III. CIMIC in operations
3.3. CIMIC support in offensive and defensive land tactical operations
CIMIC support during offense activities (attack)
Attack implies the advance into the Deep, uncontrolled territory that has been controlled by the enemy before. While this has implications for all CIMIC levels of command, the BDE supporting CIMIC unit is the first CIMIC asset that is physically confronted with it. At the same time, it is the one that faces the most challenging operating environment along all critical factors: tempo, time available, lethality, intensity, and HN capability. On Top, the Rear will be extending during attack as long the boundaries of the BSM are not adjusted; this typically happens when a tactical objective is reached.
Figure 3.6 - Scheme of considerations for a CIMIC unit in support of a brigade during attack.
In the Deep:
Despite the challenge of not reaching physically into the deep, it is necessary to acquire as much information as possible to support the attack. Information requirements which cannot be answered by own sources through existing liaison networks, need to be sent as a Request for Information (RFI) to higher levels of command. CIMIC personnel on these levels might have better access to information about the Deep due to liaison networks on a higher level and more time available.
Critical information requirements (non-exclusive) for the Deep are (most of these requirements are provided by the higher command level:
1) Population centres and numbers of residents?
2) CIMIC sites of significance?
3) Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)?
4) Population movements?
5) Attitude of population?
6) Unfriendly elements within the civil environment/ Resistance?
CIMIC's main contributions to the deep are informing manoeuvres and fires to support FoM/ FoA and mitigate harm. The available information also paves the ground for the Close as soon as the territory has been taken.
In the Close:
The deep will eventually become the close. The exact location of the CIMIC Units might greatly depend on the particular situation in the operating environment. However, it appears reasonable that they can operate in the same area and under the same protection as supply elements of the BGs. Thus, they can follow the assault forces between the echelon forces and the reserve. Regarding CFI, the CIMIC personnel of higher echelons eventually need to support the BDE CIMIC units with corroboration of information and further A&A.
Besides and FoM/ FoA, stabilising the taken area and keeping it stable is of utmost importance. There are several factors that are relevant for the Close (formerly Deep) during attack:
1) Uncontrolled population movement
2) Territory/ population:
a. Liberated occupied territor
i. HN presence and capability
ii. Posture of population
iii. Duration of occupation
iv. Enemy actions during occupation
v. Extent of replaced authorities
b. Enemy core territory
i. Attitude of population
ii. Security
iii. Resistance
iv. Cooperation authorities
v. Coordination of authorities for the purpose of FABN and services
3) Civil Situation
a. 7BLR
i. Minimum:
1. Food
2. Water
3. Medical
a. Immediate responsibility for “life, limbs, eyesight”
4. Shelter
4) Basic services
a. Security
b. Governance
5) Mitigate harm
a. Get people out of harms way
i. DPRE/ POW/ CPERS/ endangered persons
ii. Rally Points
6) Facilitate access to basic needs (FABN)
7) Populace control
Population movements within the BDE close are the most significant risk to FoM/ FoA during attack. In particular, since they are likely uncontrolled at the last minute. Further, it is difficult to inform the population beyond the FEBA on how to behave during the attack, and it is not sure that the enemy will evacuate the civilian population upfront.
In the worst case, the enemy will do the opposite, as examples from recent warfighting have demonstrated. One should assume that people do not run towards fighting but away from it. However, some might fail to do so and find themselves caught between the lines. Anyway, soldiers on the frontline have to expect the sudden appearance of civilians in harm's way. As the situation allows, they have to make them aware of the next rally point in the Rear, which they can reach relatively safely.
For this purpose, the CIMIC unit needs to contribute to the identification of rally points in coordination with other stakeholders—if applicable, primarily with the HN or any other non-military organization—or, if none at all, with the G3 and G5 only. Rally points are the first step in getting people out of harm's way.
All the factors listed above need to be reconnoitered if the information is not available by other means or provided by a higher level of command. For the latter, the information still needs to be corroborated as feasible. The time factor during an attack does not allow a deep reconnaissance. However, if timely information is required, CIMIC teams might conduct it as well and comprehensively as possible – even if not complete. Therefore, objectives of CIMIC-related reconnaissance have to be prioritized: Population centres (as feasible within force protection) are prime. Those with information gaps and/ or are most critical for decisions come first.
In the Rear:
The Rear must be stabilized and kept stable. During attack, the BDE rear area quickly extends since the BDE BGs are focused on the fight and cannot deal with an extending AO, and the DIV rear area will only be adjusted step by step in intervals.
As it is further away from the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA), the security situation is more favourable than on the BDE AO; DPRE rally, and collection points must be established here, preferably with the HN. If HN authorities are not available or capable, the force needs to identify if there are IOs/ NGOs available and capable of establishing collection points. If not, the force needs to take care of it.
One main task for the CIMIC unit during attack is to prepare in coordination with HN or other organisations for the controlled and uncontrolled population movements, from the FEBA through the DIV AO into the more stable corps rear area.
Provided information needs to be corroborated, preliminarily processed and handled by rear elements.
However, the CIMIC team's availability, tempo, and available time might restrict the feasibility of what can be done and what cannot. During high-tempo and deep attacks, the BDE CIMIC units will likely not be able to do much more than recce and report. Subsequently, CIMIC units of higher echelons will have to follow up on the situation and react to it.
Detailed coordination of these tasks is highly situation-dependent and will be part of the DIV planning and guidance by the DIV G9.
CIMIC support during defence (block and delay)
Ideally, defence activities happen after thorough preparation. Notwithstanding that defensive activities and operations can happen without prior proper preparation when tactical activities change from offensive to defensive (e.g. after the culmination of an attack or after seizing the objective in an offensive operation), defensive activities still provide the advantage that own forces know the terrain and as such CIMIC personnel know at least parts of the civil environment. In a prepared defence, the presence of the HN can also be expected to have almost full capability to control the populace, including evacuation and movements, and fulfill its obligations for basic needs and services.
Figure 3.7 - CIMIC support to defence operations
In the Deep:
Critical information requirements (non-exclusive) for the Deep are:
1) Population Centres?
2) CIMIC sites of significance?
3) Critical national infrastructure (CNI)?
4) Population movements?
One of the main tasks of CIMIC to activities in the deep during defense is informing fires/ targeting by considering the mentioned information requirements.
If defensive operations change from block to delay, the previous Close gradually becomes the Deep. Hence, all required knowledge and understanding should be developed upfront, before the start of the delay.
In the Close:
Defence offers the advantage of relatively stable boundaries in the BSM and proper presence of the HN with likely enough capabilities to manage the civil environment challenges. Although, it must be considered that HN capabilities could be stressed and/ or partially be overstretched, due to enemy hybrid activities in the AO. This risk will increase with the duration of the conflict. However, in principle, preparing for a defence operation offers the best circumstances for CIMIC to support shaping the civil environment. Nevertheless, this also depends on the time available – meaning early deployment will contribute to more preparedness.
In preparation for a planned or unplanned delay activity/ operation, all knowledge development and coordination requirements must be met upfront of the execution.
The following civil environment factors are critical for the defence:
1) HN plans to control population movements
a. Planned evacuations (including cattle and removable infrastructure)
b. Planned evacuation routes and means
c. Planned hosting facilities for DPRE?
d. Plans to control spontaneous/ ad hoc/ last minute movements/ “self evacuations”
i. Rally points
ii. Collection points
2) Protection of CNI
3) CIMIC sites of significance
4) Resistance plans of HN
5) Plans to withdraw HN authorities and capabilities
6) Road conditions
The CIMIC Staff needs to facilitate the answers to these information requirements through their liaison network. Eventually, higher echelons can deliver some responses.
In the Rear:
During defensive operations, the rear has the same information requirements, roles, and tasks as those close to the front line. In the event of a delay, the CIMIC Staff must prepare for the transfer of the civil environment due to the reorganisation of the BSM