III. CIMIC in operations
3.2. CIMIC in the Battle Space along levels of command and the geographical framework
While the battle space in previous NATO crisis response operations was often organised in a non-linear way (see Figure 3.5), warfighting, in particular kinetic combat operations, is characterised by linear battle space management. Figure 3.4 depicts a symbolized extract of a warfighting corps’ battle space. Visible is approximately one-third of a corps (“northern”) AO. The levels of command are indicated by the respective command posts’ military symbols and by the military symbol of the respective supporting CIMIC unit. To reduce complexity, the figure lacks a lot of other significant information. Several other coordination lines, units, activities, civil administrative boundaries and other information of the civil environment would overcrowd the sketch but are usually included on tactical maps. However, this figure serves as a basic sketch to better visualize CIMIC in the battle space and serves throughout this chapter for better orientation:
“where we are” and “what we talk about”.
Figure 3.4 - Linear BSM
Figure 3.5 - Non-linear battle space management
There are five principal complementing comments about this type of BSM:
First observation: Obviously, CIMIC units are employed in the rear areas of corps, divisions and brigades. The mission of such CIMIC units depends on the tactical activity of the supported unit (offensive/ defensive/ stability or enabling activity).
Second observation: The deep is a challenge for CIMIC units since they cannot physically reach there but need to gain information about it, in particular for CIMIC contributions to targeting, for information on possible DPRE movements, and in particular to support offensive operations with information (CIMIC sites of significance, civil situation, etc.).
Third observation: The higher the level of supported command, the deeper reaches the deep into enemy-controlled territory. This means that CIMIC units and HQ personnel of divisions and corps need to identify ways to gain information on the civil environment of these deep areas. (e.g. indirect access through liaison networks, recce elements, special operations forces and information of the higher command level).
Fourth observation: Stability activities and enabling activities are the predominant tactical activities in the rear area for each level of tactical command, while offensive and defensive activities are conducted in the close area. Tempo, as one of the critical factors in kinetic combat operations (see above), determines the time for conducting stability activities in the respective rear areas. The time available will gradually decrease from corps to division to brigade – depending on the tempo of
the respective tactical activity.
Fifth observation: In stability operations and during defence (block), the battlespace and AO boundaries remain relatively stable. However, in offensive operations and in dynamic defence (delay), rear areas increase or shrink and eventually boundaries and coordination lines will shift what might trigger a handover takeover of the “civil environment factors and actors” from one to another HQ, the CIMIC Staff of the respective unit has to take care of that. This happens faster from brigade to division than from division to corps. Division and corps supporting CIMIC units have to expect a significantly extending rear area in offense and a significant shrink during delay operations before adjusting boundaries.