CIMIC centre facilitates sharing of information between non-military actors and Alliance forces through:
   - Acting as a hub for exchanging information.
   - Assisting situation monitoring by collecting and collating of information.
   - Establishing an interface for situational information and assessments.
   - Disseminating of information in support of information operations.
   - Providing security information on curfews, mines, border status, routes and other threats.

The CIMIC centre as part of the CIMIC liaison architecture

The CIMIC centre is just one component that contributes to the overall force's CIMIC liaison architecture. It should not necessarily follow as an automatic assumption that there is a requirement to establish a CIMIC centre, the decision to do so should be based on an initial assessment. It must be closely coordinated
with all other components such as the use of liaison officers and CIMIC meetings. Consideration needs to be given to the following:

a. **Requirement.** The need for a CIMIC centre must be assessed. If there is no requirement, then the force should avoid establishing them. To ascertain the requirement the CIMIC staff should conduct an assessment asking questions such as:
   - What is the operational requirement identified and specified in the operations plan (OPLAN Annex W)?
   - How can liaison best be achieved/what is the best approach?
   - Do the non-military actors already have a liaison network that the military can hook up to? Are these organizations willing to let the military participate in this network?
   - If a CIMIC centre is required, what functions are to be performed?

b. **Quantity.** Identify the level of support and the amount of CIMIC centres required.

c. **Focal Points.** For improving effectiveness of all actors in liaison and exchange of information, Alliance forces need to indicate and provide a single point of contact to the non-military actors. This does not mean that direct subject related interaction of certain branches of the Alliance forces with any non-military actor needs to be prevented. However, the single point of contact assumes the general interface from the military side and provides an entry point. The CIMIC centre assumes the role of a single point of contact, thus its staff needs to co-ordinate their activities with the CIMIC liaison officer dedicated to a particular non-military actor minimizing the amount of focal points and determining clear liaison responsibility.

d. **CIMIC centre allocation within an AOO.** In order to determine the required number of CIMIC centres and their location the following factors need to be considered:
   - Size of AOO.
   - Population density.
   - Availability of a common means of communication with non-military actors
   - Organization, location and concentration of non-military actors.

e. **Command and control.** The command and control relationship between the CIMIC centre, the CIMIC unit providing the CIMIC centre and the headquarters they are assigned to, needs to be clearly defined to ensure consistency of approach.

f. **Coordination of activities.** All CIMIC centres independent from the level they are assigned to should follow a consistent and coordinated approach to CIMIC activities and plans. Coordination between neighbouring CIMIC centres is also vital in order to avoid duplication of efforts and to provide similar information
Establishing a CIMIC centre

Establishing a CIMIC centre, the following key factors need to be considered. A detailed checklist is attached in the annex (see Annex MM to the TTPs).

- **Location.** To be effective a CIMIC centre must be accessible for its target audience. The location will also be determined and often constrained by military operational requirements. The provision of security will often influence the decision for the location of a CIMIC centre and therefore restrain the effectiveness of a specific CIMIC centre. CIMIC centres must avoid being within the military perimeter of any barracks or HQ ("within the wire"), but the location must be determined carefully in order to enable access to all necessary military support.

- **Manning.** Since both military and civilian staff of the CIMIC centre will be responsible for varying functions these staff members need to be carefully selected. The requirements may differ considerably for each operation or CIMIC centre within the same AOO. An example for a manning list is attached in the annex.

- **Communications.** CIMIC centres must be equipped with adequate means of communications. This includes the ability to maintain a continuous contact between the CIMIC centre and the appropriate HQ as well as the ability to be able to communicate with all respective non-military actors.

- **Accessibility.** A CIMIC centre can only be effective in fulfilling all of its designated functions if it is accessible. If the respective non-military actors cannot gain access to, or if access is limited, the ability for civil-military liaison to take place will be severely hampered.

- **Force protection.** The requirement and level of force protection should be carefully tailored based on the threat assessment as conducted for each specific
CIMIC centre. The level of force protection is directly influencing the accessibility of the CIMIC centre. The related HQ in its CIMIC centre force protection planning will consider scenarios as: evacuation, public disorder, terrorism and/or attacks.

- **Information security.** The threat to a CIMIC centre positioned in the civil community will need to be assessed continuously. The employment of civil staff, use of secure and insecure communications, access and general security of information will be laid down in the information security plan for the respective CIMIC centre.

- **Infrastructure.** Manning, Force Protection and information security requirements dictate the selection of suitable infrastructure. The best suitable infrastructure might be counterproductive to the nature of a CIMIC centre because non-military actors and the civil population might consider the chosen infrastructure as non-permissive.

- **Funding.** Costs relating to CIMIC centres might be significant and must be assessed during the planning stage. Expenses will not only relate to the number of centres but will also include construction costs, rent, amenities, communications costs, vehicles, administrative and staff costs (in particular that for civilian staff such as interpreters, etc).

- **Life support.** The ability for the force to sustain the CIMIC centre and its staff must also be considered during the planning process.

- **Transport.** The CIMIC centre must be provided with adequate transportation means and should have the possibility to locate these means in a safe and secure way.

- **Method of Operation.** The conduct of operation for a CIMIC centre will be laid down in the related HQ standing operating procedures (SOPs). Wherever possible these SOPs should be standardised across the entire AOO.

- **Restrictions.** The CIMIC centre must avoid restrictions based on language, gender, religion, local customs, cultural differences, etc as far as possible.

**Keep in mind:**

The CIMIC centre must ensure that it is not being seen as an integral part of the intelligence community. Information exchange must be carefully managed to ensure that trust is established and maintained.

### 6.2.3 Liaison Officer
The CIMIC liaison officers are to be found in the CIMIC branch and in other CIMIC units. Their main function is to serve as the single military point of contact for the civil environment in the scope of civil-military cooperation. The CIMIC liaison officer is his unit’s ambassador.

**Basic activities and tasks of the CIMIC liaison officer**

Based on the key principles of CIMIC liaison, the CIMIC liaison officer has to:

- liaise – either planned or ad hoc – identify counterparts, coordinate activities and support comprehensive planning and execution of the operation. The liaison officer has to use non-classified (communication) means within security constraints, restraints and precautions, in order to provide, receive and exchange information.

- be familiar with the counterparts’ mandate or mission. The liaison officer has to be prepared to work together with coalition partners in identifying unity of purpose whenever it is applicable with regard to specific non-military actors, mainly governmental and UN authorities.

- maintain close contact and build up a good working relationship with the relevant non-military actors. The relationship between CIMIC liaison officers and non-military actors must be based on mutual trust, confidence, respect and understanding. Take into consideration that:
  - Some high level civil authorities (e.g. ministries, governors, embassies) might require a high-ranking, seasoned officer in order to be accepted;
  - It is recommended to pay attention to the age of the liaison officer related to life and military experience, maturity and rank, before assigning him/her to the civil counterparts;
  - Gender is to be taken into account. For example, it could be wise to deploy a female CIMIC liaison officer to achieve more effect, e.g. to local governmental institutions or offices where a woman is in charge. In addition many women work in different IOs and NGOs; therefore sending a female CIMIC liaison officer sometimes enables easier access;

- maintain, expand and update a point of contact list.

- establish the first contact with all non-military actors, following the single point of contact principle. This rule has to be acknowledged and respected by all subject matter experts (SMEs) and headquarters branches. The CIMIC liaison officer is able to gain direct access to civil counterparts for other headquarters branches and SMEs (e.g. legal advisor (LEGAD), political advisor (POLAD), etc.)

- identify key capability gaps in the civil environment that might have impact on the mission. Based on the civil proposals and his own assessment he will recommend possible solutions to deal with these gaps and bring it to the attention of the appropriate branch(es) in the headquarters through the CIMIC branch.

- be aware of other liaison officer and CIMIC units’ activities, as directed in the Annex W of the OPLAN or operational order (OPORD). If a situation arises, where
Specific guidelines for liaison with non-military actors

- In order to control the CIMIC activities and to ensure the proper co-ordination and prioritization of tasks, the CIMIC liaison officers are tasked to improve the liaison activities with non-military actors.
- Non-military actors are experts within their respective fields conducting assessments of their own. Whereas the focus of these assessments may differ from that required by the military, it may nevertheless be of great value to review them and take them as a vital contribution to the military assessment process. Exchange of knowledge, experience, and information supports this process.
- Civil authorities have to be approached with respect, no matter how organized or effective they are. Patronizing them or giving them the feeling that we consider them to be of minor value could alienate them, which will in turn lead to less effective cooperation and may lead to information gaps.
- Taking security restrictions into account, the military has to share information with the relevant counterparts in order to improve civil-military relations.
- In order to liaise effectively with non-military actors CIMIC liaison officers have to be aware of their culture, identity, structures and procedures.

Similarities. Military actors have a lot in common with non-military actors: e.g. affiliation to their mission, commitment to peace and stability, a hard working attitude, international experience, life with hardship and danger, personal risk of injury, decision making under pressure, a certain degree of frustration with political decisions, et cetera.

Differences. Organizational goals, composition and structures of military and non-military actors are different. Many of the non-military actors work with a “code of conduct” based on the four basic humanitarian principles: impartiality, neutrality, humanity, and operational independence. Consequentially, the organizational goals of non-military actors see the alleviation of human suffering as their highest priority, and the use of armed forces as preparation for war and not as a real solution to any humanitarian problem. Soldiers and civilians use a different vocabulary. In order to understand each other, both sides should avoid using their specific terminology, at least in the beginning of the relationship.

6.2.4 Interpersonal Communication Skills for a meeting
The Communication Process

Communication is the process of transferring meaning from sender to receiver.

- Encoding: The sender expresses a meaning in a message;
- Medium: the means that a sender uses to transmit the message;
- Decoding: the receiver gets the message;
- Interpretation: the receiver tries to understand the meaning of the message;
- Feedback: The receiver responds to the message.

Some terms to be explained:
- Cultural Noise: cultural variables that undermine the communication of intended meaning;
- Intercultural communication: when the member of one culture sends a message to a member of another culture;
- Attribution: the process in which people look for an explanation of another person's behavior.

Context of communication
Context is the information that surrounds a communication and helps to convey the message.

Low context society
- Message is explicit and the speaker tries to say precisely what is meant;
- Direct style: focus on speaker's statements;
- Silence may make people feel uncomfortable;
• Facial expressions and body language may be easy to interpret, if you understand the gestures of the speaker’s culture;
• Meetings are often focused on objectives.

High context society
• Meetings with new contacts focus on relationships first. Business comes later;
• Indirect style: speaker does not spell out his message;
• Avoid saying "no";
• Avoid embarrassing people;
• Messages often are implicit: listener is expected to de-code verbal and non-verbal cues, such as voice, intonation, timing, body language;
• Silence is used to understand received messages and decide how to reply;
• If the culture is neutral (Asia), control body language and facial expressions – if you do not, people will not trust you or respect you.

Cultural Differences Affecting Communication
• Do not identify the counterpart’s home culture too quickly. Common cues (e.g., name, physical appearance, language, accent, location) may be unreliable;
• Counteract the tendency to formulate simple, consistent, stable images;
• Do not assume that all aspects of the culture are equally significant;
• Recognize that norms for interactions involving outsiders may differ from those for interactions between compatriots; Do not overestimate your familiarity with your counterpart’s culture.

Sensitive Issues
• The ideas of race, religion and nationality;
• The idea of dignity;
• Gender restrictions;
• Local living conditions;
• Local customs with regard to food, manners, etc.;
• Dress code or standards;
• The value that the local community attaches to life and health;
• Care of patients and handling the deceased;
• Differences in work ethics, values and perception;
• Consideration for other’s capabilities and operating practices;
• Use of gratuities to promote cooperation.

Intercultural Communication during CIMIC meetings

Before the meeting
• Know the history of the country, the conflict and the parties involved;
• Understand the personalities of the individuals you are about to deal with. Gather as much information as possible about recent meetings;
Try to maximize knowledge of the subject matter and conduct background research;
Always have a “mission statement” available that should contain an understandable explanation of your mission and what CIMIC is and what your tasks are;
Review cultural items such as customs, traditions and local idioms and some phrases in the local language to minimize the chance of offending interviewees;
In an ideal situation, CIMIC should be seen by non-military actors as a partner, not as an obstacle. Make sure that your verbal and non-verbal messages are consistent with the characteristics of a partnership;
Prepare and ask questions that promote conversation and discuss them in advance, not only internally with the team, but also with the interpreter, so that he/she can advise on certain issues (culture, customs etc.);
If possible, always make an appointment so your contact can prepare. Be aware of security aspects, sometimes making an appointment can harm your security and therefore an unannounced meeting is preferable;
Consider a separate note-taker since the CIMIC officer who is leading the meeting should focus on the answers, non-verbal communication (facial expression, posture, appearance, voice tone, eye movement, etc.) of the counterpart;
Arrange for interpreter support if needed.
Set the appropriate atmosphere:
Schedule the meeting at a mutually convenient time (be aware of security and culture);
Allocate sufficient time (take in consideration cultural aspects of time);
If possible, agree on a quiet location.

**Conducting the meeting**
Relax and put your counterpart at ease;
Take your gear off, if the situation permits it;
Provide and/or accept refreshments if possible/if offered;
Explain the purpose of your visit if it is not routine;
Introduce your team, including your interpreter and explain everybody’s role (note-taker, observer, interpreter etc.);
Start your conversation with small talk, be aware of local customs related to small talk;
Try to build up a good personal relationship with your counterpart;
Maintain and enhance control of the meeting by asking open-ended questions. They have the following advantages;
Encourage others to disclose specific facts;
Create a better atmosphere for the interview;
Promote answers of more than a word or two;
Allow others to relax;
Increase your control;
• Do not confront your counterpart in a manner that challenges his/her integrity;
• Let your counterpart explain the meaning of unfamiliar terms. If necessary, let him/her spell out names to make sure you understand correctly;
• Do not interrupt in the middle of an answer. Be polite and attentive;
• Use your ‘active-listening’ skills (listening, reflecting and speaking);
• Do not be afraid of silence and do not rush into filling this silence with more questions.
• Suggest breaks to allow everybody to relax, especially your interpreter;
• Show appreciation and be prepared to answer questions asked by your counterpart, for he/she may also have a need for information;
• If your counterpart acts in an emotional way, you should show empathy before starting the factual meeting.

Ending the meeting
• Summarize what was said and, if possible, confirm it in writing.
• Agree on a time and place for a subsequent meeting.
• Exchange pleasantries and chit-chat in order to leave business and come back to a more personal level.

Considerations
• Acknowledge customs and greetings and show proper respect to dignities without acting timidly;
• Use local phrases appropriately;
• Know how to work with an interpreter;
• Never compromise own operations by inadvertently releasing critical information;
• Do not lie. If your lies catch up with you, you are done! Omit certain truths if necessary or tell the interviewee straight away that you are not entitled to answer certain questions;
• Do not make a promise you cannot keep. Otherwise you lose credibility.

After the meeting
• Actions after the meeting are as critical as gathering the information itself;
• Debrief your team, including the persons who waited outside the building or were observing the area;
• Write a meeting report and make sure your information is processed in the system;
• Coordinate with other branches as soon as possible, e.g. EOD, J2 etc. if unexpected issues demand an immediate response.

6.3. Reporting

The Reporting of CIMIC Information is one of the most essential tasks of CIMIC personnel. The aim is to deliver essential information that has an impact on the
mission and commanders intent. Information will come from a variety of sources and is subsequently evaluated and standardized to reporting formats by CIMIC staff and distributed throughout the chain of command. CIMIC staff will continuously monitor the civil environment in order to estimate/assess the current situation and the impact on the operation as well as prepare assessment of situation development (for more information see Chapter 5.3 and the annex).

Accurate and timely CIMIC reporting is essential.

6.3.1 Reports and returns (R2)

Reports produced by CIMIC cells should be based on the same sets of rules as CIMIC estimates/assessments. CIMIC reports have to be:

- **Accurate.** Bear in mind - inaccurate information may be more dangerous than no information at all.
- **Consistent.** An absence of consistency will hamper the identification of key capability gaps and areas of potential concern.
- **Timely.** Provide commander with information he needs when he needs it.
- **Relevant.** Your resources are limited - do not waste time on work that does not affect the mission.
- **Continuous.** Mechanism or capability factored into the process that will enable staff to monitor and provide updates as necessary. In particular, emphasis should be placed on identifying progress and concerns relating to the most critical information requirements.
- **Cooperative.** Military staff, through the CIMIC liaison and co-ordination architecture, should attempt to utilise civilian sources of information. Additionally, it is also be of benefit for the military to share information of mutual interest with the relevant civil entities.

**SENDING-CHANNEL-RECEIVER**

*(You)-(Your report)-(Reader)*

Make sure everybody understands your message!

CIMIC has to be able to prepare comprehensive reports according to CIMIC TTP 1 and/or national requirements/mission driven requirements.
The amount of data collected during ongoing missions is vast and difficult to process properly. A proper reporting system has to be supported by proper data bases (collection, storage and back up). Make sure your data is supporting your work. At the same time ensure others to whom your data are important have easy access (SharePoint, sharedrive).

Brief but detailed reporting is critical on all levels for getting the essential message through. However, within multinational forces, different national and international formats will occur. Therefore CIMIC (staff officer) must be flexible in approach to R2 system. In all phases of operation (especially in early phase) it is of utmost importance to identify problems that could have a direct impact on the execution of the mission. Some of them are related to basic needs of the population (water, sanitation, power, health, food), other may be related to political or social (cultural, religion) domains.

Reports in general are divided into different areas: (for examples see the annex)
- Time scheduled standardized reports (own CIMIC sitrep, weekly CIMIC report);
- Situation driven reports (liaison report, situation report);
- CIMIC analysis (products) covering functional areas, working groups products;
- CIMIC reports and returns (CIMIC reporting requirements);
- CIMIC operational overview (visual overview tool);
- Command level briefing tool (standard format presentation);
- CIMIC database (database highly likely will be set up by the higher HQ).

An initial default tool for reporting is the CIMIC reporting and tracking system (CRTS 33). CRTS was initially prepared for non-Article 5 crisis response operations (NA5CRO), but can be adapted to various situations.

A very good example of assessment and potential critical factors that may have direct impact on the mission can be seen in the Sphere Standards (The Sphere Project) and should also be used as the baseline for any military assessment in this area.

The CRTS provides cohesive way of processing data which enables CIMIC and non-CIMIC staff to view information on the civil environment with a common focus, in a simple and visible manner. CRTS elements are:

- CIMIC reports and returns (CIMIC reporting requirements);
- CIMIC operational overview (visual overview tool);
- Command level briefing tool (standard format presentation);
- CIMIC database (database highly likely will be set up by the higher HQ).

CRTS employs general rules for colour indicators used:
6.3.2 Working groups

CIMIC personnel on certain levels (usually corps and higher) will lead or participate in various working groups as a part of the regular battle rhythm. The most important value of working groups is multidimensional approach to certain areas through participation of SME from different branches. Products of working groups may be distributed internally in the headquarters (as an observation/LI) or sent to higher (lower) echelons as a part of the reporting (assessment) flow of documents.

6.4. CIMIC staff and field elements

6.4.1 Cooperation within the Staff/HQ

A sound cultural understanding of the overall cultural context in which you operate will allow you to complete these tasks with more confidence. Understanding the cultural orientation and dynamics of the population in the AOO is of significance for the achievement of the objective. To this purpose, not only the CIMIC staff but all the HQ should know the sensitivities of the population. To achieve this, a working group led by J/X 9 and supported by all the relevant staff at the HQ can be formed and the group can create a product which clearly pictures the social fabrics of the population and regularly inform all the personnel (especially those who are in close and constant interaction with non-military actors) about the civilian population and their sensitivities. Any changes in the attitudes of the population should be monitored closely and the personnel should be updated.

It is extremely important that the J/X 9 branch is involved in the operations planning process (OPP) and is in constant dialogue with the other branches in order to avoid redundancies. In order to mitigate the impact and maximize the effect, close liaison

- Green 🟢 No significant impact on the military mission.
- Amber 🟠 Limited/ increased impact on the military mission
- Red 🟥 Significant impact on the military mission
- Unknown 🟫 CIMIC Staff may use it if the information requested is not available or doubtful

For examples of CRTS format see the annex.
between/among all branches involved in the civil environment will be necessary. CIMIC staff should also know the clusters and cluster leads and which branch/branches of the HQ staff should be in constant coordination with the relevant cluster. It is important that CIMIC staff remain the focal point for civil-military matters. The commander has to have a clear civil picture on which to base decision making.

This table suggests possible two-way links that should be considered between branches and the CIMIC focus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRANCH</th>
<th>IMIC COORDINATION LINKAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Legal advisor (LEGAD)           | • Advise on the legal responsibilities for civilians.  
• Advise on International Humanitarian Law, Children and Armed Conflict, refugee law, Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights Law and other applicable laws.  
• Provide legal interpretation of Status of Forces Agreements and memoranda of understanding.  
• Provide legal assistance in contracts related to CIMIC projects.  
• Advise the commander with regard to Prisoners of War (POW) and detainees. |
| Political advisor (POLAD)       | • Advise on the broader political situation and how it affects the civil environment.                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Gender advisor (GENAD)          | • Advise on gender perspective (see chapter 7).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| Cultural advisor (CULAD)        | • Advise on cultural related matters regarding the environment the force is operating in.                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Personnel                       | • Terms and conditions of service for locally employed civilians.  
• Identification and provision of specialist manpower (e.g. linguists).  
• Issues related to prisoners of war and civilian detainees.                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Intelligence                    | • Input to development of joint collection plans: J/X 2 may use information derived from the CIMIC process.  
• CIMIC staff have access to a wide range of personnel on the ground but the use of information gleaned in this way for operational purposes is a sensitive issue.                                                                                           |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Operations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Input to comprehensive picture of the operational environment (CPOE).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Accounting for the effect of current operations on the civil environment, particularly the population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Awareness of the effect of the civil environment on a course of action (COA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inclusion of civil factors in AOO and route management (civilian mass movements).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Transfer of CIMIC information to and from subordinate HQs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordination of operational activities with civilians in accordance with the need-to-know principle.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The consideration of both short and long-term civil factors that will affect the planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Planning of tasks and activities within the civil environment where they become the main effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Integration of CIMIC into long-term plans, e.g. post-conflict rehabilitation, capacity building and reconstruction.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operations, support, targeting and battle damage assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Target suitability and conflict resolution, in conjunction with LEGAD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Input to short and long-term gain/loss assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reconnaissance possibilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cultural property protection (CIMIC sites of significance).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To avoid collateral damage, coordination of civilian mass movements (IDPs, refugees, etc.).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Operations, Psychological Operations and Public Affairs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure close coordination with InfoOps, psychological operations (PSYOPS) and public affairs (PA) activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Input to conduct of InfoOps / PSYOPS in the civil environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• PSYOPS can support non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Effective use of (social) media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinating posts, messages and feeds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Social media analysis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military engineering</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Liaison with the host nation (HN) on military engineering (MILENG) matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• MILENG support to tasks and activities within the civil environment, including supervision of civil actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military geographics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) | • Identification of sites (including research facilities) that pose a risk of potential environmental industrial hazard (EIH).  
  • Liaison with CBRN Cell over the impact of an EIH threat on civil actors.  
  • Location of water sources to be used for decontamination purposes. |
| Logistics | • Marking and policing of routes for military (main supply) or civilian use (e.g. refugee flow).  
  • HNS/civil-military resource management.  
  • Possible use of transportation and, where necessary, other resources in support of CIMIC tasks.  
  • Civil-military coordination of land, rail, air and sea lines of transportation in order to avoid possible problems. |
| Medical support / environmental health | • Coordination of all activities related to medical support.  
  • Medical risk assessments to assess the consequences of potential outbreaks of epidemics for humans and animals. |
| Communications and information systems (CIS) | • Technical advice on communication and information system (CIS) issues. |
| Training | • Training and theatre orientation of newly arrived staff.  
  • CIMIC induction training for all staff and units within your AOO. |
| Budget and finance | • The coordination of financial matters and the execution of CIMIC activities. |
| Military police (MP) | • Supporting non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) or in IDPs/refugees movement control.  
  • Local police and MP coordination. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Maritime              | • Provision of advice on maritime considerations specific for CIMIC.  
|                       | • Advice on port operations.  
|                       | • Harbour and channel construction and maintenance advice.  
|                       | • Provision of advice on marine and fisheries resources.  
|                       | • Maritime environmental issues (coastal and inter-coastal).  
|                       | • Monitoring and coordinating possible refugee/IDP flow activities by the seas, lakes and transboundary watercourses.  |
| Air                   | • Military may be required to manage airports and airspace, particularly in cases of humanitarian assistance.  
|                       | • To de-conflict problems, coordinating the use of civilian and military airports and helipads for civilian and military purposes.  |
| Key leader engagement | • Coordinating speaking notes and info papers with the support staff of the command group before civilian key leader engagements.  |
| StratCom              | • CIMIC activities needs to be in line with StratComs policies.  
|                       | • CIMIC staff should participate in the communication planning cycle including the StratCom working group and the information activities coordination board.  |

### 6.4.2 CIMIC contribution to HQ R2/CCIR

CIMIC, as a part of R2 system, is required in every HQ to contribute to the system in accordance with the overall reporting architecture. CIMIC input to commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR) will vary on a mission. In some cases CCIR's provided by J/X 9 may be crucial for the success of the operation.

### 6.4.3 CIMIC contribution to de-confliction of civilian mass movements

Civilian mass movements can hamper freedom of movement and freedom of manouevre of military operations. On the other hand military operations can
endanger civilian populace be it local population, refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs). It is therefore in the commander's interest to de-conflict civilian mass movements with military operations.

CIMIC is to contribute by providing an up to date civilian situation showing current IDP and refugee camps, current and expected mass movements of IDPs and refugees IOT support J/X 4 movement and J/X 3/5 operations planning.

The responsibility for safety and security of the civilian local population as well as IDPs and refugees lies with the host nation authorities. Host nation bear the primary responsibility for a safe and secure environment (SASE) for local, IDP and refugee communities / camps. Local authorities are responsible to provide basic needs. Where host nation authorities lack ability or commitment to provide basic needs of the respective communities UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and IOM (International Organisation for Migration) are mandated and in lead within the UN OCHA cluster system (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) – main clusters are the camp coordination and camp management cluster (CCCM – UNHCR and IOM in lead), the emergency shelter cluster (UNHCR and IFRC – International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in lead) and protection cluster (UNHCR in lead). Other IO and NGO working in this field are usually coordinating their activities within the UN OCHA cluster system.

Civilian mass movements can often not be directly steered and controlled. Deconfliction can happen by traffic control measures of host nation and NATO military police. Civilian mass movements can be influenced by CIMIC liaison and information operations which should primarily be communicated via host nation authorities and the respective humanitarian organisations within the OCHA cluster system.

Where host nation authorities and humanitarian organisations are not able or willing to fully provide SASE and basic needs for IDP and refugee communities, NATO military may have to support with providing SASE and contributions to humanitarian assistance. Military support is here only applicable as a last resort in accordance with the IASC Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies.

### 6.4.4 Host Nation Support

Host-nation support (HNS) seeks to provide the commander and the troop contributing nations with support in the form of materiel, facilities and services and includes area security and administrative support in accordance with negotiated arrangements between the sending nations and/or NATO and the host government. As such, HNS facilitates the introduction of forces into the joint operations area by providing essential reception, staging and onward movement support. HNS may
also reduce the amount of logistic forces and materiel required to sustain and redeploy forces that would otherwise have to have been provided by sending nations.

Cooperation and coordination in the provision and use of HNS is essential. The aim is not simply to eliminate competition for scarce resources, but also to optimize the support that the HN may make available in order to facilitate mission accomplishment. It must be carried out at appropriate levels and may include non-NATO nations as well as non-military actors which may operate with or alongside NATO.

J/X 4 will lead HNS planning and the development of host-nation support arrangements (HNSA) in close cooperation with legal, financial (J8), civil military cooperation (CIMIC) (J/X 9) and other relevant staff functions both internally and within the HN and the sending nations. CIMIC complements the efforts of J4 staff in establishing HNS and may be directly involved in the drafting and negotiating of HNSA.

CIMIC may also offer support to J/X 4 in the following areas:
- Participation in the fact finding visits that CIMIC staff may conduct within the target country for data gathering, initial assessments and establishment of liaison and coordination mechanisms;
- Information on the overall status and capability of the HN’s economy, infrastructure, health care and lines of communications to support the operational logistic requirements;
- Access to appropriate HN authorities with whom negotiations will need to be conducted and at the regional and local levels with whom the execution of HNS will need to be coordinated;
- Advice on other established arrangements (sending nations, IOs, governmental organizations and/or NGOs) that may compete or conflict with the proposed HNS arrangements.
- Assistance with the negotiation of HNSA by providing inputs on the HN’s governmental structures and support capabilities;

Due to their contacts and network, CIMIC personnel contribute to the military planning on the use of HNS by assessing the implications of military involvement on the local economy and help establish interaction with non-military actors in cases where de-confliction and harmonization between military and civil needs are required. CIMIC staff can also assist with arranging access to local civil resources and ensure that such access does not compromise the needs of the local population or other non-military actors involved. Civil-military interaction within HNS, should always be managed in full consultation with the appropriate military and non-military authorities of the host nation.

NATO Force Integration Units. As part of NATO’s adaptation to security challenges from the east and the south, the Alliance has established eight NATO Force Integration Units. As part of NATO’s adaptation to security challenges from the east and the south, the Alliance has established eight NATO Force Integration Units.
Integration Units (NFIU). These NFIUs are small headquarters including CIMIC personnel at the tactical level, which will help facilitate the rapid deployment of Allied forces to the Eastern part of the Alliance, support collective defense planning and assist in coordinating training and exercises. They will also work with host nations to identify logistical networks, transportation routes and supporting infrastructure to ensure that NATO's high-readiness forces can deploy to the region as quickly as possible and work together effectively.

**Host nation support – core functions in support to the maritime environment**

Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organizations which are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation's territory (AAP-6, Allied Glossary of Terms and Definitions).

HNS can involve the following entities or support:
- Government agencies:
  - police, fire-fighters, translators/liaison personnel, customs and immigration;
- HN civilians:
  - labour pool;
- HN military units:
  - navy, army, air force, coast guard, military police, border guard;
- HN facilities:
  - harbour entrance control towers, boathouses; checkpoints or guard posts;
- Civilian contractors:
  - support services i.e. bunkering, shipyard and repair;
- Designated roles:
  - rail operations, air traffic control, maritime coordination centre, search and rescue, harbour pilot services, firefighters and medical facilities and teams;
- Intelligence support:
  - devices, facilities and intelligence products;
- Logistic support:
  - supplies, equipment and staging areas.

These core functions are assessed to be vital to and will as such need to be performed by NATO, in the event that the HN is incapable of providing a satisfactory level of support:
- Safety;
HN safety:
Pilot service, harbour management and vessel traffic service are all vital stakeholders regarding upholding the safety of navigation in the harbour, entrances and adjacent holding or anchorage areas. Close liaison with these stakeholders will ensure that a collective effort is established to minimize disruptions to the routine operation of harbour areas.

HN security:
Host nation military forces will be unique to their particular culture and location. This includes their quantity, quality and effectiveness. Regardless of their situation or status at the outset of operations, HN forces will be indispensable in terms of the execution of stabilization and, more importantly, creating enduring solutions. Professional HN military forces will be invaluable for intelligence and understanding the operating environment; they may even have a harbor protection capability or elements of it (e.g. infrastructures, patrol boats, land patrol and other). If NATO elements are working with HN military forces, care must be taken to ensure that the population perceives their nation’s security forces as capable, competent and professional. Failure to do so will generally undermine the HN government’s legitimacy.

HN law enforcement forces play a valuable role in stabilization if these forces are competent and trustworthy. If they are legitimate in the eyes of the population, they are likely to have access to detailed intelligence on adversary leaders, networks and links to criminal or terrorist elements. The presence of local law enforcement, particularly if they are perceived to be leading activities, will have a stabilizing and normalizing impact on the population.

HN Harbour international ship and port security (ISPS)/Security Implementation. If present, international ship and port security code will have a positive contribution to the overall security, since established physical restrictions, surveillance and access control can be utilized in the overall harbor security.

HN harbour management and infrastructure:
One of the most important local authorities is the harbour master. The coordination with this authority should be planned in advance in order to integrate his information within the CIMIC structure. Liaison or daily meetings, where planned activities from both sides are exchanged, should be arranged. The information-exchange with the harbour master is of high importance for the coordination. CIMIC can provide the harbour master additional threat information from NATO channels, which will help the harbour master to adapt the ISPS-measures and increase the security of the harbour.
HN logistic support:
HNS plays an important role not only for the HPO itself but as well to guarantee its survivability. The HN level of cooperation and capability will influence the design in all planning. HNS is normally based on agreements that commit the HN to provide specific support under prescribed conditions.
In general, HNS is highly situational and heavily dependent upon the operational capabilities of the HN and its political acceptance. Maximum use of HN capabilities is especially critical when NATO forces may not be in place or have outpaced their logistics support. The amount of civil or military support provided by HN will depend on its national laws, industrial capability, and willingness to give such support.

6.4.5 Project management

A CIMIC project is a specific task undertaken by the military force either in isolation or in partnership with one or more non-military actors. Conducting CIMIC projects in isolation can only be the exception in an environment where non-military actors are not able to operate. In all other scenarios, a partnership is essential and will enhance the feasibility and sustainability of a project (local ownership).

Every project needs to be in line with the HN's development plan and initiatives of the international community. In the absence of a functioning government and state authorities, envisioned CIMIC projects need to be even stronger analyzed concerning their relevance and effects.

Projects are not a core activity of CIMIC, but if a commander decides to carry out projects (just as a tool ...), CIMIC should always be involved from the very beginning of the planning process. A commander should deny any project implementation which has not been assessed by the CIMIC branch and which has not been approved by the responsible local officials/ministries.

When properly planned and executed, projects can benefit the overall mission, can serve as a significant contribution to force protection and will improve the situation of the non-military actors and their environment. It is not the amount of money which makes a project successful but the consideration of the factors mentioned above. A poorly-planned and implemented project (e.g. poor sustainability) will, in turn, only benefit the contractor and damage the reputation of the military. When it comes to projects, less is sometimes more.

Project characteristics
If the task is to establish a CIMIC project, following characteristics must be taken into consideration:
**Size and complexity**: Projects will vary in size and complexity. Whilst this will be mission dependent, projects may be of greater significance in crisis response operations than in collective defense scenarios.

**Coordination**: Coordination is a critical factor in the project management process. CIMIC should aim to conduct CIMIC project focus at the appropriate level in order to coordinate, monitor and track projects within the AOO. The grouping of projects into categories such as health, education etc. may be used in order to assist coordination, as this is also in line with e.g. the UN cluster approach.

**Mission oriented**: Projects have to be in support of the mission. This may not always be in line with the aims of some or all of the non-military actors involved into the project.

**Clearly defined**: The purpose, scope and parameters of a project must be clearly identified and defined before its development and initiation.

**Monitored**: In order to provide full visibility of ongoing projects CIMIC staff has to track and report on the progress. This can be achieved by including that into the CIMIC report and return system. Simultaneously it gives the opportunity to check if the project is still developing into the right direction to reach the expected objectives.

**Feasibility**: A feasibility study must be conducted before the acceptance of any project in order to ensure that a project is not only achievable, but also that the beneficiary is enabled to maintain the usage. The consequences of being unable to finalize a project may will result in a negative impact upon the force.

**Level**: CIMIC projects can be conducted at all levels, but are mainly conducted at the tactical level. In particular cases, the operational level might involve itself for setting guidelines, ensuring a consistent approach and a well-balanced engagement across the joint operations area. When conducted at the tactical level it is important that subordinate units do not work in isolation and that the direction given by the higher headquarters is followed. This is not only in order to ensure coordination but also to encourage consistency across the area of operations (AOO) and unity of effort. A well-balanced CIMIC effort across the AOO will also be more likely to portray a favorable military image in relation to the non-military actors.

**Commitment**: Wherever possible, military participation and involvement must be kept to a minimum. The aim should be to encourage the hand-over of projects to the non-military actors at the earliest practical opportunity. Military resources and efforts, when involved, should balance the short term gains against long-term effects of their projects, regarding self-sustainment and capacity building. The duration of the mission against the required time for conducting the project is a
further consideration to be made. Justifying projects with “force acceptance” or “force protection” might also be a rationale for focusing on a quick impact.

**Impartiality**: Whenever conducting projects the aim should be to be as impartial as possible regarding non-military actors and the civil environment.

**Funding**: The NATO funding system rarely includes funds for CIMIC projects. As such, it is essential that funding sources, including donor organizations, nations and certain deployed units are identified as early as possible (phase 0). A system for the disbursement of funds with agreed procedures and tracking systems must be in place before any agreement to sponsor a project is undertaken. CIMIC planners have to be aware of the fact that “3rd party” funding will lead to a difficult focus (project-wise), a different project control and ultimately might result in other than planned (sometimes even undesired) effects. Utilizing of military capacities (like military engineers or military medical elements) within available resources for conducting projects can increase the effectiveness of the given budget.

**Cultural awareness**: Projects need to be in line and must reflect respect with the cultural background of the respective society. A mismatch on this could have a negative impact for the overall mission and most likely results in limited acceptance and utilization.

**Project approach**

1. **Requirement**: Ensure the project is requested.
2. **Assessment**: Ensure the project is in support of the commander’s mission.
3. **Screening**: Ensure there is a need and no duplication of effort.
4. **Acceptance**: Ensure local ownership.
5. **Execution**: Ensure local involvement.
6. **Completion**
7. **Transition**
6. Completion: Ensure there are no additional hidden commitments and the project will be maintained and sustained.
7. Transition: Make sure the project is handed over in full and sustainable local responsibility.

**Do no harm**
During the planning process of a project, it might be helpful to ask the same do no harm questions in order to avoid possible sources of problems.

**Impacts on other communities**
- How is the relationship between the people we are assisting and their neighbors?
- Will our assistance make those relations better or worse or will there be no effect at all?
- Have you considered the needs/preferences/priorities of neighboring communities?
- Have you considered the potential or actual negative effects on other communities?

**Effects on perceptions and relations**
- Will men, women, boys, girls and other vulnerable groups like older people or persons with disabilities benefit equally from the project? (include a gender perspective).
- Is anyone already doing something similar here, or nearby?
- Have you considered sources of harmful competition, suspicion, jealousy or biases within and between the communities in the area where you are working?
- Will this activity avoid or foster harmful competition, suspicion, jealousy or biases? Who profits from this project? Can it be misused or not used at all?
- Are the resources we are providing at any risk from theft, diversion, corruption or other unwanted use?

**Quick Impact Projects in UN missions**

UN mission quick impact projects (QIP) are funded from peacekeeping budget, and are intended to provide a flexible disbursement facility to support, at short notice, local level, non-recurrent activities in the areas of health, education, public infrastructure and social services, that are designed to promote and facilitate the UN peace support effort in the given country.

In some UN missions, CIMIC officers are responsible for managing some of the QIPs, whilst in others CIMIC officers will work closely with civil affairs or humanitarian affairs officers to implement these projects. It is thus important that CIMIC officers understand what QIPs are, and how they work.

Military contingents are encouraged to identify potential projects in their AOO, in close consultation with beneficiaries, community leaders and their civil affairs
and/or humanitarian affairs colleagues. Any mission component or section, (e.g. military units, military observers, CIVPOL, political affairs, civil affairs, human rights, public information, humanitarian affairs, DDR, or electoral affairs) may identify and propose QIPs, and such proposals should ideally be the result of a multi-functional team effort. Once such a project has been identified, a project proposal should be prepared and submitted for approval. In most UN missions, QIPs are managed by the humanitarian affairs section or the civil affairs section on behalf of the SRSG. In some case CIMIC officers may be involved in assisting with the identification, facilitation and monitoring of QIPs.

QIPs can contribute to building confidence in the mission, mandate and/or peace process in a number of ways, including:

- Through the type of project implemented, for example one that rapidly addresses key community needs, which can demonstrate early peace dividends and/or increase confidence in the mission;
- By cementing or supporting conflict management or resolutions activities;
- By building legitimacy and capacity of local authorities or organizations;
- Through the dialogue and interaction that comes with the process of project identification, stakeholder consultation and project implementation;
- By “opening doors” and establishing communication channels between the mission and host community;
- By helping uniformed components (UN military or police) to engage with local communities through involvement in project development, monitoring and/or implementation. This can include using military engineering assets to support a project or direct implementation by the military.

Throughout the project cycle, it is essential to be guided by the overarching principles of local ownership, gender, culture and context sensitivity. Good project and programme management are also essential to building confidence through QIPs. Bad project management, including in the selection, implementation and monitoring of QIPs, can undermine confidence and may compound conflict. Bad practice in QIP management might include:

- Falling to properly consult with stakeholders, which can lead to a lack of buy-in or a failure to address real needs;
- A lack of coordination with other non-military actors, may lead to duplication of efforts;
- Poor quality work, results in short-lived benefits;
- Implementation delays; or
- Inequitable distribution of benefits between or within communities or regions.

VII Gender awareness and Cross Cutting Topics (CCT)
7.1. Introduction

Cross-cutting topics (CCTs) are a range of different topics which could affect the mission in a number of ways, but which fall outside of the military's primary responsibilities. Different military disciplines, branches and command levels may have to consider and deal with a variety of CCTs. CCTs have a significant impact on all missions. To date the following CCTs have been identified:

- protection of civilians (persons, objects and services);
- children and armed conflict;
- women, peace and security;
- cultural property protection (CPP); and
- building integrity.

Gender awareness is not a separate cross-cutting topic, rather something that is an integral part of the CCTs listed above. Gender refers to the social attributes associated with being male and female learned through socialization and determines a person's position and value in a given context. This also means the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes.

7.2. Gender awareness

To sketch a complete picture of the civil environment, both the perspectives from men and from women in the society have to be included. Men, women, boys and girls may face different risks and vulnerabilities, play different roles in societies, or are affected by a changing security environment differently. Thus a gender perspective has to be included in planning, assessments and reports.

Specifically, the presence of gender based violence in the AOO and possible counter measures need to be assessed and conveyed to the commander.

CIMIC planners and gender advisor will also have to contribute to the Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment (CPOE). It is important to obtain a clear understanding of the operating environment and main actors, including the local culture and society which include a gender dimension. A good tool to guide the planners' thought process is the factor/deduction/conclusion table.

Example of the factor/deduction/conclusion table with gender related factors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Deduction</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Tactical units are not engaging the female population

- We will not have support from the female population and their family
- Lack of credibility of the force; will have an impact on force protection
- Insufficient or misleading situational awareness

- We need to allocate force able to engage with the entire population in a cultural respectful manner

### Risk of no female voters in elections

- No real democracy if half of the voters is excluded
- If our military mandate is to support the election, the mission has failed
- Loss of credibility and support from own national population

- We need to provide a safe and secure environment for all voters,
- We need to ensure the voting facilities enable the female population to vote

Gender can be perceived in different ways, but in most cases it focuses on the socially and culturally constructed roles and positions of men, women, boys and girls. Gender can be described as a range of characteristics distinguishing between male and female. It deals specifically with the social differences between man and woman instead of the biological differences. When looking at gender examine the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female, and the relationships between men and women, as well as the relationships among men and among women. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. They are context and time-specific and changeable. Gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a woman or man in a given context and is part of a broader socio-cultural context.

In practice, when dealing with gender it is often in terms of equality, meaning equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for men and women. This however, does not automatically imply that the aim is for men and women to become the same but that women’s and men’s rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male or female. Gender issues can be manifold. In the case of men think of structural unemployment, underprivileged men who hang around all day deprived of their role as providers of the family. Due to their frustrations and grievances they might be open to extremism which can be a way for them to seek economic and social advantages from which they are otherwise excluded. In the
case of women gender related issues are often related to sexual violence where women are often victims such as the use of rape as a weapon of atrocity in conflict. In addition women are often excluded or discriminated for employment, education or political decision making is a serious issue.

A CIMIC operator should understand that gender awareness and gender perspective is essential to enhance our understanding of all groups that need consideration in the respective AOO. Having this perspective has many advantages as it might lead to better access to the local population, organizations and authorities, better information sharing and improvement of mutual understanding and respect. It will also improve situational awareness and understanding.

The following figure serves as a simplified guide how to conduct a gender analysis, looking at internal, external, participation and integration aspects, especially focusing on the tasks of CIMIC personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i.e. how do men and women take part in the CIMIC work? What affects their participation?)</td>
<td>(i.e. how and where do we gender mainstream in our CIMIC tasks?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Internal** (i.e. how do we organize our own work?)

- **A1: Recruitment policies and equal opportunities:**
  - Male and female CIMIC personnel – all functions and levels
  - Work environment
  - Access to resources and material

**External** (i.e. how is the external situation addressed to achieve what we want?)

- **A2: Cooperation, support and representation:**
  - Participation of local men and women
  - Interaction with both local women and men
  - Participation, interaction and cooperation with partners, including women’s organizations

- **A3: Work structure:**
  - CIMIC training
  - CIMIC assessments
  - CIMIC planning
  - CIMIC reporting
  - CIMIC lessons learned and doctrine / policy development

- **A4: Mandate interpretation and execution:**
  - How the main CIMIC activities are selected and prioritized
  - Execution of selected and prioritized CIMIC activities
  - Adaption to local developments
Working towards the full integration of gender perspective within NATO extends to the planning, execution and evaluation phases of NATO-led operations. All of these phases must be based on initial and regular analysis of social groups with a gender perspective.

The following concepts shall be considered in the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and the integration of gender perspective:

a. In the framework of the comprehensive approach, make sure that risks and security for the entire population will be addressed and handled.

b. Establish and maintain liaisons with the local population, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations (IOs) at strategic, operational and tactical levels, using the appropriate civil-military co-ordination mechanisms.

c. Ensure that education and training, including pre-deployment training, is conducted for all personnel in NATO-led operations.

d. Encourage national programs to incorporate NATO pre-deployment gender training objectives into their internal system and training programs to ensure interoperability in exercises and operations.

e. Encourage NATO nations and partners to share best practices and support each other’s efforts in national implementation of UNSCR 1325.

f. Provide effective reporting and information sharing mechanisms between NATO and civilian organizations at the international level, as well as at local levels within the comprehensive approach framework.

g. Ensure effective reporting and monitoring mechanisms regarding UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions.

h. Establish concepts, procedures and mechanisms to address and respond to sexual violence in conflict as well as human security in general.

i. For given operations, analyses measures available to protect against gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse and violence in situations of armed conflict.

j. Ensure adherence to NATO Standards of Behavior and United Nations’ zero tolerance on sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) where applicable.

k. Strive for a more gender balanced composition of workforce and expand the roles of women in operations and missions at all levels.

l. Endeavour to increase representation of women throughout the NATO Command Structure and the NATO Force Structure.

m. Strive for gender equality in the NATO Force Structure in order to conduct credible and trustworthy external work and activities on women and gender in the joint operations area.

n. Integrate gender perspectives into planning, assessment and execution of operations.
Do's

- Target actions based on the gender analysis. Design services to meet the different needs of women, men, boys and girls and other vulnerable groups.
- Make sure that the population identified to be in need have equal access to services and equally participate in activities.
- Train women and men equally.
- Use programs to help prevent sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).
- When you collect, analyse and report on information, break down the data by sex and age.
- Coordinate actions with all partners.
- If you can't get quantitative information in the first hours of a response, record the sex and age of key informants who are providing you with information on the situation, and aim for a broad spread of informants. Other sources could include available programming information, census data, health statistics and household survey data. The result would be a broad snapshot of differences.

Don'ts

- Forget that women, men, boys and girls are all at risk of rape and sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). Men and boys are often victims of SGBV in conflicts.
- Favor men in livelihood programs. This could further impoverish women.
- Fail to consider gender in all sectors of the response-e.g. poor camp design can increase the risks of SGBV, and distribution programs can create opportunities for SEA.
- Forget that at the beginning of your mission, the gender analysis will not be perfect, so you may need to adapt your strategy and project design as your analysis improves.

For further information see checklist "Critical indicators".

7.3. Protection of civilians

Protection of civilians (PoC) is an overarching issue for military personal and aid workers. It ties closely with the Responsibility to Protect.

The most effective way to protect civilians is to bring an end to violent conflicts, build trust and confidence of parties in peaceful solutions, and advance peace processes and national reconciliation.

For more details see the Factsheet.

7.4. Children and armed conflict
Children are involved in and affected by conflict in different ways, they are always victims and need to be protected, even when they may be perpetrators of crimes.

In order to advance the goal of protecting children during armed conflict and ending the impunity of perpetrators, the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1612 identifies six categories of violations – the so-called six grave violations, and are the basis of evidence-gathering. These violations are: Killing and maiming of children; Abduction of children; Recruitment or use of children; Rape or other grave Sexual violence; Attacks on schools and hospitals; Denial of humanitarian access.

In many conflicts children recruited by armed groups take direct part in combat. However, their role is often not limited to fighting. Many girls and boys are also used in support functions that also entail great risk and hardship. Their tasks can vary, from combatants to cooks, spies, messengers and even sex slaves. Moreover, the use of children for acts of terror, including as suicide bombers, has emerged as a phenomenon of modern warfare.

For more details see the Factsheet.

7.5. Women, peace and security

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 introduced the topic of WPS and focused on promoting "participation of women in conflict prevention, protection and participation; women's participation in peace-building; protection of women's and girls' rights; and prevention of conflict-related sexual- and gender-based violence."

NATO has implemented this in policy with the goal to "ensure that a gender perspective is mainstreamed into policies, activities and efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts."

For more details see the Factsheet.

7.6. Cultural property protection

Cultural property (CP) is an important part of a people's identity. It can reflect their heritage, their values, and their religion. At the same time it is very fragile and if damaged might be irreparable. Therefore it requires constant and careful consideration during a mission.

Cultural property protection refers all measures for the protection of cultural property against damage, destruction, theft, embezzlement or other loss. In immovable cultural property and the term "monument protection" is used.

Bound by international law, and its positive contribution to a safe and secure environment, the military, and especially CIMIC, must take both a support position and a proactive stand regarding CPP."
Illicit trade in artifacts is a source of income for illegal armed groups and as such is directly connected to the duration of an armed conflict.

For more details see the **Factsheet**.

### 7.7. Building integrity

Building Integrity is a measure to fight corruption without reducing the efficiency of the security apparatus. It focuses on motivation rather than punishment. The NATO building integrity programme provides practical tools to reduce the risk of corruption in the defence and security sectors. It promotes good practice, processes and methodologies, and provides countries with tailored support to make defence and security institutions more effective and efficient.

Corruption in the joint operation area is not only a risk for the mission personnel, but also undermines all stabilisation efforts due to its strong link to terrorism, criminal organisations and armed opposition groups. Corruption provides resources (e.g. financial and human) for these groups and affects the efficiency of local security forces and governmental institutions. Fighting it helps to establish a safe and secure environment. Moreover, supporting a BI programme could increase public trust for the mission through a higher legitimacy. This means that the local population will be more likely to accept and support the mission. These aspects will contribute to force security and more sustainable mission results. Corruption is a major source of social unrest around the world. Corruption fuels regional conflict and acts a key source of instability. There is a clear correlation between corruption, violence and instability. The most corrupt countries in the world often are the scene of insurgencies, extremist activity, or other threats to international security.

For more details see the **Factsheet**.

### VIII Annex (downloads)

#### 8.1. Annex

##### 8.1.1 Structures / manning

Common understanding of CIMIC teams.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>DEU</th>
<th>NLD</th>
<th>DNK</th>
<th>POL</th>
<th>TUR</th>
<th>HUN</th>
<th>SVN</th>
<th>BEL</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNCG</td>
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<td>CSU</td>
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<tr>
<td>CST</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Color code:**
- **Red** (PsyOps)
- **Green** (CIMIC)
- **Yellow** (InfoOps)
- **Blue** (CA)

**Abbreviation:**
- MNCG
- CSU
- CU
- SCU
- CSE
- IAT
- CAT
- TST
- SAI
- CST
• CT
• Multinational CIMIC Group
• CIMIC Support Unit
• CIMIC Unit
• Support CIMIC Unit
• CIMIC Support Element
• Information Activity Team
• Civil Affairs Teams
• Tactical Support Teams
• Sivil Asker Isbirligi
• CIMIC Support Team
• CIMIC Team

**EU BG:**
Composition, structure, manning CJ9 of an EU (F) HQ for an EU BG (example):
Composition, structure, manning CJ9 of an EU OHQ (example):

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CJ9-01</td>
<td>ACOS</td>
<td>OP5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ9-02</td>
<td>Clerk / Admin</td>
<td>OB6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ9-03</td>
<td>DACOS</td>
<td>OF4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ9-04</td>
<td>SO Plans</td>
<td>OF3/4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ9-05</td>
<td>SO Finance</td>
<td>OF3/4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ9-06</td>
<td>SO Contracts</td>
<td>CoMIII</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ9-07</td>
<td>SO Projects</td>
<td>OF2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ9-08</td>
<td>Ops 1 (Humanitarian)</td>
<td>OF3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ9-09</td>
<td>Ops 2 (Air Movement)</td>
<td>OF3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **CJ9-01 ACOS**: Responsible to the COS for all aspects of CIMIC in the JOA. Establishes, maintains, influences, and exploits relationships between military and civilian authorities, in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives.
- **CJ9-02 Clerk / Admin**: Provides the administration support to CJ9.
- **CJ9-03 DACOS**: Liaises with NGO, ONG, HN, etc. Co-ordinates the CIMIC actions on behalf of the deployed Force, population, ONGs. Co-ordinates the CIMIC centre activities. Plans and co-ordinates CIMIC activities. Assesses the potential implications of the military/civilian interface in the planning scenarios.
- **CJ9-04 SO Plans**: Plans and co-ordinates CIMIC activities. Assesses the potential implications of the military/civilian interface in the planning scenarios.
- **CJ9-05 SO Finance**: Manages the budgets attributed to CIMIC related projects.
- **CJ9-06 SO Contracts**: Develops contracts with HN and/or other agencies for CIMIC related projects.
- **CJ9-07 SO Projects**: Responsible for CIMIC projects and Quick Improvement Projects (QIP).
- **CJ9-08 Ops 1 (Humanitarian)**: Responsible for CIMIC involvement with Force decision making and controlling process. Acts as primary contact with subordinate CIMIC staffs. Ensures that CJUG is informed about related CIMIC operations or activities.
- **CJ9-09 Ops 2 (Air Movement)**: Coordinates (balanced with CJ and CJ4) with UNO UNO CIMIC air transport requirements with NFU.

Example for a CIMIC unit within an EU BG:
8.1.2 Non-military actors
Significant International Organisations

United Nations

European Union

African Union

UNICEF

World Health Organisation

International Organization for Migration

UNESCO

Food and Agriculture Organization

International Committee of the Red Cross

The Red Crescent Societies

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
8.1.3 Risk Analysis

Risk Analysis is a proven way of identifying and assessing factors that could negatively affect the success of an operation or a project. It allows to examine the potential risks and helps to decide whether or not to move forward with a decision.

Risk Analysis triggers the following bullets:
1. **likelihood** of a threat
2. and **impact** on the operation or further procedures.

Resulting in a Net Risk-matrix, introducing to the threat-level overall.

When the value of the risks is worked out, next step would be to start looking at ways to manage them effectively and mitigate the risks.

**Identify Threats**

The first step in Risk Analysis is to identify the existing and possible threats in the operating theatre. These can come from many different sources and is not limited to the sources listed:

- Political - new government after election, Turnoil, change of stakeholders, change in public opinion
- Economy: collapse of the market system,
- Reputational – Loss of confidence against stakeholders, or damage reputation.
- Human – Illness, death, injury, or other loss of a key individual.
• Operational – Disruption to support operations, loss of access to essential assets
• Procedural – Failures of accountability, internal systems, or controls, or from fraud etc..
• Natural – Weather, natural disasters, or disease
• Infrastructure – damaged or blocked routes, loss of CIPs (Critical Infrastructure Points)
• Information – break down of communications means

**Please note** that the term “operational” can be used by civil as well as military actors tailored to their approach. Additional threats can arise during the operation phase and not every threat has to be.

In most theatres the following matrix is well established:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact/Likelihood</th>
<th>Negligible (1)</th>
<th>Minor (2)</th>
<th>Moderate (3)</th>
<th>Severe (4)</th>
<th>Critical (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No serious injuries</td>
<td>Minor injuries</td>
<td>Non-life threatening injuries, High stress</td>
<td>Serious injury</td>
<td>Death or severe injury</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal asset loss or damage</td>
<td>Some asset loss or damage</td>
<td>Asset loss or damage</td>
<td>Major asset destruction</td>
<td>Destruction or total asset loss</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No delay to programs/operations</td>
<td>Some delay to programs/operations</td>
<td>Program/operation delays and disruptions</td>
<td>Severe disruption to programs/operations</td>
<td>Loss of projects or programs/cancellation of operation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact/Likelihood</th>
<th>Very likely (5)</th>
<th>Likely (4)</th>
<th>Moderately likely (3)</th>
<th>Unlikely (2)</th>
<th>Very unlikely (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Example for scenario in *Theatre XY*: 
8.1.4 SWOT Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk scenario of threats</th>
<th>Vulnerability consideration</th>
<th>Likelihood (1-5)</th>
<th>Impact (1-5)</th>
<th>Net risk (1-25)</th>
<th>Net risk level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Administration in the country is fragile</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economical</td>
<td>Economy lacks, high inflation rate &gt;25%, import problem at BXP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputational</td>
<td>Bad international reputation of government and stakeholder due to high corruption</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human</td>
<td>Lack of Secondary and Tertiary Hospitals</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Missing support by HNS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural / mission readiness</td>
<td>Planned operation is self-sustainable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Very low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural</td>
<td>Monsun season during operation phase</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Linked to Monsun season</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Land-lines are affected by Monsun but back up thru Iridium, Thuraya phones</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Normal case more than one vulnerable consideration does exist per risk threat. These have to be merged rated to one generic statement.

**Net Risk (likelihood X impact):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 – 3</th>
<th>4 – 6</th>
<th>7 – 11</th>
<th>12 – 16</th>
<th>17 – 25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Risk Threat for the example in Theatre XY is:

8.9 = Medium

Please note: In general operations within the range of “medium” will not hamper the tasks and do not constitute a specific threat neither for civil nor military interests.
8.1.5 Actors diagram

Actors diagram

8.1.6 CIMIC sites of significance

CIMIC SITES of significance (Abstract of an Annex W)

1. **General.** Sites within this category are not to be targeted without prior authorisation from COM ECISAM. Additional sensitive sites identified on the ground should be reported up through the Chain of Command.
2. **Sites of Major CIMIC Significance (SMCS).** These sites are of such cultural, either religious, or civil infrastructure significance that their destruction or damage would either:
   a. Potentially undermine the Force's image.
   b. Seriously threaten the post-operation recovery of the involved countries.
   c. Inflict widespread and indiscriminate impact on key civil life support factors that would affect the civil population.
   d. Following sites can be deemed SMCS:

   1. Power plants/substations;
   2. APOD/SPOD, main LOCs and transportation networks;
   3. Water treatment/processing and distribution plants/installations;
   4. Dams and reservoirs;
   5. Hazardous industrial and commercial installations (Chemical or nuclear);
   6. Key historical/cultural or religious monuments or sites;
   7. UNESCO sites;
   8. IO/GO/NGO sites (i.e. IDP and Refugee camps).

3. **Sites of CIMIC Significance (SCS).** These sites are to have additional consideration prior to engagement, as engagement may: alienate significant elements of the civil population; adversely affect key civil life support; impede post-operation recovery of the concerned countries. The following sites can be deemed SCS:

   a. Places of worship;
   b. Community-based civil admin infrastructure (town hall, community centres);
   c. Health sites (hospitals, clinics, emergency service capability);
   d. Water sites (smaller scale distribution networks and infrastructures);
   e. Power lines (town/city power distribution lines);
   f. Sanitation (town/city sanitation processing capability);
   g. Cultural sites of historical and/or religious importance.

4. **Reporting Newly Identified Sites.** Formations and assigned units will identify and report new sites to JTF HQ J9 CIMIC for inclusion into the CIMIC sensitive sites list by providing grids (UTM, LATLONG and MGRS) and description of the site. The following are current sites identified as SMCS and SCS:

**8.1.7 System analysis**

Systems Analysis is an analytical process that can be employed to holistically examine adversaries, potential adversaries, non-aligned and cooperative nations or entities. It considers the operational environment as a set of complex adaptive
systems in order to identify behaviors, structures and interrelationships, and to assess strengths, weaknesses or vulnerabilities.

It is successfully utilized in both the civilian and military communities and has proven to be particularly useful in analyzing and understanding problems in complex operational environments.

Systems Understanding

Systems Analysis aims to identify a network of systems and system elements, to identify the relationships and interactions between these system elements, and to create actionable knowledge to achieve a desired effect. This actionable knowledge can be used to target actions in order to attempt to affect capabilities, behavior, or interaction and influence of key actors and entities within the operational environment.

Systems Analysis integrates the analyses from work done on specific independent systems, such as the PMESII domains. Systems Analysis is a continuous, iterative and collaborative process that should be conducted in close co-operation with internal/external Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations and Centres of Excellence (COEs), as required.

Systems Analysis supports the planning, execution, and assessment processes at the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It describes the engagement space in varying degrees of complexity commensurate with the respective current level of NATO interest and is directly dependent on the analytical requirements. For example, a tactical view of a particular area within the engagement space will likely require more detailed study than a strategic view of the same area. The resulting in-depth understanding of the engagement space allows the Commander to determine
what actions will produce changes in the behavior of critical actors in a way that will ultimately lead to the achievement of mission objectives.

The overall goal of Systems Analysis is to gain a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics, capabilities, behavior and interaction of the various systems (and their related subsystems) within the engagement space. As these elements evolve or change in time and space, Systems Analysis assists in providing a contextual assessment of the objectives, capabilities, likely actions and possible effects of each of these systems.

The iterative Systems Analysis process generally includes the following activities:
- **Systems break down**, in which subsystems, system elements and components are identified and where system boundaries, structures, and general relationships are determined.
- **Interaction analysis**, which explores inherent system dynamics in order to understand the underlying behavior of the system over time and highlighting the “cause and effect” relationships between elements of the system.
- **Model synthesis**, which re-combines the system’s elements to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the behavior of the system as a whole. This helps to identify similarities, interfaces, patterns, key factors, and feedback loops within the system in order to understand its comprehensive behavior.

The Systems Analysis process consists of the following activities and, as it is not a linear process, they may be re-iterated non-sequentially:
- Identify actors and their attributes, such as objectives, intentions, capabilities, relationships and interactions.
- Identify real world objects (e.g. a bridge) and abstract objects (e.g. a political power gap), processes and logical dependencies (e.g. bridge on Main Supply Route also provides access route for local trade and communal worship).
- Identify normative behavior and apply, where possible, available conceptual patterns.
- Identify potential knowledge gaps.
- Identify leverage points.
- Identify possible undesired effects from potential actions.

**Key Term**

**Leverage Point** – a point of pressure or influence that can cause a change to the state of the system.
To assist in the understanding of how a particular system operates, Systems Analysis frequently uses Influence Diagrams to help visualize how key actors (individuals, groups and organisations) interact with each other and which interrelationships are particularly important. Influence Diagrams can be used to show where critical requirements, capabilities or vulnerabilities exist and where the behavior of system elements can be influenced or affected in either a positive or negative way. These diagrams can also depict Objectives, Criteria for Success and Decisive Points.

The lack of availability of simulation tools and analysis time may significantly limit this phase of the analysis and thus restrict analysis of the dynamic aspects of the engagement space. The effort to develop a system analysis model could vary significantly depending on the method used, the time available and the desired level of fidelity/accuracy. In some cases, a Rehearsal of Concept (ROC drill) or war-gaming might adequately serve the purpose. For longer-term analysis, a number of simulation runs or a complete empirical study might be more appropriate.

LIAISON AND COORDINATION MATRIX

1. General.

The Coordination and Liaison Matrix is a tool, drafted and maintained by CIMIC, for the use of JFCNP and CCs in the conduct of Civil and Military Interaction (CMI); engagement and liaison activities. Whilst the Matrix is maintained by CIMIC, all functional areas within the HQ are to input into the accurate identification of actors in the JOA and who, within NATO, they should interact with, and at what level: strategic, operational, tactical. All engagement and liaison activity requires synchronization with all other Information Activity (IA) and should be conducted IAW the COM’s priorities and with adherence to the StratCom narrative.
2. **Strategic Level Engagement.**

External coordination efforts with regional non-NATO governments, the UN, EU and other IO/NGO/GO, as depicted in the Liaison Matrix, will be conducted through NATO HQ and by NATO capitals.

3. **Operational Level Engagement.**

It is planned and managed via the Engagement Working Group (EWG), synchronized with other IA in the IA Working Group (IAWG), for presentation at the Joint Effects Information Board (JEIB). COM NRF is authorized by SACEUR to liaise and engage with HN representatives. In addition, SACEUR has authorized COM NRF, through HN coordination, to establish liaison with the IO/NGO/GO as depicted in the Coordination and Liaison Matrix.

4. **Operational Level Liaison.**

It is to be conducted IAW the Coordination and Liaison Matrix, which may include CMI across all functional areas; CIMIC, PAO, Info Ops, PSYOPS, ENG etc., and needs to be synchronized with other IA in the IAWG, for presentation at the JEIB.

5. **Tactical Level Liaison.**

Based on COM NRF’s liaison authority, CCs will establish and maintain tactical level liaison and coordination, as necessary, with the HN on the regional level and below. Liaison and coordination with IO/NGO/GO should be conducted IAW the Coordination and Liaison Matrix.

6. **Matrix Legend**

- Indicates lead on coordination, liaison and engagement.
- Indicates coordination, liaison and engagement at the relevant level of responsibility after approval of lead.

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**COORDINATION AND LIAISON MATRIX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Level of Engagement</th>
<th>NATO/HTS Roles/Outlines</th>
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<th>IAWG</th>
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</table>

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8.4. Reference documents
8.4.1 Nato

- AJP 3.19 - Allied Joint Doctrine for CIMIC (1.8 MB)
- TTPs.pdf (3.2 MB)
- Civil-Military Cooperation Functional Planning Guide.pdf (846.7 KB)

8.4.2 UN

- UN OCHA: UN-CMCoord Field Handbook (Version 2.0, 2018) (2.5 MB)
- UN OCHA: UN CMCoord Guide for the Military (1.10 MB)

8.4.3 US CA

- US Civil Affairs Field Manual (FM 3-57) (4.10 MB)

8.5. Templates

8.5.1 Checklist for establishing a CIMIC centre

- checklist-for-establishing-a-cimic-centre.docx (106.8 KB)

8.5.2 Checklist for CIMIC meeting

- cimic-meeting-checklist.docx (48.9 KB)

8.5.3 Checklist for an interview

- checklist-for-an-interview.docx (48.2 KB)

8.5.4 Checklist Critical indicators and Gender awareness

- critical-indicators-and-gender-awareness-checklist.docx (47.2 KB)

8.5.5 Reports

- cimicrep.docx (33.7 KB)
- after-action-report.docx (49.6 KB)
- after-action-report-example.docx (57.2 KB)

8.5.6 Assessments
IX Definitions, glossary, table of content and cover

9.1. Definitions

9.1.1 Measures of effectiveness (MoE) and measures of performance (MoP)

Background

Operations take place in dynamic environments where changes in the political, economic, social, military, infrastructure and information domains are constantly happening. Military Commanders need feedback in order to determine the effectiveness of their operations and make recommendations for changes.

In NATO, this feedback process is called ‘Operations Assessment’. Operations Assessment is to be understood as the function that enables the measurement of progress and results of operations in a military context, and the subsequent development of conclusions and recommendations that support decision making.

CIMIC supports the Operations Assessment process. This is done by formulating and measuring MoEs and MoPs;

- **Measures of Effectiveness (MoE):** A metric used to measure a current system state. "Are we on track to achieve the intended new system state within the planned timescale?"
• **Measures of Performance (MoP):** A metric used to determine the accomplishment of actions. “Are the actions being executed as planned?”

**MoE Development**

MoEs for assessing the success of CIMIC activities should be designed with the same consideration in mind as for any other type of operation. The following general criteria should be considered:

- **Ends-related.** MoEs should directly relate to the tasks that will support the commander’s intended end-state.
- **Measurability.** In order to measure effectiveness, a baseline assessment must be established before you execute the action. Your effectiveness will be measured against the baseline.
- **Timeliness.** Feedback must be timely and clearly stated for each MoE and/or MoP and a plan made to report within specified time periods.

MoEs should be kept in mind when planning your actions. If the effects and actions are not linked to the Commander’s objectives, or are not clearly set out in writing, measuring your effectiveness is nearly impossible. If MoEs are difficult to write for a specific effect, then re-evaluate the effect and consider rewriting if necessary.

MoEs developed in support of CIMIC must be as specific as possible in order to determine direct cause-and-effect relationships. Remember that an ‘effect’ must be MEASURABLE. The more specific the MoE, the easier it will be to determine what actions are required to produce the desired effect.

One of the biggest challenges with MoEs is the difficulty in isolating variables and establishing a direct cause-and-effect relationship. CIMIC capabilities are directed at key leaders/decision-makers and those in the civilian environment who you come into contact with. This makes it much more difficult for you to establish concrete causal relationships, especially when assessing human behavior.

**Evaluation of MoEs:**

Anyone can observe actions and effects; it could be a CIMIC team, a project manager or a CIMIC Centre. Observation is as individual as each event. Observation might be event-driven. For example, you know that a local dissident against the local government plans to address the population with the purpose of discouraging the population from participating in civil governance. Deliberate assessment through interviews, polling, and surveys of those who participated in the events is as important as with those who observed the event (a CIMIC team or project manager, for example). It is now your challenge to evaluate and validate the observations.
Many evaluation tools are available. Before you create your own metrics, first refer to the mission personnel responsible for mission assessment (assessment branch).

Here is a scenario for your consideration:

You and your CIMIC team have been living and working in a specific region for several months. It is a calm region. You have created a positive working relationship with the community, are welcomed into the homes and businesses of key leaders, and have been working together with the civilian population to participate in civil governance. Based on your actions and efforts, your work has resulted in positive effects in support of your commander. One day, you learn that an opposition leader to the local government plans to address the population with the purpose of changing their allegiance from the current government. Based on your research and regional awareness, you know the goal of this speaker is to destabilize the local community with his rhetoric and, in previous speeches has targeted the young university students and disenfranchised youth. Through your actions you are confident that you and your CIMIC team have built a strong rapport with the local population, which supports your commander’s objectives. But now, based upon this potential disruption to the status quo, you’ve been tasked to provide feedback from this activity to your commander.

Simplified example of MoE/MoP for CIMIC at the tactical level:

Commander’s objective (end-state): Achieve security and stability in the region.

CIMIC effect (this is the effect that you will provide to the commander, in support of his objective): Will the village population participate in civil governance (which will allow your commander access to and influence with the local population)?

Actions (those projects or activities that you and your CIMIC team plan to execute in order to encourage and influence the village populace to participate in civil governance):

- Village leaders (political, government, religious, tribal, educational) will be identified and visited by the CIMIC team on a regular basis.
- The CIMIC team will establish a Discussion Group in the local Internet cafes and universities in order to establish rapport with the potentially disenfranchised young adults and youth.
- The CIMIC team will become involved with voter registration and city council meetings.

Measure of Performance (MoP) (actions executed and used):

- The number of pro-government rallies/demonstrations in the village since 1 July.
- Percentage of positive new media stories since 1 July.
- Number of citizens participating in democratically elected functions since 1 July.
Create an evaluation tool

Many evaluation tools are available, but the “Likert scale” is a measurement commonly used in questionnaires. A Likert item is simply a statement that you ask someone to comment on in order to determine their agreement or disagreement on a topic or subject. An odd number of responses are often used. You can find many examples and samples on the Internet to assist you with creating a tool specific to your situation.

Let’s explore an example discussed above. During your planning process, you will establish the methods by which you will engage with the population. You must determine the statements you want to put forward for comment during your conversations.

Here are some suggestions:
- I enjoyed the speaker’s presentation.
- The topic of a new school is important to me.
- There are other projects more important to me.
- The speaker created an unrealistic expectation for my village.
- Because of this presentation, I will vote for this speaker’s candidate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. I enjoyed the speaker’s presentation.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. The topic of a new school is important to me.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. There are other projects more important to me.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. The speaker created an unrealistic expectation for my village.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Because of this presentation, I will vote for this speaker’s candidate.</td>
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</table>

Perhaps you can ask follow-up questions, such as:

1. **Question**: You seemed to enjoy the speaker, but do not intend to vote for his candidate. Why is that?
   - **Answer**: He was very interesting and spoke with passion, but he does not represent our values.
2. **Question**: What project is more important than a new school?

  - **Answer**: Our village already has a school and a clinic, but the clinic has no equipment. It is important that my neighbours have some health care instead of building a school we do not need.

Add any other questions that you consider important, but do not make these too lengthy. Your goal is to assess the result of the rally and to determine if your effectiveness has been diminished.

Final evaluation: Using an initial baseline assessment of the degree to which the village population participated in civil governance (before the speeches), you, the CIMIC team, will subjectively assess your effectiveness and provide timely feedback to your commander.

### 9.2. Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACTORD</td>
<td>Activation Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHP</td>
<td>Allied Hydrograph publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied Joint Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOI</td>
<td>Area of Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>Allied Tactical Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWNIS</td>
<td>Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BI</td>
<td>Building Integrity</td>
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<td>CA¹</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>CA²</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAA¹</td>
<td>Civilian Assembly Areas</td>
</tr>
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<td>CAA²</td>
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<td>Children and Armed Conflict</td>
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<td>Civil Affairs Supported Activities</td>
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<td>Civil Affairs Team</td>
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<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical Biological, Radiological and Nuclear</td>
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<td>Camp Coordination and Camp Management</td>
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<td>CCFs</td>
<td>Core Competencies and Functions</td>
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<td>CCIRs</td>
<td>Commander’s Critical Information Requirements</td>
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<td>CIMIC Centre of Excellence</td>
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<td>CCT</td>
<td>Cross-Cutting Topics</td>
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<td>Civil Emergency Planning</td>
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<td>Core Humanitarian Standard</td>
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<td>CIMIC Coordination Meeting</td>
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<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>C-IED</td>
<td>Counter Improvised Explosive Devices</td>
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<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>Communications and Information Systems</td>
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<td>CI&amp;Sy</td>
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<td>CJSOR</td>
<td>Combined Joint Statement of Requirements</td>
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<td>Civil-Military Operations Centre</td>
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<td>Centre of Excellence</td>
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<td>Centre of Gravity</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counter-insurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP¹</td>
<td>Common Operational Picture</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>Comprehensive Operations Planning</td>
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<td>Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Cultural Property</td>
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<td>Component Planning guidance</td>
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<td>SITREPS</td>
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<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<td>Special Operations Force</td>
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<td>SU</td>
<td>Situational Understanding</td>
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<td>SWOT</td>
<td>Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats</td>
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<td>Tactical Control</td>
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<td>Technology, Environment</td>
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<td>Task Force</td>
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<td>Tool for Operational Planning Functional Area Service</td>
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<td>Tactical Support Teams</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tactics, Techniques and Procedures</td>
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<td>UK DFID</td>
<td>United Kingdom Department for International Development</td>
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9.3. Table of content and Cover

9.3.1 Table of content

- [CIMIC Handbook_table of content](92.2 KB)

9.3.2 Cover

- [CIMIC Handbook](54.8 KB)

1 Different principles of non-military actors, particularly humanitarian NGOs and IOs, limit their potential level of interaction with the military.

2 Partner nations as defined by the NAC and referenced in MC 0458/3 to include “Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) countries as well as those partners across the globe with a partnership program with NATQ” and including troop contributing partners to NATO-led operations.

3 For the definition of CIMIC Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.19 dated 09 Nov. 2018. For further read, see Chapter 2.

4 [AJP-3.19](https://example.com).

5 Land, air, maritime, space, cyber.
Civil-military liaison, support to the force, support to non-military actors and the civil environment. See Chapter 2.

See Chapter 2.

Article 5 NATO treaty.

AJP 3.19, Chapter 4, 4.24

“Resilience is a society’s ability to resist and recover easily and quickly from these situations, combining civilian, economic, commercial and military factors. Resilience is a broad concept focusing upon continuation of basic governmental functions. Resilience is the combination of civil preparedness and military capacity.”

See common understanding of CIMIC teams.

See AJP-3.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for Maritime Operations for details.

See Military Committee (MC) 0376/3, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) and Allied tactical publication (ATP)-02, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for shipping manual for details.

See Allied hydrograph publication (AHP)-01, Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System for details.

See NSC website www.shipping.nato.int for details.

Military government operations: Operations executed by civil affairs to provide expertise in the civil sector functions in order to establish transitional military authority or conduct support to civil administration.

Civil-military operations: Activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation.

Civil affairs operations: Actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government.

NATO use operating environment.

With the exception of the 95th CA Brigade Headquarters and its subordinate battalion headquarters, CA units are still organized to provide the supported commander the
manpower and equipment to form the nucleus of the CMOC.

(F)HQ – “F” in Brackets – a (F)HQ is a “small” Force Headquarters for a BG operation. FHQ is a Force Headquarters for major joint operations.

For further information see UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 2.0 (2018)

CIMIC Estimate: It is the principal CIMIC planning output in support of planning and will form the base of Annex W. This is a living document aiming to assemble as much raw data as possible that should be updated throughout the whole planning process. (For further information see CFPG).

TOPFAS (tool for operational planning functional area service), and this is the data and planning support tool for operational planning. The objective of TOPFAS is to provide operations planners with software tools to support their operations planning and assessment activities. This tool will provide the capabilities required to support the preparation and evaluation of planning products and to conduct concurrent collaborative and distributed operations planning by multiple headquarters and staffs from different functional areas. TOPFAS enhance information sharing; improve the availability, quality and timeliness of information exchange; and achieve a common situational awareness and a better planning synergy and synchronization.

CEP Analysis: Resilience status and capability gaps of HN, critical infrastructure, and cultural property

For further informations see CFPG Annex B and F for a sample factor analysis

CIMIC concept is under construction.

CIMIC Contribution to the centre of gravity (CoG): CIMIC analysis and work on a centre of gravity-analysis is naturally mainly on non-military actors. At the tactical level, COG tend to be host nation and civilian specific capabilities at specific points that provide freedom of action and the means for achieving tactical objectives (something physical and tangible).

CIMIC Coordination Meeting (CICOM): The CICOM is a X9 led multilateral forum the ultimate aim of which is to ensure a comprehensive Civil-military approach to support the achievement of the military objective. CICOM enables coordination among the CIMIC community to share and update information, task distribution and de-confliction. It could be held at the joint level with the participation of relevant divisions and components or held at the component level with the participation of relevant divisions and main tactical subordinate units.

Mission analysis briefing (MAB): Mission analysis determines the tactical problem that must be solved, the specific tactical conditions to be created and the tactical key factors. Mission analysis for CIMIC planner consists of an in-depth analysis of the civil environment to determine the problem to be solved (the "what") and the conditions that
must be established. Phase 3a ends with the mission analysis briefing (MAB) and the key product of MAB is the commander’s planning guidance (CPG). The CPG will guide further planning of the staff as well as initiate and orientate planning by the main subordinate units.

30 Refer to CFPG for further detail.

31 **Cross cutting topics:** Approved cross cutting topics such as protection of civilians (PoC), children and armed conflicts (CAAC), women, peace and security, cultural property protection (CPP), and building integrity (BI)) were given to the CIMIC division/branches. Therefore, the different (CIMIC) SOs in lead for the respective WGs have to make sure that all CCT relevant information for the operational/tactical CONOPS is covered on the same way as described for CIMIC and produce (if needed) an appropriate Annex W. For further informations see [chapter 8.2](#).

32 For further informations see CFPG Annex C for CIMIC Input to an OPLAN.

33 **CIMIC tactics, techniques and procedures publication (AM 86-1-1)/TTP1**

34 **CIMIC tactics, techniques and procedures publication (AM 86-1-1)/TTP8**

35 Preferably as part of a program.

36 **The principle of local ownership describes the perception and acceptance of the local population regarding the project.**

37 **During the execution phase CIMIC should control the ongoing process, like costs, local involvement, timings, etc.**