

Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence

The Hague



Resilience through Civil Preparedness A CCOE Info Sheet

Introduction:

What is Resilience?

Resilience has been defined as a society's ability to resist and recover easily and quickly from a major shock, such as natural disaster or an armed attack.¹ Resilience is a combination of Civil Preparedness and military capacity. Each NATO member state needs to be resilient to major shocks. A resilient country is less attractive as a target and therefore contributes to the alliance's overall security. Robust resilience through civil preparedness in allied states is crucial to NATO's collective security and defence.²

What is Civil Preparedness?

Civil Preparedness is defined as all measures and means taken in peacetime, by national and Allied agencies, to enable a nation to survive an enemy attack and to contribute more effectively to the common war effort³.

Civil preparedness refers to the ability to sustain the functions vital to society, ensuring basic supply for the population and the State's capacity to act in a crisis situation. This also means that the private sector in allied nations is ready to provide support to NATO military operation.⁴ Civil preparedness is a central pillar of allies' resilience and a critical enabler for alliance collective defence.⁵ While civil preparedness remains a national responsibility, NATO can support Allies in assessing and, upon request, enhancing their civil preparedness⁶.

Aims of this Info sheet

1. Provide a **general overview** about Resilience through Civil Preparedness.
2. Describe **NATO's approach** to Resilience through Civil Preparedness.
3. Recognize potential **CIMIC contribution** to Resilience through Civil Preparedness.

¹ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm

² North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2018). "The Secretary General's Annual Report 2017". pp 19.

³ AAP6

⁴ Mission of Finland to NATO. (2017). "Civil preparedness underpins a society's resilience."

⁵ NATO. (2016). "Warsaw Summit Communiqué"

⁶ NATO. (2016). "Warsaw Summit Communiqué"



Overview about Resilience through Civil Preparedness:



NATO Treaty's

Civil Preparedness is anchored in Article 3 of the alliance's founding treaty. In the context of article 3 the aim is to increase the state of resilience of the alliance and especially to enable individual NATO member countries to resist a potential threat.

*"In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack"*⁷

At the NATO Warsaw Summit 2016. The heads of the NATO states decided to make a commitment to enhance NATO's resilience and to develop individual and collective capacity to resist any form of armed attack.

*"In this context, we are today making a commitment to continue to enhance our resilience against the full spectrum of threats, including hybrid threats, from any direction. Resilience is an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and effective fulfilment of the alliance's core tasks"*⁸

Why NATO deals with Resilience through Civil Preparedness?

Recognizing that the modern, global environment is characterized by uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity⁹. New efforts are urgently needed that extend traditional activities at territorial defence and deterrence. Therefore it is crucial to develop modern approaches to build a society's capacity to anticipate and resolve disruptive challenges to its critical functions, and to prevail against direct attacks if necessary.¹⁰

The need for Resilience through Civil Preparedness is re-appearing not just because the landscape of conflict has changed, but also because the modern conflicts now, target all aspects of states and societies.¹¹ NATO forces rely on civilian assets to enable rapid deployment and support operations across alliance territory. Decades of over-reliance on private sector capabilities have left gaps in the alliance's ability to support military operations.

⁷ NATO. (1949). "The North ATLANTIC Treaty". Washington D.C. NATO. (2016). "Warsaw Summit Communiqué".

⁸ (2016). "Warsaw Summit Communiqué".

⁹ Conference Paper. (2017). "Interdependency in Resilience. Building resilience – Collaborative proposals to help nations and partners". Norfolk. Allied Command Transformation. p. 2

¹⁰ Kramer D., Binnendijk H., Hamilton D. (2015). NATO's New Strategy: Stability Generation. Washington DC. Atlantic Council and Center for Transatlantic Relations. p. 8.

¹¹ Zekulic V., Godwin C., Cole J. (2017) "Reinvigorating Civil-Military Relationships in Building National Resilience". RUSI Journal.

Why does NATO military has to deal with Resilience?



90% of military transport is accomplished using civilian assets, over 50% of satellite communications used for defence purposes are provided by the commercial sector, 75% of host nation support to NATO operations is sourced from local commercial sources. Therefore understanding that there is a lack of awareness of the additional demands that major scale NATO operations will place on nations' critical infrastructure and services in times of crisis or conflict, particularly during a collective defence scenario. Although NATO forces should possess the capabilities to sustain themselves, coordination is required to avoid civilian system failures having cascading effects on military ability to conduct operations.

NATO's approach towards Resilience through Civil Preparedness

Fundamental elements of Resilience through Civil Preparedness can already be found in **1949 North Atlantic Treaty in Article 3 and 5**. The need to resist threats through self-help and mutual aid was present since 1949.¹²

During the Cold War, NATO strongly encouraged national civil defence policies of allied nations, recognizing that these national activities supported the ability of allies to help themselves and offer mutual aid when required.¹³ With the fundamental security changes after the Cold War, focus on and funding for civil defence activities by NATO waned as alliance vulnerability was seen to shift from within the alliance to the borders of NATO's territory.¹⁴

The **Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC)** established in 1950's and located in the NATO HQ in Brussels, is NATO's top advisory body in the area of civil defence. In 2016 they conducted two classified reports on the state of Resilience in NATO and how to enhance resilience through Civil Preparedness¹⁵. Subsequently CEPC analysed and identified the most common security threats to NATO. In the next step these threats were converted to the BR *for national resilience* (BR) through Civil Preparedness.

At the **Warsaw Summit 2016**, NATO leaders agreed to enhance alliance Resilience **"to the full spectrum of threats"**. This commitment was made as an acknowledgement of the changing nature of security challenges facing alliance members. Also the key-leaders of the NATO states agreed to the BR *for national resilience* and to take measures to implement those.¹⁷ The BR *for national resilience* represent the backbone of NATO's approach towards Resilience through Civil Preparedness, and provide indicators for the NATO nations on which they can measure their current state of resilience and identify possible gaps and areas for improvement.¹⁸

¹² NATO. (1949). "The North ATLANTIC Treaty". Washington D.C.

¹³ Prior, T. (2017). "NATO pushing Boundaries for Resilience". CSS Analysen in Security Policy. No. 213/09/2017. Zurich.

¹⁴ Prior, T. (2017). "NATO pushing Boundaries for Resilience". CSS Analysen in Security Policy. No. 213/09/2017. Zurich.

¹⁵ Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC). (2016). "Report on Enhancing Resilience through Civil Preparedness". PO(2016)024 (NC).

¹⁶ CEPC. (2016). "Report on the State of Civil Preparedness. PO(2016)0057 (NC).

¹⁷ NATO. (2016). "Warsaw Summit Communiqué."

¹⁸ CEPC (2016). "FACTSHEET ON BASELINE REQUIREMENTS FOR NATIONAL RESILIENCE AND RESILIENCE GUIDELINES". Brussels





1. Assured continuity of government and critical government services	the ability to make decisions, communicate them and enforce them in a crisis.
2. Resilient energy supplies	back-up plans and power grids, internally and across borders.
3. Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people	able to de-conflict these movements from NATO's military deployments.
4. Resilient food and water resources	ensuring these supplies are safe from disruption or sabotage.
5. Ability to deal with mass casualties	ensuring that civilian health systems can cope and that sufficient medical supplies are stocked and secure.
6. Resilient civil communications systems	ensuring that telecommunications and cyber networks function even under crisis conditions, with sufficient back-up capacity.
7. Resilient transport systems	ensuring that NATO forces can move across alliance territory rapidly and that civilian services can rely on transportation networks, even in a crisis.

These seven requirements apply to the full crisis spectrum, from an evolving hybrid threat all the way up to the most demanding scenarios introduced by alliance planners.¹⁹



¹⁹ Shea J. (2016). "Resilience: a core element of collective defence". NATO REVIEW magazine.





Good Governance (GG) – The first of the *NATO BR for National Resilience*²⁰ is the assured continuity of government and critical government services. Having Good Governance builds up trust in the governmental institutions, increases the reliability of the preparedness strategies, guarantees the sustainability and increase of Resilience and provides a sense of public safety.

Building Integrity (BI) – Corruption is a security risk and can have negative impacts on the resilience if not taken into account during Civil Preparedness. The impacts can involve unreliability of available resources, decreased efficiency of local security forces, and reduction of public trust.²¹ During planning phase introducing principles of integrity, transparency and accountability is fundamental to achieve efficient and sustainable results in the recovery period.²²

Cultural Property Protection (CPP) – Cultural Property (CP) can be destroyed or damaged intentionally or as a collateral damage during natural disasters or security threats. The damaging of cultural heritage can affect a community's identity and resilience. To be prepared to act and protect the CP is important to keep the social, ethnic and religious identity cohesive and strong.²³

Protection of Civilians (POC) – The POC includes efforts to avoid, minimize and mitigate negative effects of conflicts on the civilian population, comprehending persons, objects and services²⁴. In the *NATO BR for national resilience* is a focus on the security of critical civilian infrastructure and the continuity of essential services²⁵.

Children in armed conflict (CAAC) – The protection of children in armed conflict is important to achieve resilience, and civil preparedness plays a big part in it. Resilient children, prepared to respond and bounce back from disruptive events, contribute to a stronger and disaster-prepared society.²⁶

Women, Peace and Security (WPS)²⁷ – The different roles of women and men in society can influence how they divide responsibilities during disasters and emergencies, usually leaving women with survival disadvantages compared to men. The WPS agenda indicates the need for an increased participation of women in mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, their protection in emergency and humanitarian situations and for the importance of including a gender perspective into disaster preparedness planning to achieve effective and sustainable results.

²⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 2016. "Warsaw Summit Communiqué." AJP 3.19, Annex B, B-16

²¹ AJP 3.19, Annex B, B-16

²² CCOE. Building Integrity Factsheet 2018

²³ AJP 3.19, Annex B, B-11

²⁴ AJP 3.19, Annex B, B-2

²⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 2016. "Warsaw Summit Communiqué."

²⁶ AJP 3.19, Annex B, B-5


²⁷ IFRC (2003) Gender perspectives: A collection of case studies for training purposes.

https://www.preparecenter.org/sites/default/files/topics/gender_perspectives_ifrc.pdf





Resilience through Civil Preparedness Stakeholders



Nations

Building resilience starts and conducts on national ground. NATO nations have defined *the NATO BR for National Resilience*, and allied nations will have to make the necessary arrangements to be able to implement these resilience requirements. All the way horizontally across the government and the private sector; and vertically from the highest level of national governments down to state, county, and municipal level.²⁸

Trident Juncture Exercise 2018:

NATO's largest exercise in recent years, is also the alliance's first military exercise to officially include substantial civil preparedness elements and to practice cooperation between the military and the civilian authorities. Specific events have been integrated in the exercise program, including simulated mass casualty incidents, evacuation drills, CBRN emergencies, taking care of evacuated civilians, and crisis management.²⁹

Private Sector

The private sector is one of most important stakeholders in the Resilience through Civil Preparedness field. As mentioned before in the Info sheet (see point. 2. why is NATO military dealing with Resilience through Civil Preparedness) NATO's military capabilities rely heavily on civilian assets. Therefore effective Resilience through Civil Preparedness building requires active engagement by the private sector, which, as stated out before, owns most infrastructures critical to essential societal and military functions.

NATO Nations need to employ wider incentives, strengthening and expanding their engagement with the commercial sector: to share insights on vulnerabilities and risks, to help highlight inherent interdependencies and promote collaboration. The problem-solving ability of the private sector and their importance as the drivers of innovation is a critical factor in building Resilience through Civil Preparedness.

²⁸ Meyer-Minnemann, I. (2017) "Resilience and Alliance Security: The Warsaw Commitment to Enhance Resilience". Forward Resilience: Protecting Society in an Interconnected World Working Paper Series. John Hopkins University. Center for Transatlantic Relations.

²⁹ NATO (2018) "Norway uses Exercise Trident Juncture to strengthen its national resilience". https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_160130.htm?selectedLocale=en



NATO



In NATO several entities are dealing with Resilience through Civil Preparedness.

In the **NATO Headquarter** in Brussels, **CEPC** is the main responsible NATO body. In 2016 CEPC defined the BR for National Resilience and guidelines. The reports on the state of Resilience in NATO member states are also conducted by CEPC. As civil preparedness remains mainly a nations responsibility, NATO is able to support allied nations and nations from the partnership for peace framework in enhancing their resilience. If there is request from a nation, CEPC can support these efforts with the deployment of a resilience advisory team.³⁰

The **NATO Allied Command Transformation Headquarters** (NATC HQ) in Norfolk USA, is currently developing the “Collaborative Resilience (CoRe)” concept. The concept aims to recognize, assess and quantify NATO military forces dependencies on national civilian critical infrastructure/services. Furthermore CoRe tries to create a common understanding how the shortfalls/failure of civilian capabilities (infrastructure, assets, both public and private owned) will affect military operations. Additionally the last desired outcome of the CoRe project is to develop guidance to enhance national resilience levels to support NATO operations in an article 5 scenario.³¹

The **NATO Allied Command Operations** in Mons, announced recently the designated areas of responsibility for the BR for national resilience within Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) level with J9 as the overall coordinator and contact to NATO HQ and CEPC.

Population

As all disasters are firstly local, civil preparedness starts with the individual level.

Individual civil preparedness should enable a single person, in a crisis/emergency situation or in occurrence of a dangerous event being able to deal with the consequences from the start of the crisis to the arrival of support. The competence to personal emergency management and civil preparedness must be learned by any person before the occurrence of the hazardous event. This includes the development of the knowledge and capabilities required for this purpose as well as the procurement and storage of the necessary equipment and food/water supplies.³² As the empowerment of personal and community preparedness remains mainly a national responsibility, NATO is able to support the nations on request.

It is crucial to create awareness that resilient individuals contribute to a country's overall Resilience.

Strategic Partners

In paragraph 83 of the **2016 NATO Warsaw Summit Communiqué**, it is stated that “NATO will continue to pursue cooperative security through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations”. NATO's main strategic partners for Resilience through Civil Preparedness are the European Union and the United Nations.

³⁰ NATO. (2011). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50093.htm

³¹ Conference Paper. (2017). “Interdependency in Resilience. Building resilience – Collaborative proposals to help nations and partners”. Norfolk. Allied Command Transformation. p. 2

³² Lauwe P. et al. (2017). „Verhinderung und Vorbereitung“. In: Karutz H., Geier W., Mitschke T. (eds) Bevölkerungsschutz. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg



The European Union



(EU) remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. The Warsaw Summit Communiqué (2016) outlines concrete actions both organisations intend to take together to counter hybrid threats. These include measures to bolster resilience by: Intensifying staff contacts on resilience requirements with promoting coherence between the NATO Defence Planning Process and the EU Capability Development Plan. Aiming to be ready to deploy experts upon request to support NATO allies or EU member states.

Further coordinated work streams need to be explored, particularly looking at interdependencies between civil authorities, military and the private sector. Interdependencies range from the reliance of the military on civilian logistical and telecommunication capabilities to the reliance of civil authorities on military capabilities for handling disruptive events.

The EU Global Strategy speaks of resilience as “a broad concept encompassing all individuals and the whole of society” that features “democracy, trust in institutions and sustainable development, and the capacity to reform”.

The Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external action (2017) recognizes the need to move away from crisis containment to a more structural, long-term, non-linear approach to vulnerabilities, with an emphasis on anticipation, prevention and preparedness.

Areas of commitment which focus on the security of the EU are:

- resilience against hybrid threats
- cyber-security
- strategic communication
- enhancing the security of critical transport infrastructure
- counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism
- further developing cooperation with NATO and OSCE.

The EU Civil Protection mechanism coordinates disaster preparedness and prevention activities of national authorities and contributes to the exchange of best practices. Moreover, resilience is a central objective of the EU’s development and humanitarian assistance. The strategic importance of resilience is also reflected in the EU’s Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises (2018), which expands the scope and ambition of the Comprehensive Approach.³³

United Nations

Practical cooperation between NATO and the UN include topics such as crisis assessment and management, civil-military cooperation, training and education, tackling corruption in the defence sector, civilian capabilities, promoting the role of women in peace and security, the protection of civilians, including children in armed conflict, combating sexual and gender-based violence, the fight against terrorism.³⁴

³³ A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external action. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. Brussels, 7.6.2017, JOIN(2017) 21 final.

https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/join_2017_21_f1_communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v7_p1_916039.pdf.

Council Conclusion on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises – Council Conclusions (22 January 2018)

https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/2018-01-cn-conclusions_on_ia.pdf.

³⁴ NATO (2019) “Relation with the United Nations”. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50321.htm





Some United Nations programs and agencies have greater prominence regarding Civil Preparedness to achieve or enhance Resilience. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) disaster risk reduction efforts happen through partnerships with countries to strengthen national and subnational policy, legal and institutional systems, foster greater coherence of Disaster Risk Reduction and climate adaptation efforts, provide access to risk information and early warning systems, and strengthen preparedness and response measures.

Together, these efforts strengthen the resilience of countries and urban and rural communities.³⁵

Emergency preparedness is understood by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as the knowledge and capacity developed by governments, recovery organizations, communities and individuals to anticipate, respond to and recover from the impact of potential, imminent or current hazard events, or emergency situations that call for a humanitarian response. OCHA's Emergency Preparedness contributes to civil preparedness before a disruptive event and to enhance resilience over time.³⁶

Potential CIMIC contribution and task to Resilience through Civil Preparedness

- To ensure the relevance of the Resilience through civil preparedness topic in all force activities.
- To advise the commander on Resilience through civil preparedness.
- To establish liaison with non-military actors related to the topic.
- To monitor, assess, prepare and evaluate resilience BR shortcomings
- To provide assessments on the impact on the mission of incidents occurring in the field of Resilience through civil preparedness.
- To provide advice IOT ensure a cross-functional, comprehensive, and coherent situational awareness and understanding of the civilian environment and its impact on the situation and military operations in AOR.
- To know where a population COG/where to gravitate the population
- To assess the state/region or the designated Area of Operation (AOR) Civil Preparedness status
- To identify the potential impacts (how these effect your individual commander's mission)
- To assess the risks for the military mission
- To coordinate with to other staff sections like J2/J3/J4 JENG/JMED/CBRN and higher and lower HQ to advise on mitigation of the negative impact to the military mission.

³⁵ UNDP. <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/climate-and-disaster-resilience/disaster-risk-reduction.html>

³⁶ OCHA. <https://www.unocha.org/themes/preparedness-and-risk-management>

CIMIC Reporting Groups possible cross-walks to resilience baseline requirements	
Baseline requirements	CIMIC Reporting Groups ³⁷
Assured continuity of government	DELTA: Civil Administration Law & Order –police – detention facilities –border & customs local authorities and civil administration capability banking/economy telecommunications & media, emergency services
Resilient energy supplies	ALPHA: Key Civil Life Support power –water –sanitation –food –health
Ability to deal with uncontrolled movement of people	BRAVO: Humanitarian Issues shelter –HA de-mining, FOM , protection/security – minorities & vulnerable groups – IDP and Refugees movements and assistance centres
Resilient food and water supplies	ALPHA: Key Civil Life Support power –water –sanitation – food –health
Ability to deal with mass casualties	ALPHA: Key Civil Life Support power –water –sanitation – food –health
Resilient communications systems	DELTA: Civil Administration Law & Order –police – detention facilities –border & customs local authorities and civil administration capability –banking/economy – telecommunication & media, emergency services
Resilient transport systems.	CHARLIE: Key Civil Infrastructure road and rail network – civil aviation – public transport assets



CCOE contribution to Resilience through Civil Preparedness current status

In the 2019 BI-SC COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF DISCIPLINES, NATO makes clear that Civil Preparedness is not a new single discipline in NATO and will be included, due to its strong Civil-Military links, in the Civil-Military Cooperation discipline. Therefore, CIMIC Centre of Excellence who is the Department Head of Civil-Military Cooperation discipline is responsible for coordinating Civil Preparedness training and education.³⁸

Training and Education status

The Crisis Management and Disaster Response Centre of Excellence organised a trial course in 2018, which led to the development of the first NATO course, which addresses the topic on strategic level and is planned to take place in Sofia in December 2019. It is an outcome of a collaborative effort of the Crisis Management and Disaster Response Centre and CIMIC Centre of Excellence.

The CIMIC Centre of Excellence in close coordination with Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCBS) developed an Operational Level Module on Resilience that is included in the NATO CIMIC Higher Command Course since December 2018. This module has been developed to be an exportable module (can be used as stand-alone) for Training of Operational Level HQs.

³⁷ AM 086 001-001 (CIMIC TTPs) TTP 01, currently under revision

³⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 2018. "2019 BI-SC COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF DISCIPLINES".